C-109 Modification Manual - p.3 Introduction
Many thanks to Paul Stahl Jr, for sending us this modification manual for the C-109 fuel transport, an modified verison of the B-24 bomber. His father, Paul Stahl Sr, was the project engineer for the C-109.
Consolidated C-109 Gallery
Page 3 - Section 1 - Introduction to C-109 Airplanes
Two manifolds consisting of selector valves to provide means of defueling all of the cargo tanks are located on the catwalk between the two rear bomb bay tanks. Each manifold is covered by a hinged plywood guard, which gives protection for the exposed valves and at the same time serves as a step for personnel walking over the catwalk.
All of the radio equipment is removed from the Command deck and is relocated to the Flight deck and other parts of the airplane, as covered in detail on the radio modifications section of this manual.
The oxygen bottles which are located on the Command deck and also above it, are removed from the airplane. (NOTE: Since only 10 out of the 23 oxygen bottles are to be left in the C-109 Airplane the bottles removed from the Command deck are not reinstalled).
Due to difficulties which would be encountered in servicing the aileron servo unit, on the Command deck, when all deck tanks are installed, this servo unit is relocated to a position between the bomb rails in the top of the aft bomb bay. The new position of the servo unit is directly below its old location, and the only change in the rigging is a change in cable lengths.
After the Command deck is clear of all radio and oxygen installation as noted above, wooden cradles and straps are installed to receive the three Command deck tanks. This tank installation consists of one 'cross deck' tank which is located immediately aft of the rear spar of the wing center section crosswire the airplane, and two 'side deck' tanks which are R.H. and L.H. located in a longitudinal position immediately aft of the adjacent 'cross deck' tank, on either side of the airplane. The piping from these tanks run to one common manifold from which one line runs to the afore-mentioned main defueling headers located on the catwalk in the bomb bay.
All three of the deck tanks have individual filler caps; to fill them with gasoline, it is necessary to bring the filler hose inside the airplane and fill each tank separately.
All armament and provisions for same are removed from the waist section of the airplane, including the Sperry Ball Turret and supporting structure, the side waist guns and ammunition boxes and track.
The hole left by the removal of the Sperry Ball Turret is capped from the outside by a circular reinforced aluminum alloy plate riveted in place. The hole left in the floor inside the airplane is covered with 3/4" plywood sheet reinforced and held in place with bolts.
Stephen Taylor, WW2 Relic Hunter
I have uploaded all the WW2 aircraft manuals I have collected over the years, (over 150), and they are listed below grouped as US, UK and German, (plus one Russian…..love the IL2!).
When I first start digging WW2 relics it was from old RAF and USAAF bases in the UK. My first love was always the aircraft of WW2, with my childhood bedroom ceiling filled with Airfix models, hanging from cotton threads in mock dogfights. Finding even the smallest piece of an aircraft always brings a shiver to my spine, thinking of the pilots, one minute sat in the canteen with a mug of tea or coffee, the next fighting for their lives above the skies of Europe. On one occasion I recovered 12 Merlin engine exhaust stubs from behind an aircraft revetment, and it still gives me chills to this day!
Filming for WW2 Treasure Hunters gave me the opportunity to dig on three separate crash sites, and I helped in the recovery of a Ju88, Boulton-Paul Defiant and a Fairy Battle. Manuals of the kind I’ve uploaded below can help with the identification of parts recovered from both crash sites, and old RAF/USAAF bases.
Not an awful lot more to say really other than I hope you find them useful.
