CIA

CIA

To attempt to understand the roll of the CIA in world affairs, one must always keep in mind the era in which the CIA began to operate — the Cold War — that time after the end of World War II when Stalinist Russia was looking to expand its communist doctrine to any country that would listen to the sales pitch. was sold on capitalism and was committed to stopping the spread of communism — sometimes at the ultimate cost.The beginning*Gathering intelligence about enemies real or suspected has been a part of the American fabric since the days of George Washington. This cat-and-mouse game is ostensibly intended to help countries prepare their defensive forces for invasion by foreign entities.However, depending on one's point of view, agencies operating in the gray area of international intrigue sometimes interpreted directives from the top levels of government differently from what was originally intended. It is within the gray area that covert operations take on a bigger-than-life persona.The early 1940s

Even prior to the Pearl Harbor Attack by the Japanese, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt had expressed concerns about the lack of coordination between the State and War departments, regarding intelligence sharing and cooperation.In July 1941, six months before the attack, Roosevelt recruited William Donovan, a New York attorney, to devise America's first peacetime intelligence organization. Donovan was appointed to the role of Coordinator of Information (COI) and director of the nondepartmental organization.The attack on Pearl Harbor suggested the role of COI should be re-thought. The result was the creation, in June 1942, of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which would gather and analyze information requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and "conduct special operations not assigned to other agencies."The OSS, however, was not granted total authority over global matters. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), a branch of the FBI, had been created in 1940 to take responsibility for intelligence work in Latin America. That was viewed by some as counterproductive to the goal of centralizing the entire intelligence community of foreign affairs.When World War II ended, Harry S. Truman, who ascended to the presidency after Roosevelt's death in April 1945, saw no reason for the OSS to continue operations, and he officially disbanded the unit in October of that year. In actuality, however, most of the counterintelligence functions were transferred back to the State and War departments, though to a lesser degree.Truman, however, soon realized that a centralized system for intelligence was needed after all, if the United States were to keep tabs on the Soviet Union and their own intelligence arm, the KGB. He sifted comments from a number of strategic agencies, including the State Department and the FBI. That led, in January 1946, to the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). The group was responsible for "providing strategic warning and conducting clandestine activities."About two years later, another restructuring of the intelligence department occurred. The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA was to “coordinate the nation’s intelligence activities and correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence which affects national security and to perform other duties and functions related to intelligence as the NSC might direct.” The head of the CIA was given the title of Director of Central Intelligence, or DCI, and is appointed by the president.The CIA in world affairs

Since its inception, rumor and innuendo have obscured the CIA and its operations in a shroud of mystery. Accusations about the agency have included conspiracies to assassinate foreign leaders unsympathetic to western wishes for democratic rule by the people of the country in question.The new vocabularyThose living in the gray area developed an extensive new vocabulary to describe the various intricacies and nuances of their operations. The CIA's own definition of "covert action" is "any clandestine or secret activities designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of U.S. foreign policy conducted in such manner that the involvement of the U.S. Government is not apparent."Other "buzz words" and phrases include:

  • proprietaries,
  • political action,
  • black or white propaganda,
  • invisible government,
  • disinformation,
  • counterespionage,
  • counterinsurgency,
  • subversives,
  • sabotage,
  • proliferation,
  • Third World,
  • clear and present danger,
  • psychological, biological, bacteriological, radiological, and chemical warfare,
  • LSD and other hallucinogenic, mind-altering drugs,
  • Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty,
  • expropriation,
  • paramilitary,
  • plausible deniability,
  • secret army,
  • neutralize,
  • body count quotas,
  • case officers,
  • weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and
  • “precipitate conditions leading to the assassination of....”
  • Proprietaries were legitimate businesses owned by the CIA and used as a base for espionage and covert operations; Radio Free Europe, Air America, Air Asia, and Civil Air Transport are examples.Propaganda is “intended to undermine the beliefs, perceptions, and value systems of the people under the rule of the adversary government.” An example of black propaganda occurred when, in October 1964, the CIA circulated an anti-Islamic pamphlet in Egypt, making it seem as though the Soviets had done it.Plausible deniability was an action designed to keep the president of the United States out of the loop regarding any covert activity that may have gone wrong, even though the president knew of the general shape of the plan.It works in the following way: A president indirectly communicates “his desire for a sensitive operation” to personnel in a meeting. That creates a “blank check” for CIA leaders who are determined to carry out the president’s wishes. Instead of keeping the president informed of the progress of the action, however, the information is kept internalized.An example of how the concept works is the Iran-Contra Affair of the 1980s. It was discovered that Lt. Colonel Oliver North, and others, were funneling the proceeds of arms sales to Iran to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua who were attempting to oust the left-wing Sandinistas. It was thought by those conducting the operation, that then president Ronald Reagan didn’t know of any wrongdoing and could “plausibly deny” any such knowledge to the public.The intense media and congressional feeding frenzy eventually got to the truth of the matter —Reagan did, in fact, know about the scandal and couldn’t convince the public that he had no knowledge of it.To “precipitate conditions leading to the assassination of (target),” the CIA would attempt to undermine the government of a Third World (underdeveloped) country that was thought to be sympathetic to communism. The propaganda barrage would attempt to sway the masses into a state of revolt, which would then lead to a military coup and resultant deaths of the country's leader and his supporters.Operations: the good, the bad, and the uglyTwo of the earliest significant CIA operations occurred in Iran in 1953 when the established government was overthrown (because of the British notion that Iran was about to nationalize its oil industry), and the Shah of Iran was reinstated from exile. The other was in Guatemala in 1954, where Operation PBSuccess was organized to oust a president, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, who was sympathetic to the communists, in favor of pro-west candidate Carlos Enrique Castill Armas.Other than its incipient involvement in South Vietnam following the First Indochina War in 1954, those two “successes” for the CIA were followed by a period of little activity in the western hemisphere until Fidel Castro, a left-leaning rebel who led a revolt against the government of Fulgencio Batista, took control of Cuba in 1959.That development prompted the U.S. and the CIA to develop a plan to replace Castro with a pro-American figure. In 1961, the plan, now known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion, was initiated. Due to poor communications between the ground force and the air support arm of the plan, the invasion was repelled and resulted in the humiliation of the United States and the CIA on a worldwide stage.Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the CIA turned its attention to the Cuban buildup of ballistic missiles. With the aid of Russia and Czechoslovakia, Cuba began to install missiles for “defensive purposes.” In October 1962, during a CIA-owned U-2 flyover of San Cristobal, it was discovered that nine missile sites were being loaded with Russian SS-4s and SS-5s, which had a range of about 2,500 miles — far enough to reach nearly every major city in the U.S.That discovery led to the Cuban Missile Crisis.The CIA’s involvement in Southeast Asia began in the mid-1950s when they coordinated the “Secret Army” in Laos to fight the “Secret War” against the communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese as a part of the Vietnam War. The fear was that if Laos fell to left-wing forces, Thailand would be next and the whole of Southeast Asia would fall to The Domino Theory. The effort was assisted by the CIA’s own fleet of aircraft known as “Air America.”In Latin America in 1973, the CIA aided Chilean nationalists in their fight to oust leftist Salvador Allende. Various sources report that Allende was either killed by the coup leaders or committed suicide before they got there.The Church CommitteeThe wild and unbridled covert campaigns of the CIA would come under microscopic scrutiny, however, by the “Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,” a.k.a. the Church Committee, so named after its chairman, Frank Church of Idaho.What was uncovered during the sessions shocked even the most knowledgeable of government officials.Cryptic “projects,” “operations,” and “programs,” were code names for covert operations.The code names included “Project NKNAOMI,” which established a covert support base. “Project MKULTRA” was used to develop chemical, biological, and radiological weapons.“Project Bluebird” dabbled in mind control — some procedures were used on CIA agents, or “case workers,” some with the agent’s permission, some without. The project was later renamed “Artichoke,” to expand the scope of the experiments.Those experiments had code names, as well. Projects “Chatter,” “Third Chance,” and “Derby Hat” delved into “truth serums,” LSD, and other mind-altering chemicals.The CIA’s “Operation Mongoose” was a plan to assassinate Castro as early as 1959, shortly after Castro came to power.The “Phoenix Program,” which operated from 1962 to 1965, was intended to help South Vietnamese officials recruit and train police forces and paramilitary units for the defense of their country.The aftermathThough controversies continue to plague the agency, the CIA continues to “battle the forces of evil.”Following the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, DCI George Tenet disclosed a “top secret” document dubbed the “Worldwide Attack Matrix,” which revealed the CIA’s plan to combat terrorist activities in 80 countries. The activities were quoted to be from “routine propaganda to lethal covert action in preparation for military attacks.”Criticisms of the agencyThe CIA has taken criticism for a number of failures, notably its ineffective intelligence gathering. They include allowing a double agent, Aldrich Ames, to infiltrate the organization to the extent of gaining a high-level security clearance. Failing to predict the fall of the Soviet Union, the Trade Center and Pentagon disasters, India’s nuclear tests, and the agency’s presentation of data describing Iraq’s stockpile of WMD as unsupportable by available intelligence, are among the most recent faultfindings.


    *It is not within the scope of this article to examine, in depth, all of the operations in which the CIA has been either known to have been, or thought with good reason to have been, involved. Some of the included examples are public information (with the passage of the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 and subsequent amendments). As is necessary and timely, events are not in chronological order.


    Records of the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]

    Established: In the National Security Council, effective September 18, 1947, pursuant to the National Security Act (61 Stat. 495), July 26, 1947.

    Predecessor Agencies:

    • Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCOI, 1941-42)
    • Office of Strategic Services (OSS, 1942-45)
    • Strategic Services Unit (SSU), Office of the Assistant Secretary of War (1945-46)
    • Central Intelligence Group, National Intelligence Authority (NIA, 1946-47)

    Functions: Advises the National Security Council and other Executive branch agencies concerning intelligence matters. Coordinates federal intelligence activities and provides centralized services for other agencies. Develops and disseminates intelligence, counterintelligence, and foreign intelligence information. Engages in intelligence and counterintelligence activities outside the United States.

    Finding Aids: Harry Schwartz, comp.,"Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Central Intelligence Agency," NM 40 (1964) supplement in National Archives microfiche edition of preliminary inventories.

    Security-Classified Records: This record group may include material that is security-classified.

    Related Records:
    Record copies of publications of the Central Intelligence Agency in RG 287, Publications of the U.S. Government.
    Records of the Office of Strategic Services, RG 226.
    Records of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, RG 262.

    263.2 General Records of the Central Intelligence Agency
    1894-1980

    History: Office of the Coordinator of Information established with the appointment of William J. Donovan as COI by Presidential order, July 11, 1941, to collect and analyze intelligence information and make it available to the President and selected agencies. Simultaneous with the transfer of Foreign Information Service Branch of OCOI to newly established Office of War Information, by EO 9182, June 13, 1942, remaining OCOI units were redesignated Office of Strategic Services by Presidential military order, June 13, 1942 placed under Joint Chiefs of Staff jurisdiction and given responsibility for both collecting and analyzing intelligence, and planning and executing special operations. OSS abolished, effective October 1, 1945, by EO 9621, September 20, 1945, with intelligence research, analysis, and graphic presentation functions transferred to Department of State, and general intelligence functions transferred to newly established Strategic Services Unit of Office of the Assistant Secretary of War.

    Central Intelligence Group established under the National Intelligence Authority by Presidential directive, January 22, 1946, to plan and coordinate foreign intelligence activities. By National Intelligence Authority Directive 4, April 2, 1946, NIA assumed supervision of the SSU dissolution during spring and summer 1946, assigning some components to Central Intelligence Group at request of Director of Central Intelligence, and effecting incorporation of the remaining units into other War Department organizations. SSU officially abolished by General Order 16, SSU, October 19, 1946.

    Central Intelligence Group and National Intelligence Authority abolished by National Security Act, which created the CIA, 1947. SEE 263.1.

    263.2.1 Intelligence studies

    Textual Records: Study of the Soviet espionage network in Europe ("Rote Kapelle," 1936-45), 1973. Study of intelligence and counterintelligence activities on the eastern front during World War II (1941-43), n.d. Study of German intelligence activities in the Near East prior to and during World War II (1938-44), n.d.

    263.2.2 Records of the Historical Staff

    Textual Records: Unclassified (sanitized) version of CIA historian Arthur B. Darling's The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950 (CIA Historical Series, HS-1), 1953 CIA historian Ludwell Lee Montague's General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950- February 1953 (CIA Historical Series, DCI-1), 1971, the latter with index George S. Jackson's and Martin P. Claussen's Organization History of the Central Intelligence Agency, May 1957 and Wayne G. Jackson's Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, 26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961 (HRP 91-2/1), 1973. Formerly security-classified Historical Staff collection of primary source materials used in the compilation of security-classified CIA histories ("History Source Collection," 96 ft.),1946-73. Background records relating to Organization History of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1950-1953, by George S. Jackson and Martin P. Claussen (DCI Historical Series, HS-2). Background papers for CIA staff officer Thomas F. Troy's Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (1981), 1940-80. The Raymond E. Murphy Collection on International Communism, 1917-58.

    263.2.3 Records of the Shanghai Municipal Police

    Textual Records: Investigation files, 1894-1947 (50 ft. and 67 rolls of microfilm). Records relating to espionage activities in Shanghai, 1926-48. Microfilm copy of Russian emigrant registration cards and certificates, 1940-52 (16 rolls). Microfilm copy of Tsingtao registration forms, 1946-49 (4 rolls).

    Microfilm Publication: M1750.

    263.3 Records of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and its Predecessors
    1941-74

    History: Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service established in the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) by Presidential directive, February 26, 1941, to record, translate, and analyze foreign radio broadcasts. Redesignated Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service by FCC order, July 28, 1942. Transferred to the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, by order of the Secretary of War, December 30, 1945 and to the Central Intelligence Group, National Intelligence Authority, August 5, 1946. Renamed the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, October 31, 1946, and Foreign Broadcast Information Branch, December 31, 1946. Transferred to CIA, and assigned to Directorate of Intelligence, September 25, 1947. Redesignated Foreign Broadcast Information Division, December 13, 1950, and transferred, as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, to the Directorate of Science and Technology, July 1, 1965.

    Textual Records: Daily transcripts and summaries of monitored foreign radio broadcasts, and daily teletypes of material selected for transmission to government agencies, 1947-48 (144 ft.). Summaries, miscellaneous reports, and notes of broadcasts, 1947-48. Daily reports, 1941-59. Transcripts of monitored broadcasts relating to the Vietnam War, 1957-74 (114 ft.).

    Related Records: Records of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, RG 262. Record copies of publications of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (CIA) in RG 287, Publications of the U.S. Government.

    263.4 Records of the Foreign Documents Division
    1920-60

    Textual Records: Scientific information reports, 1958-60. Reports relating to Soviet bloc International Geophysical Year activities, 1958-60. Index of names from selected German documents captured during World War II, 1920-45 (21 ft.). Reference materials relating to German documents during World War II, 1933-45. Captured Italian registers of suspected foreign intelligence agents in Italy, 1920-40.

    263.5 Textual Records (General)
    1946-93

    Selected records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, 1964-93. Unclassified Directorate of Operations personality files on Lee Harvey Oswald, 1963-93 and Raoul Wallenberg, 1945-93. Office of National Estimates publication, "The Law and Custom of the National Intelligence Estimate" by Sherman Kent. Estimates of the Office of Research and Estimates (ORE), 1946-50. National intelligence estimates concerning the Soviet Union, 1950-83 and Soviet military power, 1956-84. Directorate of Intelligence records relating to CIA reporting on the Soviet Union, 1957-79. Miscellaneous studies, 1954. Team A/Team B estimates of Soviet offensive threat, 1976. Articles, 1955-92, from Studies In Intelligence. Studies and other records relating to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in Guatamala, 1952-54. Records relating to the paramilitary Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, 1961. Daily calendars and telephone logs for Directors Sidney Souers and Hoyt Vandenberg, 1946-47.

    Subject Access Terms: Kennedy, John F. Oswald, Lee Harvey Wallenberg, Raoul Cuba Bay of Pigs.

    263.6 Cartographic Records (General)
    1971-86
    440 items

    Maps: Published maps of various countries, showing topography, population, administrative divisions, land utilization, economic activity, and ethnology, 1971-86.

    263.7 Motion Pictures (General)
    1952
    3 reels

    Films alleging the use of bacteriological or germ warfare by the United States during the Korean War, produced by the Peking Film Studio (with English-language narration) and by the National Film Studio of North Korea (English-language subtitles), 1952.

    263.8 Sound Recordings (General)
    1963-64
    1 item

    Audiotape of Lee Harvey Oswald on the WDSU radio station program "Carte Blanche."

    Bibliographic note: Web version based on Guide to Federal Records in the National Archives of the United States. Compiled by Robert B. Matchette et al. Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1995.
    3 volumes, 2428 pages.

    This Web version is updated from time to time to include records processed since 1995.


    1. Operation Paperclip

    Operation Paperclip

    Operation Paperclip was a CIA program to recruit German scientists with an intention to brainwash them and prepare them to serve in the U.S. In 1945, the U.S. President Harry Truman ordered the execution of the plan on condition to exclude those found ‘to have been a member of the Nazi Party’¦’ This would have excluded almost all of the German scientists. Therefore, the CIA white washed the public profiles of the German scientists and tailored their biographies to serve their purpose. About 1600 scientists legally migrated to the U.S. These scientists played an undeniable role in the realization of the U.S.’s ballistic missile technology and space programs. The success of Operation Paperclip was, therefore, one of the most valuable services rendered by the CIA.


    Intelligence, Policy, and Politics: The DCI, the White House, and Congress

    Crafting an Intelligence Community : Papers of the First Four DCIs

    Admiral Sidney W. Souers, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter and General William Bedell Smith accepted President Harry S. Truman’s challenge to craft an intelligence organization. Each man marked his tenure with his unique brand of leadership that provided his successor with the foundation needed for the next step toward the Central Intelligence Agency of today.