2-litre diesel Edit
Throughout the 1950s there was an increasing demand for a diesel-engined Land Rover.  Diesel technology had improved, making small-capacity high-speed engines practical. Diesel power had also become prominent in industrial and agricultural uses throughout the world, and fleet users of Land Rovers were often in the situation where their Land Rovers were the only petrol-engined vehicles in their fleet, making spares, servicing and fuel supply more complex.  The Rover Motor Company was in talks with Standard-Triumph in 1954, with the possibility of a merger. Standard were Britain's pioneers of road-going small diesel engines with the 20C engine fitted to Ferguson tractors and the Standard Vanguard car (Britain's first diesel car). Rover engineers were able to study Standard's diesel designs as part of these. The merger was called off, but Rover had gained vital experience and knowledge in developing small diesel engines.   The result was a wet-liner 4-cylinder engine. Fuel injection equipment was from CAV, and the engine used Ricardo's Comet swirl chambers, but with Rover-developed dimples to produce quieter and smoother running. Heater plugs were fitted to each combustion chamber to improve starting.  The engine was launched in the Land Rover in 1957. The vehicle had to have an extra 2 in (51 mm) let into the chassis in the engine bay to enable the new engine to fit.  The engine's power output and speed range was close enough to the existing petrol engine to allow the same transmission unit to be used on all vehicles.   
2.25-litre petrol (Engine Codes 10H, 11H and 13H) Edit
The Series II Land Rover launched in 1958 was larger, heavier and more complex than the original, and there was an ever-present need for higher powered engines.  Also, the Rover petrol engines in use at the time, with the archaic Inlet-Over-Exhaust valve layout and were approaching the age of 20 years in design terms. A new, larger petrol engine specifically developed for the Land Rover was needed.  The existing 2-litre diesel engine was used as a basis, but with a radically changed internal structure.  The new engine was a ‘dry-liner' type, and a wider bore was used to improve low-speed torque output.  Despite the numerous changes the petrol engine could use the same machining line as the diesel, establishing a design commonly used between Land Rover's petrol and diesel engines that would survive for decades.   The 2.25-litre petrol was the most popular engine option right up to the mid-1980s and established a worldwide reputation for reliability and longevity.   The engine's relatively low compression ratio and general strong design made it tolerant of poor quality fuel and oil as well as infrequent servicing. With proper maintenance these engines can easily survive more than 250,000 miles (400,000 km) of service. This was partly due to the commonality between petrol and diesel versions making the petrol version somewhat over-engineered for the job they retained the extraordinary strength characteristics of the diesel while being much less stressed. The only major change to the design was the fitting of a 5-bearing crankshaft in 1980, which improved bottom-end strength and refinement.  Despite its utilitarian origins, the 2.25-litre petrol is a quiet, smooth-running engine, and this enabled Rover to fit it to their P4 saloon car as the Rover 80.  Various power outputs were available for this engine depending on the compression ratio and the amount of emissions regulation equipment fitted.    
2.25-litre diesel (Engine Code 10J) Edit
|Displacement||2.3 L 139.5 cu in (2,286 cc)|
|Cylinder bore||90.47 mm (3.562 in)|
|Piston stroke||88.9 mm (3.50 in)|
|Block material||Cast iron|
|Head material||cast iron|
|Valvetrain||OHV, chain drive camshaft, push-rod operated|
|Fuel system||CAV DPA rotary pump and CAV Pintaux injectors|
|Power output||62 hp (46 kW) @ 4,000 rpm|
|Torque output||103 lb⋅ft (140 N⋅m) @ 1,800 rpm|
The Series II Land Rover was a sales success, but there was still room for improvements. In 1962 the slightly altered Series IIA was launched. As well as some suspension and steering system changes, the biggest update was an improved diesel engine.  This shared many parts with its petrol-fuelled sibling, including the block, valve gear, cooling systems and lubrication systems.  A forged crankshaft was used for added strength, and different pistons were needed.  The cylinder head used the same basic casting, but was very different internally, being in essence an updated version of that used on the original 2-litre engine, to which the new diesel bore a strong external resemblance. Like the 2.25-litre petrol, the 2.25-litre diesel was a dry-liner design. It was built on the same production line as the petrol engine and the flexibility of the basic design was much in evidence- for example, where the diesel engines had their fuel injector pumps, the petrol engine had its distributor fitted. Although it offered a modest improvement in power and a useful jump in torque, the main benefit of the new diesel engine was that it was much quieter and more efficient than the older unit.  It also proved to be much more reliable in service.  Like the petrol engine, the diesel was upgraded to a 5-bearing crankshaft in 1980. The engine was fitted to the Austin FX4 Black Cab between 1982 and 1985. FX4s fitted with the engine were designated 'FX4R' ('R' for 'Rover'). In this application the engine gained a reputation for very short service life and unreliability. This was caused by the significantly greater times spent at idle speed in the Black Cab than in the Land Rover. Solihull engineers had warned Carbodies, builders of the FX4R that this would cause problems as at idle speed the engine's oil pressure dropped, causing the automatic tensioner unit for the timing chain to not operate fully. At the high number of hours spent at idle speed (taxi drivers tended to leave the engines idling for long period whilst waiting for passengers or when off-duty as well as all the time spent in stationary traffic in London) this caused the timing chains to stretch, causing incorrect fuel injection timing which greatly reduced engine life. The 10J engine was also adapted into a marine engine by Mercury of the USA and sold under the Mercruiser 165 name.  
Used in: Land Rover Series II, Series III, and One Ten also Carbodies FX4 (also called Austin FX4) and sold as a Mercury marine engine. There is also evidence of the 10J engine being offered as a conversion for Volga saloon cars by a Belgium-based company. 
2.5-litre diesel engine (Engine Code 11J, 12J, 13J, 14J and 15J) Edit
|Displacement||2.5 L 152.3 cu in (2,495 cc)|
|Cylinder bore||90.47 mm (3.562 in)|
|Piston stroke||97 mm (3.82 in)|
|Block material||Cast iron|
|Head material||cast iron|
|Valvetrain||OHV, belt-driven camshaft, push-rod operated|
|Fuel system||Lucas-CAV DPS rotary pump and CAV Pintaux injectors|
|Power output||68 hp (51 kW) @ 4,200 rpm|
|Torque output||114 lb⋅ft (155 N⋅m) @ 1,800 rpm|
Land Rover's radically updated product line was launched in 1983. Initially only the long-wheelbase One Ten was available and it was sold with the same engine line-up as the preceding Series III model- 2.25-litre petrol and diesel engines and the 3.5-litre Rover V8.   However, Land Rover planned a series of rolling improvements.  Launched shortly before the short-wheelbase Ninety model in 1984 was a 2.5-litre diesel engine. This was little more than an updated version of the existing diesel unit  (at this time 22 years old). The stroke was lengthened to improve torque, and an updated cylinder head was used to reduce noise and emissions. A more modern injector pump improved fuel economy and an improved glow plug system improved cold-starting performance. The most significant change was the swapping of the chain-driven camshaft for one driven by a fibre toothed belt, which also drove the repositioned injector pump.   The drive vacated by the injector pump was used to power a vacuum pump for the brake servo system. To reduce engine weight, extensive use of aluminium castings was made for the cambelt case, vacuum pump, rocker cover and other parts.  Other small improvements were made such as the fitment of a spin-on cartridge oil filter instead of older, harder-to-change element type and the fitting of under-piston oil jets. In the mid-1980s Land Rover was part of the Land Rover Group, responsible for production of the Freight Rover van. The 2.5-litre diesel was fitted to the Freight Rover 300series and the FX4 taxi (the engines for these applications had slight design changes, such as higher-mounted injector pumps and non-waterproof cambelt cases. They received the designations 14J and 15J respectively. Being fitted with a timing belt rather than a chain the 15J engine suffered none of the reliability problems in the FX4 that its 10J predecessor had encountered (see above)). The engine became a special-order only option after the introduction of turbodiesel engines (see below) but remained in production (and popular with military and some commercial buyers) until 1994.   The British Army used this engine in the vast majority of the 20,000 Land Rovers it bought between 1985 and 1994.  A manufacturing flaw with pistons combined with Army maintenance practises (such as a tendency to over-fill the sump with oil) caused the engines to over-breathe and ingest their oil, leading to piston failure. Late military-spec engines had a centrifugal separator in the breather system, allowing excess oil to drain back to the sump. These engines were designated 13J.   and 11J (ref Land Rover Defender Military 110 1991 Supplementary Parts Catalogue). These later, modified engines were the first in their class (small capacity high-speed diesels) to pass the Ministry of Defence's arduous 500-hour durability trial.