    The Crafting of an Intelligence Community collection of 800+ Agency documents along with 600 supplemental items shows the day-by-day activities, decisions, staff meetings and contacts that confronted each DCI. They ran the gamut of choosing a secretary to responding to a Presidential question to an evening social event with various ambassadors and dignitaries.


    10 Dirty Secret CIA Operations

    We&rsquove always loved to discuss some of the shadier dealings of the government and the military&mdashand no organization provides more fodder for these discussions than the American Central Intelligence Agency.

    The CIA has a way of very publicly blowing their cover&mdashseeming to pop up wherever turmoil, strife, and political unrest materialize. Despite being almost synonymous with dirty tricks, the Agency has essentially been given free rein, permitted to use whatever tactics they see fit to deal with any (real or perceived) threat to American interests.

    If there&rsquos one thing we know about absolute power, it&rsquos that it corrupts absolutely and if there&rsquos one thing we know about the CIA, it&rsquos that the astoundingly unethical and criminal projects highlighted in this list are probably just the tip of the iceberg.

    PBSUCCESS was the code name for a CIA-backed coup led against the democratically elected government of Jacobo Arbenz, the President of Guatemala, in 1954. It&rsquos one of the first in a long line of suspected or acknowledged CIA interventions in the governments of foreign countries, and it was indeed a tremendous success from the Agency&rsquos point of view.&mdashthe first indication that such a feat could be accomplished relatively smoothly.

    Elected in 1950, Arbenz set about instituting reforms aimed at making his country self-sufficient, by giving huge chunks of government land back to citizens. This rubbed the US Government the wrong way, as much of this land was &ldquoowned&rdquo by the United Fruit Company, a truly evil corporation with which the Eisenhower administration was snugly in bed at the time (CIA director Allen Dulles and his brother John, the Secretary of State, both had strong ties to the company).

    The Agency snidely referred to Arbenz policies in internal memoranda as &ldquoan intensely nationalistic program of progress colored by the touchy, anti-foreign inferiority complex of the &lsquoBanana Republic.&rsquo &rdquo In other words, non-dependence on the US and its allies was not to be tolerated.

    Four hundred and eighty CIA-trained mercenary soldiers, led by exiled Guatemalan military officer Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, forcibly wrested Guatemala from Arbenz&rsquo control. While he and his aides were able to flee the country, CIA documents show that &ldquothe option of assassination was still being considered&rdquo right up until the day he resigned on June 27, 1954.

    After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the Agency&rsquos public image was worse than ever. President Kennedy famously proclaimed that he would &ldquosplinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds&rdquo (shortly before getting shot, but we digress). But to deal with Cuba, he turned to the only person he knew he could trust: his brother, Robert, who organized Operation Mongoose. This operation was conducted by the Department of Defense in conjunction with the CIA, under Robert Kennedy&rsquos supervision. He told his team at its first briefing that deposing Castro was &ldquothe top priority of the US government&mdashall else is secondary&mdashno time, money, effort, or manpower is to be spared.&rdquo

    Among the dozens of extremely silly methods of assassination proposed: infecting Castro&rsquos scuba gear with tuberculosis planting exploding seashells at a favorite diving site slipping him a poisoned fountain pen and even even poisoning or slipping a bomb into one of his cigars. Castro&rsquos bodyguard asserted that there were hundreds of CIA schemes on Castro&rsquos life&mdashand they all ended in failure, a gigantic waste of time and money. Castro was Cuba&rsquos dictator for forty-nine years, stepping down in 2008 due to failing health, and appointing his younger brother as his replacement.

    President Sukarno ruled Indonesia from 1959 until 1966, when he was deposed by Suharto, one of his generals. Sukarno had been deemed pro-Communist by the CIA, which meant there would inevitably be an attempt to oust him or at least make him look bad&mdashbut the plot they actually came up with was truly laughable.

    The CIA produced a porno film starring a Sukarno look-alike, titled &ldquoHappy Days&rdquo, for distribution in Indonesia. Not that the culture generally frowns upon such things, but as the CIA understood it, &ldquobeing tricked, deceived, or otherwise outsmarted by one of the creatures God has provided for man&rsquos pleasure cannot be condoned&rdquo in Indonesian culture, and &ldquowhat we were saying was that a woman had gotten the better of Sukarno.&rdquo The film went as far as production, and stills were made, but for some reason (perhaps common-sense) it was never deployed.

    Bizarrely enough, this idea resurfaced shortly before the Second Gulf War, when the CIA suggested that a fake gay porno featuring Saddam Hussein or Osama Bin Laden be produced in order to discredit these men in the eyes of their followers. This went nowhere&mdashat least one official claiming that nobody would care. &ldquoTrying to mount such a campaign would show a total misunderstanding of the target. We always mistake our own taboos as universal when, in fact, they are just our taboos.&rdquo

    The May 2011 raid that killed Osama Bin Laden was the result of an insane amount of intelligence collecting and planning regardless of his crimes, conducting a US military operation to kill a foreign national on Pakistani soil was bound to have myriad consequences. A courier had been tracked to an Abbottabad compound, where it was pretty damn certain Bin Laden was hiding. But before conducting the raid, they had to be absolutely sure&mdashand one method of collecting this proof was shady in the extreme.

    The CIA recruited a respected Pakistani doctor to organize a fake vaccination drive in the town, and in the process collected thousands of blood samples from children in the area children&mdashamong them, as it turned out, Bin Laden&rsquos children. Since theirs was a fairly upscale section of town, the campaign began in a poorer area to make it look more authentic, then moved on to the neighborhood housing the Bin Laden compound a month later&mdashwithout even following up with the required second or third doses in the poor area. The whole thing worked&mdashwith consequences.

    For one thing, Dr. Shakil Afridi&mdashthe doctor involved&mdashhas been convicted of treason by the Pakistani government and given a thirty-three-year prison sentence (&ldquoWouldn&rsquot any country detain people for working for a foreign spy service?&rdquo one Iranian official helpfully pointed out). For another, the campaign has caused irreparable damage to organizations that carry out legitimate vaccinations. There are deep-seated suspicions in many Middle Eastern regions about those who provide vaccinations, and this gambit to assist in finding Bin Laden has only bolstered those suspicions&mdashparticularly in Nigeria, India and of course Pakistan, where efforts to eradicate polio are ongoing.

    February 2011 saw the beginning of the Libyan Revolution, which would culminate in the August ousting of Libyan dictator Muammar el-Qaddafi, followed by his capture and killing in October. There was little mention at the time of any potential involvement by foreign interests&mdashbut about one year later, an incident occurred which shed a curious light on the entire Revolution.

    On September 11, 2012, an American diplomatic mission in Benghazi came under attack by armed militants. The response came not from within the mission itself, but from half a dozen CIA agents deployed from a hidden base within the city. More reinforcements arrived from Tripoli, and diplomatic personnel where whisked by convoy to chartered aircraft which carried them out of the country.

    This betrayed a CIA presence in the city, which had hitherto been unknown. The Agency was forced to admit that it had maintained a fairly strong presence in Libya since about February 2011&mdashright around the time the Libyan Revolution began. The annex which had housed the secret base was scrubbed clean and abandoned after the incident at the mission.

    Operation Mockingbird was a bit of a two-pronged approach to dealing with the media: on the one hand, journalists were routinely employed by the CIA to develop intelligence and gather information, or to report on certain events in a way that portrayed the US favorably. On the other, there were actual plants within the media&mdashpaid off with bribes or even directly employed by the CIA&mdashto feed propaganda to the American public.

    Mostly, this program was meant to convince the public of how incredibly scary Communism was, and to make sure that public opinion favored taking out the Red Menace at any expense. Even scarier was the fact that having major newspaper publishers and the heads of TV stations bought and paid for meant that significant overseas events could be excluded from coverage in the media&mdashevents like the aforementioned coup in Guatemala, which didn&rsquot see the light of the day in the American press at the time.

    Congressional hearings in 1976 (the &ldquoChurch Committee&rdquo) revealed that the CIA had been bribing journalists and editors for years. Following the Church hearings, newly minted CIA director and future President George H.W. Bush announced: &ldquoEffective immediately, the CIA will not enter into any paid or contract relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station.&rdquo Yet he added that the CIA would continue to welcome unpaid, voluntary support of said journalists.

    Protests against US involvement in Vietnam were proving to be a giant pain in the backside for the government&rsquos plans in the mid 1960s. While Mockingbird was busily using the mainstream to try to shove the necessity of the war down the throat of the public, the &ldquocounter-culture&rdquo couldn&rsquot be controlled so easily. Ever-mindful of the KGB&rsquos propensity for their own style of dirty tricks, the CIA attempted to weed out any foreign influence on the American anti-war movement by launching Operation CHAOS&mdashand they didn&rsquot even bother to come up with an innocuous-sounding code name.

    Since the FBI&rsquos COINTELPRO program of domestic surveillance wasn&rsquot quite producing the desired results, President Lyndon B. Johnson authorized the CIA to undertake its own program of spying on US citizens. Their main task was to infiltrate student organizations&mdashboth radical and otherwise&mdashin order to gather intelligence on potential foreign influences, and to subvert such groups from within. Famous groups such as &ldquoStudents For a Democratic Society&rdquo and the Black Panthers were targeted eventually, the program for some reason expanded to include women&rsquos liberation and certain Jewish groups.

    There is strong evidence that this type of activity has never ceased, though CHAOS itself was shuttered after the Watergate scandal. In 2011, the Agency came under fire for allegedly working with the New York Police Department to conduct surveillance of Muslim groups in the area, who had not done anything wrong and who are now suing in Federal court.

    Phoenix was a program headed by the CIA, in conjunction with US Special Forces and Australian and South Vietnamese commandos, during the Vietnam War. Its purpose was simple: assassination. And although this was a military unit, their targets weren&rsquot military, but civilian.

    From 1965 to 1972, Phoenix was involved in the kidnapping, torture, and murder of thousands upon thousands of citizens. People deemed critical to the infrastructure of the Viet Cong, or thought to have knowledge of VC activities, were rounded up and taken to regional interrogation centers, were they were subjected to: &ldquorape, gang rape, rape using eels, snakes, or hard objects, and rape followed by murder electric shock . . . rendered by attaching wires to the genitals or other sensitive parts of the body, like the tongue the &lsquowater treatment&rsquo the &lsquoairplane&rsquo in which the prisoner&rsquos arms were tied behind the back, and the rope looped over a hook on the ceiling, suspending the prisoner in midair, after which he or she was beaten beatings with rubber hoses and whips the use of police dogs to maul prisoners&hellip&rdquo

    Phoenix was the subject of 1971 Congressional hearings on abuse. Former members described it as a &ldquosterile depersonalized murder program&rdquo, and it was phased out after negative publicity, though the replacement program F-6 was quietly phased in to take its place.

    The success of Operation Ajax paved the way for all future CIA operations of a similar nature. It resulted in the return to power of the Shah in 1953, after a military coup planned by American and British intelligence.

    The first democratically-elected leader of Iran, Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, was seen as a potential liability because of his plans to nationalize the oil industry. Fearful of having to compete with the Soviet Union for Iranian oil, the decision was made to install a leader who was partial to US interests. You can probably see a theme developing here.

    CIA agents Donald Wilber and Kermit Roosevelt Jr. (the grandson of Theodore Roosevelt) carried out the campaign by bribing everybody who could be bribed in Iran: government officials, business leaders, and even street criminals. These recruits were asked to support the Shah, in various ways, and to oppose Mossadegh.

    It worked: an uprising was instigated, Mosaddegh was jailed, and pro-Western Iranian Army General Fazlollah Zahedi was installed in his place. Zahedi had been arrested by the British during World War Two for attempting to establish a Nazi government, and he lived up to that legacy by appointing Bahram Shahrokh&mdasha protege of Joseph Goebbels&mdashas his director of propaganda.

    In 1978, Afghanistan became mired in civil war as two Communist parties seized control of the country. When it began to look like anti-Communist rebels were gaining a foothold, the Soviet Union invaded the country to lend support. And that&rsquos when the US, of course, decided to get involved.

    The CIA set up camps to train the rebels, known as Mujahideen, in the necessary tactics for beating back the Soviets. Advanced weaponry was also part of the deal, including&mdashimportantly&mdashStinger surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles. Soviet airstrikes had driven hundreds of guerrillas out of the cities and into the surrounding hills, and mitigating the effectiveness of those strikes proved to be essential in prolonging the conflict, placing a great strain on Soviet resources.

    The Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan almost until its collapse in the early 1990s, but the legacy of the Mujahideen lives on. The CIA are finding their own tactics and training turned against them by Mujahideen veterans who have begun their own training programs, producing highly trained and skilled terrorists who now make up the backbone of Al-Qaeda and other radical groups. The US discovered these ramifications the hard way after invading Afghanistan in 2001. The invasion led to a quagmire of an occupation, which&mdashas of this writing&mdashhas dragged on for just as long as that of the Soviets.

    Floorwalker has a blog and Twitter you can stick it to the man by following.


    4. The Unabomber’s brother partly blames the CIA for his actions

    Ted Kaczynski, better known as the Unabomber, is one of America’s most notorious criminals, who commenced a bombing campaign across the nation through the 1970s until the mid-1990s.

    Kaczynski was actually involved in a CIA-funded study at Harvard University that saw undergraduate students humiliated for their opinions and beliefs. David Kaczynski, Ted’s brother, wonders if his involvement may have influenced some of his crimes.


    CIA - History

    JFK and the Diem Coup
    JFK tape reveals high-level Vietnam coup plotting in 1963

    Washington, D.C., August 26, 2009 - The Central Intelligence Agency participated in every aspect of the wars in Indochina, political and military, according to newly declassified CIA histories. The six volumes of formerly secret histories (the Agency's belated response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request by National Security Archive senior fellow John Prados) document CIA activities in South and North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in unprecedented detail. The histories contain a great deal of new material and shed light on aspects of the CIA's work that were not well known or were poorly understood. The new revelations include:

    • The CIA and U.S. Embassy engaged in secret diplomatic exchanges with enemy insurgents of the National Liberation Front, at first with the approval of the South Vietnamese government, a channel which collapsed in the face of deliberate obstruction by South Vietnamese officials [Document 2 pp. 58-63].
    • As early as 1954 that Saigon leader Ngo Dinh Diem would ultimately fail to gain the support of the South Vietnamese people. Meanwhile the CIA crafted a case officer-source relationship with Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu as early as 1952, a time when the French were still fighting for Indochina [Document 1, pp. 21-2, 31].
    • CIA raids into North Vietnam took place as late as 1970, and the program authorizing them was not terminated until April 1972, despite obtaining no measurable results [Document 5, pp. 349-372].
    • In 1965, a time when the South Vietnamese regime was again in conflict with the Buddhist majority, the CIA secretly funded Buddhist training programs [Document 2, p. 38].
    • CIA involvement in South Vietnamese elections goes beyond what has been previously disclosed, and matches the scope of the agency's controversial 1960s political action program in Chile [Document 2, pp. 51-58].
    • In the later period of the war, according to the CIA's own historian, Saigon leader Nguyen Van Thieu's mistrust of the United States increasingly focused on the CIA [Document 2, p. 87].
    • The CIA historian, contrary to neo-orthodox arguments regarding progress in the Vietnam war, concedes that U.S. pacification efforts failed in Vietnam&mdashincluding the so-called "Phoenix" program&mdashand traces this failure to several causes, including South Vietnamese lack of interest and investment in this key facet of the conflict [Document 3, p. xv-xvi].
    • The CIA was aware from the very early 1960s of the problems posed by Laotian drug trafficking to its Laos campaign, but not only took no action, it did not even make drug trafficking a reporting requirement until the Nixon administration declared war on drugs [Document 5, p. 535].

    The CIA's Vietnam Story
    By John Prados

    The Central Intelligence Agency's Vietnam war history actually begins in 1950, when agency officers moved to French Indochina as part of the United States legation in Saigon. During the French war in Indochina the CIA's involvement grew to encompass a base in Hanoi but not much more, since the French did not encourage CIA activity. The French tamped down further after an incident in which CIA officers were revealed as reaching past them to open channels to Vietnamese nationalists. When the lands of Indochina&mdashVietnam, Laos, and Cambodia&mdashbecame independent "associated states" the CIA expanded its activity somewhat, and during the last year of the French war, 1953-1954, agency involvement grew considerably as the French were obliged to accept U.S. assistance with unconventional warfare activities as a condition of expanded military aid from the Eisenhower administration, and with the use of CIA proprietary aircraft of Civil Air Transport (later Air America) in Laos and at Dien Bien Phu.

    Starting with the Geneva agreements of 1954 the CIA's role expanded further and began to assume the shape it would keep through the remainder of the Indochina wars. Agency stations were created in South Vietnam and Laos, an agency base remained in North Vietnam until the spring of 1955, and the CIA was represented in Cambodia until that nation broke relations with the United States in 1963 (a CIA station in Cambodia was created following U.S. intervention there in 1970). Besides its crucial importance in gathering intelligence and providing interpretations of events in Indochina, the agency was arguably as important as the U.S. embassy in political relations with the South Vietnamese government. Moreover, as the primary action agency for counterinsurgency through most of the war, it actually conducted a full-scale war in Laos and ran a variety of paramilitary programs in South Vietnam. The agency's broad span of activities reached into virtually every aspect of the Indochina war.

    The newly declassified CIA histories cover much but not all of this ground. Despite their massive size&mdashalmost two thousand pages in six volumes&mdashthe histories leave out significant pieces of the story. The most notable lack is any substantial treatment of U.S. intelligence analysis on Indochina, although a complementary study by General Bruce Palmer, Jr., published in 1984, dealt with intelligence estimates in some detail and the reports themselves have since been declassified. (Note 1)

    The present set of monographs nevertheless stand as the broadest recounting of CIA operational experience in the Southeast Asia conflict, a substantial achievement for their author, Thomas Ahern, a clandestine services officer who served during the war in both South Vietnam and Laos. Ahern began work on the series in the early 1990s, completed the first in 1998 and finished the last of the series in 2006.