2.5-litre petrol engine (Engine Code 17H) Edit
|Displacement||2.5 L 152.3 cu in (2,495 cc)|
|Cylinder bore||90.47 mm (3.562 in)|
|Piston stroke||97 mm (3.82 in)|
|Block material||Cast iron|
|Head material||cast iron|
|Valvetrain||OHV, chain drive camshaft, push-rod operated|
|Fuel system||Weber carburetor|
|Power output||83 hp (62 kW) @ 4,200 rpm|
|Torque output||133 lb⋅ft (180 N⋅m) @ 2,000 rpm|
At the launch of the Ninety Land Rover had insisted that there would not be a 2.5-litre development of the petrol engine.  However, buyer demand and economics made the change inevitable. The larger petrol engine was launched in 1985 (having been developed under the codename 'Project Harrier') and, like its 2.25-litre predecessor it had much in common with the diesel engine.  The block was identical, as were most ancillary parts. The key difference was that the petrol engine retained its timing chain,  since it lacked the need to drive an injector pump. The cylinder head was adapted to use unleaded fuel. As before, the engine was smooth and refined, and provided the Land Rover with adequate road performance.  However, as fuel prices rose and diesel engines improved sales of the petrol engines fell, especially in Europe. It remained a popular option in Africa and other areas where fuel prices or the simplicity of the engine made it an attractive option. It remained available until 1994 although by this time sales had dwindled to almost nothing in the face of a new generation of refined diesel engines.    By this time buyers were limited to those with specific reasons to buy petrol-engined vehicles- for example several police forces in the UK bought fleets of 2.5 petrol Defenders in the mid-1990s because a diesel-engined vehicles would have caused maintenance and logistical problems when operated alongside the fleet of standard patrol cars, all of which were petrol fuelled. 
Diesel Turbo (Engine Code 19J) Edit
Land Rover's global sales collapsed during the early 1980s.  This was mainly due to foreign competition offering larger, more powerful, more comfortable vehicles. Land Rover suffered from poor build quality and materials during the 1970s and by 1983 the then-current Series III model was distinctly outdated, despite recent improvements.  Land Rover decided to focus the sales of its Ninety/One Ten/127 range on the UK and Europe, for which it required a diesel engine with significantly better performance than the 68 hp (51 kW) 2.5-litre type then in production. Project Falcon was started in 1984 to develop a turbocharged version of this engine.  The resulting engine was Land Rover's first production turbodiesel and their first engine to be given a marketing name- the Diesel Turbo,  a name given to differentiate it from the VM Motori-built turbodiesel then being used in the Range Rover, which was sold as the 'Turbo D'.  The Diesel Turbo, although essentially the same as the 2.5-litre diesel, had numerous additions and modifications to allow it to cope with the stresses of turbocharging. New pistons with Teflon-coated crowns and Nimonic steel exhaust valves were used to withstand higher combustion temperatures. The crankshaft was cross-drilled for improved strength and cooling. The block was modified to allow an oil feed/drain system to the turbocharger, and the cooling system was improved with an 8-bladed viscous fan and integral oil cooler. The engine was fitted with a high-capacity breather system to cope with the greater volumes of gas flow through the engine.   Despite the inherent age of the design, it performed well in tests against its rivals and provided the vital blend of performance and economy the Land Rover had needed for many years.  It was the first diesel model to match the petrol engine's 4-ton towing limit and the first to be able to exceed the UK national speed limit of 70 mph (113 km/h).  However, early engines suffered several failures. Most serious were failed main and big-end bearings and splits or cracks in the block.  In 1988 a new block and an improved design of bearing and bearing cap was fitted which solved these issues. The engine's higher internal temperatures meant that the cooling system also had to be maintained to a much higher standard than the earlier engines. Further changes were made in 1989, this time to the breather system to prevent oil being drawn into the air filter. Despite these issues, the Diesel Turbo was a strong seller. It was the standard engine for the UK and European markets and Land Rover's sales increased after its introduction.   Time has shown that these engines can turn in long service lives if maintained as required—like many early turbodiesels, a lack of maintenance causes failure.   