    Some discussion of the individual studies appears below. In terms of overall scope, Ahern began with South Vietnam, with a discussion of CIA's role during the high years of the war and the crisis of the final evacuation from Saigon. Published in October 1998 under the auspices of the agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, Ahern's CIA and the Generals deals with the agency's political action programs, its role in elections, in secret negotiations, and CIA liaison with the South Vietnamese government from 1964 through the end of the war in 1975. Ahern's second monograph, CIA and the House of Ngo (June 2000), returns to the dawn of the American involvement and covers the same ground for the period of the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem, which ended late in 1963. The third volume in the series, CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam (August 2001), bridges both eras and focuses in on operational programs that attempted to gain the loyalty of Vietnam's peasantry for the Saigon government or to neutralize the parallel hierarchy of the insurgents, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. In February 2004 the Center for the Study of Intelligence put out Ahern's more limited monograph, Good Questions, Wrong Answers: CIA's Estimates of Arms Traffic Through Sihanoukville, Cambodia, During the Vietnam War. In this study Ahern comes closest to reviewing intelligence analysis, although most of his treatment of the subject remains redacted in the version of this document that the CIA recently declassified.

    Another specialized study followed in May 2005, The Way We Do Things: Black Entry Operations into North Vietnam, in which Thomas Ahern turns his attention to CIA efforts to mount clandestine espionage and sabotage missions into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, primarily in the period until 1963, although there is some treatment of later efforts. By far the longest of the Ahern narratives is his 2006 monograph on the CIA in Laos, Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos, 1961-1973, in which he deals with the full panoply of agency activity in that landlocked Southeast Asian nation.

    All of these studies provide much detail, although, as noted, they are thin on some aspects of CIA's work. Aside from intelligence analysis, the CIA monographs contain little on early agency activities during the French war, on the organization and function of the agency's Saigon Station, on intelligence collection (excepting specific cases of particular operatives, and the question of collection on Sihanoukville), on its activities in Cambodia (except as just mentioned), on CIA coordination with the U.S. military, on its relations with agency proprietaries like Air America, or (except in the case of CIA missions into North Vietnam) on the specifics of CIA's cooperation with South Vietnamese police and intelligence services. Nowhere in these many pages will the reader discover a figure for the overall number of CIA officers who served in the Vietnam war or on the agency's casualties in that conflict.

    A second problem is the deletion of materials which CIA censors continue to keep secret. This is a particular difficulty with Ahern's monographs on North Vietnamese operations, the Sihanoukville intelligence dispute, and the volume on Laos. The Sihanoukville study, in particular, is so heavily redacted that readers may fail to grasp the story. (Note 2) The monograph on pacification was previously declassified in 2007. A comparison between that version of Ahern's study and the one released in 2009 reveals that the bulk of materials protected by CIA censors in their earlier redaction are of purely historical interest. It can only be hoped that censors today are protecting true national security secrets.

    Document 1: Thomas L. Ahern, CIA and the House of Ngo: Covert Action in South Vietnam, 1954-1963,. Center for the Study of Intelligence, June 2000, 231 pp. SOURCE: FOIA

    This volume covers the early years of the agency's work in Vietnam, and ends with the South Vietnamese military coup that overthrew Saigon leader Ngo Dinh Diem, of which the CIA was aware if not complicit and the Kennedy administration was involved. The CIA historian stops short of any admission that the agency was an actor in the Diem coup. Except in minor details this CIA monograph does not go much beyond what is already in the public record. (Note 3) One minor detail of interest is that, as late as the morning of the day the Diem coup actually occurred, the U.S. military command in South Vietnam advised CIA that nothing was happening in Saigon and that the agency should stop reporting that any coup was imminent [p. 207]. Among other highlights this CIA history notes that agency experts recognized as early as August 1954 that Diem would have political problems, that the CIA went beyond headquarters guidance&mdashand effectively set policy for supporting Diem&mdashand that its relationship with his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu began as early as 1952 [pp. 21-31]. The CIA history concludes that the "most fateful episode" in the agency's relationship with Diem came not at the time of the 1963 coup but during a Saigon political crisis in the spring of 1955 [p.75]. By October 1958, before the communist insurgency in South Vietnam had even begun, CIA had assessed that Diem's popularity was in decline [p. 127]. In fact, in its overall conclusions the CIA history argues that "the near-destruction of the Communist apparatus in the countryside, between 1955 and 1959, resulted not in the consolidation of Saigon's control, but in the creation of a political no-man's land," and further that "whatever the possibilities in 1955, it is possible that by 1963 the conflict could not be won at all, or at least by any politically sustainable level of American commitment" [p. 219].

    Document 2: Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., CIA and the Generals: Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam, Center for the Study of Intelligence, October 1998, 243 pp. SOURCE: FOIA

    This volume of the CIA history picks up where the first one leaves off, providing an overview of CIA efforts from the moment of Diem's 1963 assassination to the fall of Saigon in 1975. Roughly a third of the entire study is devoted to the two-year period after the Paris Accords of 1973 and the trauma of the evacuation of Saigon, which agency sources regard as the highlight of the work. (Note 4)

    The CIA history nevertheless packs a host of important material into its condensed account of the decade that followed Diem's rule. The account shows that the CIA's relationship with Saigon leaders changed over time, depending on the agency's station chief, the U.S. ambassador, and the South Vietnamese leaders involved. In the final period from about 1969, when Nguyen Van Thieu led the Saigon government, "Thieu's mistrust of the U.S. increasingly focused on the CIA" [p. 87] in spite of numerous agency efforts to support him through political action, propaganda, and advice.

    Among the highlights in this volume are material on the CIA and South Vietnamese Buddhists&mdashwhom the CIA secretly supported and trained in 1965, shortly before the Saigon government launched a campaign against them, and whom the agency did not view as communist-instigated [pp. 38, 43, 101]. The agency's involvement in South Vietnamese politics resumed in 1966 with cash subsidies to Saigon police accounts that had been drained to support loyalists for Saigon leaders and continued with substantial involvement in the South Vietnamese elections of 1967 and 1971&mdashat far greater levels than anything previously disclosed [pp. 45, 51-58, 100-102]. Agency involvement went beyond cash to include using CIA agents to feed ideas to South Vietnamese leaders, openly providing suggestions for a political platform, supporting individual candidates, using agents to counteract charges of electoral fraud, and manipulating the South Vietnamese National Assembly to certify election results.

    Besides its interventions in elections, Ahern believes that the CIA's most important political initiative was its clandestine contact with the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. The CIA history provides a detailed account of a series of feelers early in 1967 and again from late that year, past the Tet offensive, and into February of 1968. Feelers culminated in offers to exchange prisoners which were first approved and then sabotaged by the Saigon government [pp. 47-50, 58-63]. The Tet offensive itself led to a proposal from an informal group of CIA Vietnam experts to present the Saigon government with a virtual ultimatum for reform, an "Operation Shock" [p. 73]. Agency officials differed on what the impact of Tet had been, however. Late 1968 negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam over a bombing halt led Saigon leaders to break off their CIA contacts for more than a month, after which Thieu began to delegate his side of the relationship to other officials [pp. 84-86]. By 1969 the CIA worried that political crisis might lead Thieu&mdashas Ngo Dinh Nhu had once done&mdashto denounce the CIA [87]. In 1971 a Saigon official close to Thieu suggested U.S. officials arrange briefings for him in a way calculated to pressure the United States to crack down on its Vietnam dissenters [104]. Despite some success in anticipating the North Vietnamese offensive of 1972, the agency's last station chief in South Vietnam argued that "the illusion that the war is over and we have won is shattered" [109].

    Document 3: Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam, Center for the Study of Intelligence, August 2001 SOURCE: FOIA

    This volume of the CIA's Vietnam history goes back to the beginning of agency involvement to lay out a record of its efforts in behalf of the South Vietnamese to encourage popular support for the Saigon government. The CIA historian argues that the agency's record shows the CIA "understood the insurgency little better than did the rest of the bureaucracy" [p. xiv]. In fact the Saigon station took the lead innovating pacification measures throughout the conflict, with the headquarters role essentially limited to commentary on Saigon station proposals. The major CIA initiatives through the war are profiled, including early civic action, the village defense program, the formation of mountain scouts, strategic hamlets, people's action teams, census grievance and revolutionary development programs, the intelligence coordination and exploitation program, and the late-war "Phoenix" program&mdashall of which flowed from agency field officers or the Saigon station itself.

    Pacification proved unsuccessful, in the CIA historian's view, partly because South Vietnamese authorities from the beginning were not well established in the villages&mdash80 percent of the government bureaucracy was located in Saigon or in provincial capitals in the beginning [p. 5], and later for reasons ranging from lack of American focus to Saigon obstructionism. During the Diem period the CIA Saigon station's paramilitary chief, a key actor in all pacification activities, is quoted saying, "The Vietnamese official is the real obstacle to success" [p. 59]. In the later part of the war, which the CIA historian views as 1969 to 1975, he concludes that this period "saw the gradual decay of the CIA-sponsored pacification programs, as the Vietnamese elected not to invest in them" [p. xv-xvi]. This conclusion in the CIA's official history contradicts scholarship that argues the National Liberation Front was defeated by pacification success during this late period. (Note 5)

    Document 4: Thomas L. Ahern, Jr. , The Way We Do Things: Black Entry Operations Into North Vietnam, Center for the Study of Intelligence, May 2005, 71 pp. SOURCE: FOIA

    This volume of CIA history, a shorter monograph, centers specifically on agency programs to infiltrate singleton agents and reconnaissance/sabotage teams into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Here Ahern picks up the story from the beginning of the Diem government and focuses primarily on the period until late 1963, when CIA's primary role was ceded to the U.S. military. There is a small amount of material on later cooperation with military programs until 1968, and a bit on late war missions into North Vietnam (greater detail regarding these is actually provided in Document 5). The CIA history shows that the initiation of penetration missions came slowly due in great measure to dilatory South Vietnamese action&mdashthe Diem government and its intelligence agencies repeatedly promised cooperation and then did little to advance the program for months or years. One highlight is that Diem took the seagoing junk the CIA procured and modified for spy missions and leased it to a Japanese fishing company, while claiming success emplacing fictitious agent networks in North Vietnam. Through 1959 agreements on intelligence sharing with CIA plus U.S. support of the South Vietnamese police yielded no data at all [p. 8].

    Once the CIA began mounting its own missions, the first long-term agent inserted into the North initially sent a series of 23 messages to his handlers. This represented "the longest and most prolific radio correspondence for any penetration of the program" [p. 13]. Dozens of subsequent missions and hundreds of commandos sent into North Vietnam, the CIA history makes clear, produced very little intelligence. The study documents multiple cases where assorted elements cast doubt on the continued loyalty or reliability of commando teams while the CIA's Saigon station repeatedly ignored the evidence to maintain the program still had value. An important revelation in this monograph is that the CIA station, in the wake of the Geneva accords of 1962, proposed a covert sabotage offensive against North Vietnam [p. 29-30]. This was a prelude to the OPLAN 34-A effort to coerce North Vietnam which the U.S. adopted at the beginning of 1964.

    Document 5: Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos, 1961-1973, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2006, 593 pp. SOURCE: FOIA

    In what is by far the longest of the CIA histories, Thomas Ahern takes on the ambitious task of examining the front of the Southeast Asian conflict where the CIA waged its own war, a full-service operation in which it served as the main action agency while also supplying its standard covert action and political warfare efforts. The study details the inception and progress of the array of tribal secret armies the CIA recruited in Laos, most prominently that of the Hmong tribe, whose military leader was General Vang Pao. While, in general, this volume is long on combat action it nevertheless passes quickly over certain key events, such as the specific Hmong role in the resumption of the Laotian war in 1963 and the key tipping point of Operation "Triangle," in the summer of 1964, when the U.S. cast off the Geneva restraints. Other important military events of the 1969-1971 period, declassified elsewhere, are shrouded in secrecy here by censors' redactions. The book is best read in conjunction with the Air Force official history of the war in northern Laos, declassified through the Archive's law suit against that agency and which the Archive posted in April 2008. (Note 6) This CIA history is also circumspect on relations within the U.S. embassy, on those between agency managers in Vientiane and in Thailand, on those between the CIA and U.S. Air Force, on the CIA's management of Air America, on the operation of the CIA base at Long Tieng, and on political action in the Laotian twin capitals. The role of Thailand in the CIA war is represented here largely by deleted material even though this has been declassified. Among the highlights of this CIA history is the coverage of drug trafficking in Laos [pp. 535-548], and the treatment of missions into North Vietnam mounted from Laos during 1970-1972 [pp. 349-372].

    Document 6: Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., Good Questions, Wrong Answers: CIA's Estimates of Arms Traffic Through Sihanoukville, Cambodia, During the Vietnam War, Center for the Study of Intelligence, February 2004, 52 pp. SOURCE: FOIA

    Probably the most important intelligence dispute of the Vietnam war in the period after 1968 concerned the importance of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville in supplying North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front (NLF) forces in the lower part of South Vietnam and the base areas located in contiguous parts of Cambodia. The CIA began reporting on the importance of Cambodia to the NLF in 1965, and arms traffic through the port became an issue the following year, with the first of a series of visits by Chinese merchant vessels. The extent of this traffic was debated among U.S. intelligence agencies and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). The dispute became extremely intense, featuring visits to South Vietnam by senior CIA officials, by study groups deputized by the United States Intelligence Board, and a variety of internal debates. The CIA historian was right to have attempted a dissection of this dispute. Unfortunately for the public, much of the dispute remains opaque in this agency monograph, which is so heavily redacted by CIA censors that much of the detail is simply missing. The highlight of this monograph concerns government secrecy: whereas the CIA usually protects the specifics of raw intelligence reporting ("sources and methods"), in the Cambodia case it seems to have released that material and kept secret much of the substance of the intelligence debate on this matter.

    1. General Bruce Palmer, Jr., US Intelligence and Vietnam. Special Issue: Studies in Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1984. Also see Harold P. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968. Central Intelligence Agency: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999. For the estimates themselves see John K. Allen, Jr., et. al, eds. Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948-1975 (NIC 2005-03). Director of National Intelligence: National Intelligence Council, 2005.

    2. For a more coherent account than is available in the declassified portions of Ahern's monograph on this subject see John Prados, "Port of Entry: Sihanoukville," The VVA Veteran, v. 25, no. 6, November-December 2005.

    3. John Prados, Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 105-131. A paperback edition of this book will be published in the fall of 2009 by University Press of Kansas under the title William Colby and the CIA. For the role of President Kennedy see National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book no. 101, "JFK and the Diem Coup," November 5, 2003 (Archive website). For a different view see Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

    4. This section of the narrative should be read in conjunction with Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End Told by the CIA's Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1977. Snepp's account is important here because it provides a contemporaneous perspective and a view from within the U.S. embassy, and because to a degree the CIA historian writes in counterpoint to it.

    5. Lewis B. Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Final Years in Vietnam. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1999.

    6. Victor B. Anthony and Richard P. Sexton, The War in Northern Laos, 1954-1973. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1993. Posted in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 248, "Fighting the War in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973," April 9, 2008.

    A TALE OF OBSESSIVE SECRECY

    Before addressing the substance in the new CIA histories it will be useful to pause and consider what this case also shows about the U.S. Government's broken system for declassifying and releasing records. In actuality, this CIA release was not at all a voluntary contribution to American history, but was compelled by a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Filed in 1992, that FOIA request may be the longest running case in the CIA's files, and its treatment shines a blinding light on how the agency handles its statutory duty to release records. A whole series of questionable actions were taken by the CIA's FOIA officers in handling the materials involved here, in fact a sordid story that only begins with the seventeen years that have been necessary to bring this information to light. Only an agency obsession with secrecy can account for the way in which this FOIA request was treated. At the time of the request none of the governments involved in the war any longer existed&mdasheven the North Vietnamese state had been transformed&mdashthe CIA actors were in retirement, the Vietnam war had entered history, and the most recent events concerned were almost twenty years into the past. By 2001, the time of the CIA's initial response this was even more true, and by 2009 the continued presence of this FOIA request on the agency's books was positively embarrassing.

    The original FOIA request called for "any retrospective study or monograph, or official history" compiled on a series of subjects including operations against North Vietnam from 1960-1975, in Laos between 1958 and 1975, and the same plus administrative histories of the CIA and its stations in South Vietnam, and Laos in the years from 1960 to 1975. The CIA took nine years to respond to this request and when it did so, in early 2001, it replied to the effect that no agency records could be identified that were responsive to the FOIA. Not only did that claim not pass the smell test, dozens of CIA monographs that are directly responsive are cited in footnotes in these newly released histories. This analyst had learned in the interim that the present CIA histories, written Thomas Ahern, were in preparation. In an April 2001 letter appealing the CIA finding I cited these works as examples of materials that were obviously within the scope of the request. In response to my appeal, the CIA released these histories through a letter on February 25, 2009. In the course of its declassification work on this FOIA request the following irregularities have occurred:

    * CIA FOIA officers substituted the Ahern studies for the larger body of materials that were clearly implicated in the FOIA request. This was a matter of policy, not the individual action of a CIA information official. At the time of the request the agency had sought&mdashand received&mdashlegislative approval, under the 1986 CIA Act, to exclude "operational records" from FOIA. It happens that the CIA possesses an extensive collection of histories of its secret operations, both contemporaneous and retrospective. In applying for the operational records exclusion, agency director William J. Casey made explicit promises to Congress that this grant of authority would be accompanied by a much more vigorous at declassifying historical material&mdashof which these "Clandestine Service Historical Papers" are obvious examples. Instead the CIA moved to extend the definition of "operational records to include the histories.