200Tdi (engine code: 11L, 12L, 13L and 14L) Edit
In 1989 Land Rover had launched the Discovery its Range Rover-based family 4×4 that quickly became Europe's top-selling 4×4.  One of the key reasons for its success was its ground-breaking turbo-diesel engine. The 200Tdi was one of the first mass-produced small-capacity (i.e., not a lorry engine) direct-injection diesels,  with the attendant improvements in power and efficiency that system brings. Developed under the codename Gemini, the 200Tdi was planned from the start to be used on all Land Rover's products.  For production reasons, it had to be machined on the existing machinery, so used the same block and crankshaft as the existing 2.5-litre diesel engines. It also used many ancillary parts used on the older engines.   However, it was a true break with the past. An aluminium alloy cylinder head reduced weight and noise, a new Bosch injection system gave improved running characteristics and better starting performance. An intercooler boosted power and efficiency further. Lessons learnt from the Diesel Turbo were included, such as the fitment of an inertial separator in the breather system to remove oil before crankcase gases were returned to the air intake. Initially turbocharged and naturally aspirated diesel versions and a carburettor-fed petrol version were to be produced. The direct-injection system meant that only machining of the injector sockets was needed to allow the fitment of spark plugs. However, the performance and economy of the turbodiesel version was such that the other variants were not produced.  The 200Tdi was launched in the Discovery in 1989. It was then fitted to the utility Land Rover (renamed the Defender) in late 1990.  For this application the engine was slightly de-tuned and, whilst in the Discovery the 200Tdi used all-new components, packaging restraints in the Defender meant that the 200Tdi in this role shared many exterior parts (such as the timing belt system and case) with the Diesel Turbo. Most obviously the turbocharger was retained in the Diesel Turbo's high mounting position on top of the manifolds in the Defender, rather than being tucked under the manifolds in the original Discovery version.  In 1992 the engine was fitted to the Range Rover. In the Range Rover it has a 14L engine number. Although the older petrol and naturally aspirated diesel units were theoretically still available, the 200Tdi had better performance and economy than any of them, and so dominated the sales figures.  It is still highly regarded by Land Rover enthusiasts and has established itself as a powerful and long-lived unit that with proper maintenance can exceed 300,000 miles (480,000 km) of use.   
Used in: Land Rover Defender, Discovery and Range Rover
300Tdi (engine code: 16L, 20L & 25L) Edit
Although the 200Tdi engine had been an undoubted technological and sales success, it had certain limitations and flaws that needed to be rectified. Despite the numerous differences, it was still in essence a direct-injection version of the older Diesel Turbo engine.  It was also considered rather raucous and unrefined, especially for use in the Discovery and Range Rover models.  A special version of the engine had to be produced to fit the Defender, and problems with weak head gasket had been identified.  The British Army (and some other military buyers) had not opted for the 200Tdi because it could not be fitted with a 24-volt generator for powering radio equipment- instead the Army continued to buy vehicles with 2.5-litre naturally aspirated diesels.  Upcoming European diesel emissions regulations (Euro I) meant that Land Rover would be forced to radically alter the engine anyway. The resulting development project (coded Romulus) produced the 300Tdi engine. Although externally very similar to the Discovery/Range Rover version of its predecessor, 208 changes were made. These included modifications to the block, cylinder head, fuel injector system and ancillary systems. The crankshaft, pistons and connecting rods were significantly altered over the 200Tdi.  The most obvious external changes were the fitting of a rubber acoustic cover over the engine to reduce noise and the change to a single serpentine belt to drive the ancillaries instead of the multiple V-belts of the older engines. Emissions regulation included the fitting of an exhaust gas recirculation system. Power and torque outputs remained the same, and the engine had been specifically designed to be compatible with all the models in the Land Rover range without any changes. This meant that the Defender engines were fitted in the same tune as the Discovery/Range Rover engines.  The 300Tdi was noticeably smoother and quieter than the 200Tdi, but was generally found to not be quite as economical in real-world use.  It turned out that the Euro I emissions regulations were not as severe as Land Rover anticipated, and so the 300Tdi was able to remain in production until the introduction of the Euro III rules. When fitted to vehicles with an automatic transmission, power was increased to 122 hp (91 kW) to make up for the power losses in the transmission. These engines (designated 23L) had Bosch Electronic Diesel Control systems, where the mechanical injector system was controlled by a drive-by-wire electronic throttle to reduce emissions.  The 300Tdi was replaced in 1998 by the 5-cylinder Td5, bringing to an end the line of Land Rover 4-cylinder engines that can be traced back to 1957. The Td5 engine was loosely based on the Rover Group's L-series diesel engine. The 300Tdi remained in production in Brazil, and was offered as an option on rest of world (non-UK/Europe) models. Following Ford's acquisition of Land Rover in 2000, the engine was used in Brazilian-built Ford pick-up trucks as well.  Increasingly restrictive emissions laws worldwide and falling sales led to production of the 300Tdi ending in 2006. A much-modified 2.8-litre version was built by International Engines in Brazil until 2010, and was available as an after-market fitment to Land Rovers through specialist converters.   International then became MWM International Motores and a further update of the 300Tdi design was launched as the 3.0 Power Stroke. Although based around the same block and basic architecture as the 300Tdi the Power Stroke has major differences such as electronic common rail injection and new crossflow cylinder head with Overhead camshaft.
Used in: Land Rover Defender, Discovery, and Range Rover "Classic" also various Brazil-assembled Ford pickup trucks.
Td5 (engine codes: 10P, 15P and 16P) Edit
|Displacement||2.5 L 152.4 cu in (2,498 cc)|
|Cylinder bore||84.45 mm (3.325 in)|
|Piston stroke||88.95 mm (3.502 in)|
|Block material||Cast iron|
|Head material||Aluminium alloy|
|Valvetrain||OHC, chain-driven camshaft|
|Fuel system||Lucas Electronic Unit Injection|
|Power output||122 hp (91 kW) @ 4,850 rpm (Defender version), 136 hp (101 kW) @ 4,850 rpm (Discovery version)|
|Torque output||221 lb⋅ft (300 N⋅m) @ 1,950 rpm (manual transmission), 232 lb⋅ft (315 N⋅m) @ 1,950 rpm (automatic transmission)|
By the mid-1990s the Rover Group was looking to rationalise its engine ranges and produce new designs that would be able to meet emissions legislation for the foreseeable future. The recently released K-Series petrol engine range would be extended to cover that sector, but Rover had no in-house diesel engines suitable for both its cars and its 4×4s.  The 300Tdi could not be fitted to any of the car range and was about to fall foul of the upcoming Euro III emissions standards. The existing L-Series 2-litre diesel was not suitable for use in Land Rover products and could not be developed into such a unit.