    * The agency also did nothing to fulfill its obligation to review the clandestine service records every ten years with a view to terminating their status as "operational records" Ten year reviews took place in 1996 and 2006 under that requirements but it cannot be said that the Agency has followed the letter or spirit of the law. For example, in its 2006 review, the CIA expanded the scope of Directorate of Operations file series that may be excluded from FOIA, including "Clandestine Service History Program Files" as well as files of the Directorate of Science and Technology and the "Security Center." Conversely, during the period when this FOIA request was pending, the CIA had no problem giving some researchers privileged access to historical material that it would not provide through the FOIA. Favored authors were able to inspect histories of operations against the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe, on psychological warfare and paramilitary operations, on the Bay of Pigs, and on the Berlin Tunnel operation, just to cite cases of which I am aware. At a minimum this establishes that the CIA itself was prepared to disregard the operational records issue when it chose to. In the present FOIA case, the CIA used its shaky legal authority to reject a request for older clandestine service histories substituting the Ahern studies for them.

    * Agency authorities actually released one of the Ahern histories, the volume on Pacification, in 2007. In declassifying that material at that time, the agency did not provide the study to the original FOIA requestor in partial response to the freedom of information case, or even directly inform him that the material had been opened.

    * The recently released histories, in particular the Laos volume, have redacted material on subjects already in the public domain. Excised passages in the Laos history, for example, judging from their context and positioning, must refer to items that were declassified in the corresponding volume of the Foreign Relations of the United States series that was published as long ago as 1999. Since references to the Foreign Relations series make up the vast majority of the limited number of footnotes the CIA declassified in this history, the agency had to be aware of this fact. Fortunately, an Archive FOIA lawsuit against the Air Force forced declassification of an important official history of air operations in Northern Laos, which includes information that some CIA reviewers believed they were keeping secret when they scrubbed this agency Laos history. This illustrates the subjectivity of the review process even at CIA.

    * This author responded to the actual FOIA release by filing an appeal of the deleted material in the Ahern histories that focused on the public domain material and other items that should no longer be construed as secret. The CIA rejected the appeal on the grounds that the right of appeal had been exhausted when objecting to the CIA's arbitrary claim that no Vietnam records existed. In other words, the CIA chose to regard a protest of its administrative action as exhausting the statutory right of appeal on the substance of its actual declassification.

    * Beyond this highly questionable action the CIA failed to supply some missing pages from the Ahern histories even though the requester had noted in his appeal that certain pages of the Ahern histories had unaccountably not been included in the materials released. It is normal practice to supply pages missing from documents.

    * In addition the agency larded its response to the FOIA request by adding many hundreds of pages of declassified National Intelligence Estimates and related documents which had not figured in the FOIA, and had in fact already been released&mdashand published&mdashby the National Intelligence Council on CIA's behalf in April 2005. The only function of this action is to enable the agency to claim the pages as achievements in the official reports it is obliged to file with U.S. authorities on the extent of its declassification activity.

    * Less than a month separates the CIA's response to this FOIA request from its general release to the public of the same material. Because the National Security Archive is dedicated to making information available to the American people, it does not object to this final irregularity,but it should nevertheless be noted. By this action, at a minimum, the CIA has implicitly recognized that release of these records was in the public's interest all along&mdashcalling into question its seventeen year delay in making the material available.

    * Finally, the CIA summarily rejected a subsequent FOIA request for a number of the "Clandestine Service Historical Papers" identified in the Ahern histories&mdashand in doing so it failed to meet the acknowledgement and response deadlines specified in the law. The rejection was on the grounds that these were "operational records."

    These irregularities are not fanciful, they are matters of record, and they illustrate the weaknesses of a FOIA system that largely leaves federal agencies to be the judge of their own action. The agency, it seems, cannot escape from its obsession with secrecy. The Freedom of Information Act makes illegal the "arbitrary and capricious denial" of information but the CIA Act trumps that. Plainly Congress needs to supervise the Agency's actions under the CIA Act to ensure that it conforms to the spirit and letter of the law. This case also points to the need for changes in secrecy policy so that historical information is not treated like today's secrets. A useful change would be oversight by the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) of declassification manuals used by federal agencies. Moreover, a new executive order on secrecy policy could end the CIA's veto over decisions by the Interagency Declassification Appeals panel so it will not have that threat to block declassification action on mandatory review requests.


    Approval by authorities

    In the late 90s, several proprietary CAN-based safety protocols were invented. Survived has the Safetybus p by Pilz, Germany. In the year 1999, CiA started to develop the CANopen-Safety protocol, which has been approved by the German TÜV. After heavy political deputes in the standardization bodies, this CANopen extension (CiA 304) was internationally standardized in EN 50325-5 (2009).

    Devicenet uses the CIP Safety protocol extension. Germanischer Lloyd, one of the leading classification societies worldwide, has approved the CANopen framework for maritime applications (CiA 307). Among other things, this framework specifies the automatic switchover from a default CANopen network to a redundant bus system. These functions are nowadays generalized and specified in the CiA 302 series of additional CANopen application layer functions.


    Yes, the CIA Director Was Part of the JFK Assassination Cover-Up

    John McCone was long suspected of withholding information from the Warren Commission. Now even the CIA says he did.

    Philip Shenon, a former Washington and foreign correspondent for the New York Times, is author, most recently, of A Cruel and Shocking Act: The Secret History of the Kennedy Assassination.

    John McCone came to the CIA as an outsider. An industrialist and an engineer by training, he replaced veteran spymaster Allen Dulles as director of central intelligence in November 1961, after John F. Kennedy had forced out Dulles following the CIA’s bungled operation to oust Fidel Castro by invading Cuba’s Bay of Pigs. McCone had one overriding mission: restore order at the besieged CIA. Kennedy hoped his management skills might prevent a future debacle, even if the Californian—mostly a stranger to the clubby, blue-blooded world of the men like Dulles who had always run the spy agency—faced a steep learning curve.

    After JFK’s assassination in Dallas in November 1963, President Lyndon Johnson kept McCone in place at the CIA, and the CIA director became an important witness before the Warren Commission, the panel Johnson created to investigate Kennedy’s murder. McCone pledged full cooperation with the commission, which was led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, and testified that the CIA had no evidence to suggest that Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin, was part of any conspiracy, foreign or domestic. In its final report, the commission came to agree with McCone’s depiction of Oswald, a former Marine and self-proclaimed Marxist, as a delusional lone wolf.

    But did McCone come close to perjury all those decades ago? Did the onetime Washington outsider in fact hide agency secrets that might still rewrite the history of the assassination? Even the CIA is now willing to raise these questions. Half a century after JFK’s death, in a once-secret report written in 2013 by the CIA’s top in-house historian and quietly declassified last fall, the spy agency acknowledges what others were convinced of long ago: that McCone and other senior CIA officials were “complicit” in keeping “incendiary” information from the Warren Commission.

    According to the report by CIA historian David Robarge, McCone, who died in 1991, was at the heart of a “benign cover-up” at the spy agency, intended to keep the commission focused on “what the Agency believed at the time was the ‘best truth’—that Lee Harvey Oswald, for as yet undetermined motives, had acted alone in killing John Kennedy.” The most important information that McCone withheld from the commission in its 1964 investigation, the report found, was the existence, for years, of CIA plots to assassinate Castro, some of which put the CIA in cahoots with the Mafia. Without this information, the commission never even knew to ask the question of whether Oswald had accomplices in Cuba or elsewhere who wanted Kennedy dead in retaliation for the Castro plots.

    While raising no question about the essential findings of the Warren Commission, including that Oswald was the gunman in Dallas, the 2013 report is important because it comes close to an official CIA acknowledgement—half a century after the fact—of impropriety in the agency’s dealings with the commission. The coverup by McCone and others may have been “benign,” in the report’s words, but it was a cover-up nonetheless, denying information to the commission that might have prompted a more aggressive investigation of Oswald’s potential Cuba ties.

    Initially stamped “SECRET/NOFORN,” meaning it was not to be shared outside the agency or with foreign governments, Robarge’s report was originally published as an article in the CIA’s classified internal magazine, Studies in Intelligence, in September 2013, to mark the 50th anniversary of the Kennedy assassination. The article, drawn from a still-classified 2005 biography of McCone written by Robarge, was declassified quietly last fall and is now available on the website of The George Washington University’s National Security Archive. In a statement to POLITICO, the CIA said it decided to declassify the report “to highlight misconceptions about the CIA’s connection to JFK’s assassination,” including the still-popular conspiracy theory that the spy agency was somehow behind the assassination. (Articles in the CIA magazine are routinely declassified without fanfare after internal review.)

    Robarge’s article says that McCone, quickly convinced after the assassination that Oswald had acted alone and that there was no foreign conspiracy involving Cuba or the Soviet Union, directed the agency to provide only “passive, reactive and selective” assistance to the Warren Commission. This portrait of McCone suggests that he was much more hands-on in the CIA’s dealings with the commission—and in the agency’s post-assassination scrutiny of Oswald’s past—than had previously been known. The report quotes another senior CIA official, who heard McCone say that he intended to “handle the whole (commission) business myself, directly.”