It was decided to design a new diesel engine family that could be produced in various capacities and states of tune suitable for all of Rover's needs. The development was codenamed Project Storm and design responsibility was given to Land Rover who were to build the engines.  The result was a range of engines using the L-Series as a base—the bore/stroke dimensions were the same and the Storm engine used the same piston and connecting rod assemblies. The Storm utilised Electronic Unit Injection by Lucas (at the time this technology was rare on small-capacity engine, being used only on large commercial vehicles) and a cross-flow aluminium alloy cylinder head on a cast-iron block. The designers had aimed at increasing servicing intervals so the engine incorporated both conventional and centrifugal oil filters. The electronic systems included an 'anti-stall' system to allow heavy loads to be started from rest at idle speed and two programmed operating modes for road and off-road use.  The overhead camshaft (operating both valves and the unit injectors) was driven by a duplex chain assembly. The Storm design encompassed 4-, 5- and 6-cylinder engines (of 2, 2.5 and 3 litres respectively).
In the event the takeover of the Rover Group by BMW, who brought their own range of diesel engines, made the Storm engine largely redundant.  Only the 5-cylinder version made it to production as the powerplant for the Defender and the new Discovery Series II as the 'Td5' in 1998. Offering more power and greater refinement than the 300Tdi the Td5 greatly improved the appeal of the Discovery but caused concern amongst many operators of the Defender due to its electronic engine management systems which were considered to be less reliable and more difficult to repair 'in the field' than the mechanical injection systems used on previous Land Rover diesel engines. In deference to these concerns (including those voiced by the British Army) Land Rover kept the 300Tdi in production for fitment to special-order vehicles (see above). It transpired that the Td5's electronics were highly reliable. Early engines suffered two isolated mechanical failures—sudden and complete failure of the oil pump drive and 'cylinder head shuffle' caused by weak retaining studs. Both these faults were fixed within 2 years of the engine starting production and the Td5 is now considered highly reliable. In 2002 the engine was improved to reach Euro 3 antipollution stage, and an EGR Valve system was introduced. Electronics were also updated to improve the low-speed throttle response which had been prone to producing a jerky power delivery in off-road or towing situations.
The engine has proved itself on numerous expeditions in hostile terrain (including Land Rover's own G4 Challenge).  The engine's mechanical strength and electronic control systems makes the Td5 much more tuneable than the older engines. Numerous aftermarket companies produced tuning upgrades offering as much as 180 hp (134 kW 182 PS). The Td5 was replaced in the Discovery by the AJD-V6 unit in 2004 and the Ford ZSD-424 in the Defender in 2007. Production of the Td5 at Solihull ceased that year making it the last Land Rover-designed-and-built engine. 
In 1956, the Rover Company held talks with Spanish engineering company 'Metalúrgica de Santa Ana S.A.' (later to be renamed Santana Motor) with the aim of starting Land Rover assembly in Spain. Under the terms of the agreement Santana would initially build Land Rovers from Complete Knock Down kits shipped from Britain, but locally manufactured content would gradually be increased until the entire vehicles were built from scratch in Spain. Santana would also have exclusive sales rights in Spain, South America, Central America and North Africa, selling both Santana- and Land Rover-badged vehicles in these markets where necessary. Production at Santana started in 1958. From 1962 Santana began to improve and modify the Land Rover design to meet the demands of its own markets. These were the common demands of more power, better ride comfort and improved refinement. To this end Santana produced several unique versions of the Land Rover engine designs it had rights to. These included 94-horsepower (70 kW) 3.3-litre (200 cu in) six-cylinder versions of the 2.25-litre petrol and diesel engines in the late 1960s and a 75-horsepower (56 kW) turbocharged version of the 2.25 diesel in 1982.
In the early 1980s when Land Rover was looking for ways to improve its engine range, especially its diesels, the Santana engines were looked at. The 6-cylinder version was considered too large and heavy for the Range Rover but a turbocharged 5-cylinder variant was considered since it provided an ideal blend of power, weight and size. The 2.25TD was studied to provide development information for the Diesel Turbo engine. In the end production reasons meant that Land Rover favoured a diesel version of the Rover V8 instead. When that engine did not reach production Range Rover diesel engines were bought-in from VM Motori.
C-109 Modification Manual - p.3 Introduction - History
1 . Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior 2d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1957).