    The report offers no conclusion about McCone’s motivations, including why he would go to lengths to cover-up CIA activities that mostly predated his time at the agency. But it suggests that the Johnson White House might have directed McCone to hide the information. McCone “shared the administration’s interest in avoiding disclosures about covert actions that would circumstantially implicate [the] CIA in conspiracy theories and possibly lead to calls for a tough US response against the perpetrators of the assassination,” the article reads. “If the commission did not know to ask about covert operations about Cuba, he was not going to give them any suggestions about where to look.”

    In an interview, David Slawson, who was the Warren Commission’s chief staff investigator in searching for evidence of a foreign conspiracy, said he was not surprised to learn that McCone had personally withheld so much information from the investigation in 1964, especially about the Castro plots.

    “I always assumed McCone must have known, because I always believed that loyalty and discipline in the CIA made any large-scale operation without the consent of the director impossible,” says Slawson, now 84 and a retired University of Southern California law professor. He says he regrets that it had taken so long for the spy agency to acknowledge that McCone and others had seriously misled the commission. After half a century, Slawson says, “The world loses interest, because the assassination becomes just a matter of history to more and more people.”

    The report identifies other tantalizing information that McCone did not reveal to the commission, including evidence that the CIA might somehow have been in communication with Oswald before 1963 and that the spy agency had secretly monitored Oswald’s mail after he attempted to defect to the Soviet Union in 1959. The CIA mail-opening program, which was later determined to have been blatantly illegal, had the code name HTLINGUAL. “It would be surprising if the DCI [director of central intelligence] were not told about the program” after the Kennedy assassination, the report reads. “If not, his subordinates deceived him. If he did know about HTLINGUAL reporting on Oswald, he was not being forthright with the commission—presumably to protect an operation that was highly compartmented and, if disclosed, sure to arouse much controversy.”

    In the 1970s, when congressional investigations exposed the Castro plots, members of the Warren Commission and its staff expressed outrage that they had been denied the information in 1964. Had they known about the plots, they said, the commission would have been much more aggressive in trying to determine whether JFK’s murder was an act of retaliation by Castro or his supporters. Weeks before the assassination, Oswald traveled to Mexico City and met there with spies for the Cuban and Soviet governments—a trip that CIA and FBI officials have long acknowledged was never adequately investigated. (Even so, Warren Commission staffers remain convinced today that Oswald was the lone gunman in Dallas, a view shared by ballistics experts who have studied the evidence.)


    CIA commemorates 60-year anniversary of one of its most infamous failures in history – Bay of Pigs invasion – with ‘victory’ coin

    &ldquoThis silver coin commemorating an anticipated (but never realized) Bay of Pigs victory features an outline of Cuba with a rebel invader advancing past a fallen member of Castro's military in the foreground,&rdquo the agency tweeted on Tuesday, with a photo of the artifact.

    This silver coin commemorating an anticipated (but never realized) Bay of Pigs victory features an outline of Cuba with a rebel invader advancing past a fallen member of Castro's military in the foreground.#HISTINT#Museum

    &mdash CIA (@CIA) May 25, 2021

    The jokes practically wrote themselves, with one user commenting that &ldquoanticipated but never realized&rdquo victory is an interesting [way] of saying &ldquowe lost.&rdquo

    More than one comment called the coin the CIA version of a &ldquoparticipation trophy,&rdquo referring to the consolation prize doled out at school sporting contests in the US.

    Some responses featured a smiling Fidel Castro smoking a cigar. Castro was the leader of the Cuban revolution, whom the CIA sought to depose through the Bay of Pigs invasion.

    The CIA also failed in an untold number of attempts to assassinate Castro, prompting one commenter to ask if they were releasing coins commemorating those failures, and another to quip: &ldquoThey could never beat the final boss.&rdquo Castro officially retired in 2006 and died in 2016 of natural causes.

    Among the replies was a funny reference to a SU-100, a Soviet tank destroyer that Castro personally used to hit one of the invading ships &ndash according to a plaque at the Museum of the Cuban Revolution in Havana, next to which the vehicle is mounted on a plinth.

    The museum page to which the CIA&rsquos tweet links actually admits that the Bay of Pigs invasion was &ldquoan unqualified disaster&rdquo and that Cuban forces captured or killed most of the 1,400 invaders within three days. It also reveals that the reverse side of the coin &ldquoprominently displays a cross, shield, and the flag of Cuba with the phrases &lsquoCrusade to Free Cuba&rsquo and &lsquoThere will be no end but victory.&rsquo&rdquo

    &ldquoReissue it in a set with a keychain for that goofy assault on Venezuela that was thwarted by fishermen and a very limited edition &lsquoWe created ISIS and the Syrian civil war and all America got was the bill&rsquo T-shirt,&rdquo another user suggested.

    It&rsquos unclear why the agency picked this particular day to bring up the Bay of Pigs, considering that the 60th anniversary of the failed invasion was in mid-April. In any case, the level of mockery rivaled that meted out to the &ldquowoke&rdquo recruiting videos posted on YouTube earlier this month.

    Think your friends would be interested? Share this story!


    More Comments:

    Harvey Wallbanger - 1/1/2009

    "The damage done to the CIA by [this] congressional oversight regime is quite extensive."

    Mr Knott is an "Assistant" Professor at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia.

    He might as well have an art degree from Tallahasee Junior College.

    Congressional oversight of the CIA is not only proper, the leaks are the pressure valve of a true democracy and expose the worst of these programs and agents.

    "When the people fear their government, there is tyranny when the government fears the people, there is liberty."
    - Thomas Jefferson, third President of the United States.

    Congressional leaks keep a check on these dirty little agencies, and thank god for the NY Times.

    Mr Knott, you are a hack and a dangerously undereducated "expert". Let me know when you get a full professorship and a brain.

    Derek James Armstrong - 1/6/2008

    After reading the comments today, they make interesting reading with our "hindsight of today’s world. -It’s a shame that there is not sensible debate going on here,
    Goodness, we need it
    Are we all happy to accept that we need to "shut people up, kill people or de-throne people" to make the world work? Is this where we have arrived at as human beings? The goodness that prevails in the common people is the spirit of the world and should be listened to. Any governance should be concerned with listening to that innate goodness.

    Erin Kathleen Carrington - 4/16/2004

    I know you wrote this a while ago, but I just came across it while searching for information for a research paper. This article is extremely well written and emphasizes all of the points that I have constantly been trying to make people understand. There seems to be absolutely no accountability when it comes to the people really making decisions about the intelligence community, and instead blame is placed on the agencies themselves rather than those whose poor decisions have been causing problems for years. Glad to know that someone shares my opinion on this issue.

    Aaron Richard, Randall Huckeba - 3/29/2004

    Oversight is a question, but this is not the correct answer. Concluding that the CIA should have no oversight, or very minimal oversight is ill informed and reckless. The record on responsibility from president to president is a destroyer of thesis, lest we forget historical examples. The notion that an intelligence agency should be put in the hands of one elected official, who by the very nature of our system often has close ties with other large entities (many times ill-informed voters), being non-governmental, with sometimes different goals than that of its mission statement is risky. I agree that congress is rickety, but it is an inescapable answer. The writer should focus on solving the problems of leaks and misguided actions in congress instead of throwing the baby out. It is the political system, and the individuals elected which drive congress to act in such ways. Hedging bets on the chief executive shows lack of judgment, and treating Henry Kissinger as a founding father does nothing to further this assertion. The goals in historical relations with China for example show this. The great step forward during Nixon, met with at least a half step back after his advice like his on Tiananmin. I must ask of the greater dynamics involved with intelligence, action, and credibility, and how are they connected with oversight? By the way, Kissinger lovers most often forget founding principles such as integrity.
    “Nixon and Kissinger displayed little interest in how China was treating its people during what we now know were the last years of the Cultural Revolution”, (About Face, James Mann, page 370.) They were of course “straight forward” in not caring about this, but “Blowback” comes to mind. What type of oversight fosters a greater stability in that region? The cheese shot of Pelosi in Mann’s book are great by the way. I reference you to the focus of an ill-informed executive and Intelligence focuses. Think of the weapons the CIA helped to proliferate in Afghanistan by Carter, was this not a sterling example of a great executively controlled move. “Presidents need options short of war to handle this type of threat!”

    PS: Notice that I did not mention Clinton one time. It was very hard.

    Frank Fiordalisi - 9/9/2003

    Absolute secrecy is required for the success of any intelligence gathering mission. Failure of the Congress to recognize the importance of this has doomed the the U.S. to a worldwide reputation of a nation whose intelligence agency cannot be trusted. Therefore other countries will not cooperate fully, for fear of exposure of their agents. Now comes to the American public, Senator Bob Graham (D- Fl) who for 8 years chaired the Senate Intrelligence Commttee, and is still the ranking democrat, running for the office of President, and he has the nerve to say that the failure was one of the current administration.

    Tyrone Olds - 7/16/2003

    Since you wrote this article, have you found any new suspects to blame 9-11 on?