3 . For problems of administrative feedback, see the book of that name by Herbert Kaufman, with the collaboration of Michael Couzens (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings institution, 1973).
4 . Personnel figures are excerpted from tables 3-1 and 2-4 of the NASA Historical Data Book , 1956-1968 (NASA SP-4012, 1976).
5 . James E. Webb Space Age Management: The Large-Scale Approach, McKinsey Foundation Lecture Series, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), especially pp. 60 65.
6 . On this concept, see Richard L. Chapman et al., Project Management in NASA (NASA SP-324, 1973), p. 109.
1 . D. Brainerd Holmes to Philip Drotning, 12 June 1963. Holmes was Director for Manned Space Flight 1961-1963.
2 . Richard R. Nelson, The Moon and the Ghetto: An Essay on Public Policy Analysis (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1977), p. 144. Citation that follows is in ibid., p. 145.
3 . The concept of "key decisions" was suggested by L. L. Durirch and Robert E. Lowry, "The Scope and Content of Administration-The TVA illustration," Public Administration Review 13 (Autumn 1953): 219-226.
4 . Section 203(b)(5) of the Spare Act.
5 . Wernher von Braun, Director, Marshall Space Flight Center, briefing of House Science and Astronautics Committee Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, 24 Jan. 1964, in hearings on 1965 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong 2d sess. (1964), p. 803.
6 . Bureau of the Budget Bulletin 60 2, 21 Sept. 1959, and Circular A-76, 3 Mar. 1966.
7 . Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-196R (NASA SP-4101, 1966), p. 259.
8 . Apollo Program Office, NASA-Apollo Program Management, vol. I (Dec. 1967), p. 2-8.
9 . Dr. Mueller stressed the importance of a philosophical approach to meeting schedules which minimizes 'dead-end' testing and maximizes 'all-up systems flight tests,"' at 22d meeting, Manned Space Flight Management Council, 29 Oct. 1963. This is apparently the first official reference to the all-up concept.
10 . Webb, to Heads of all Headquarters Offices and Directors of Field Centers, "Office of the Administrator," 29 Dec. 1965.
11 . "Organization and Management," in "Preliminary History of NASA, 1963-1969 " final ed. (15 Jan. 1969), p. Vl 39, This unpublished manustript was reproduced for internal NASA use after preparation for the White House Administrative Histories Project, with a preface by Acting Administrator Thomas O. Paine and a foreword by James E. Webb.
1 . On NACA, see Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Policy Planning for Aeronautical Research and Development, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (19 May 1966), pp. 38-43, 166-168.
3 . Policy Planning for Aeronautical Research and Development, p.. 166.
5 . Enid C. B. Schoettle, "The Establishment of NASA," in Sanford Lakoff, ed., Knowledge and Power (New York: Free Press, 1966) pp. 185-186.
6 . Michael H. Armacost The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press 1969) pp. 226-233.
7 . Schoettle, "The Establishment of NASA," p. 212.
9 . House Committee on Government Operations, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Government Operations in Space, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (4 June 1965), p. 40.
11 . The authoritative account of the lunar landing decision is John Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970).
13 . House Science and Astronautics Committee, Defense Space interests, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (1961), p. 19.
14 . Levine, Future of the US Space Program, p. 71. Emphasis in original.
15 . Logsdon, Decision to Go to
16 . On the reasons for selecting Houston, tee Thomas P. Murphy, Science, Geopolitics, and Federal Spending (Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington, 1971), pp. 207-210.
17 . Minutes of 1st meeting, MSF Management Council, 21 Dec. 1961
18 . The first part of the quotation is from a memo of 11 July to Wiesner from Donald Horning, chairman of the Space Vehicle Panel the second part, from PSAC, Report of the Space Vehicle Panel (On the Matter of Lunar Mission Mode Selection), 26 July 1962, p. 15.
19 . Webb to Holmes, 7 Aug. 1962.
20 . Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965 (NASA SP-4007, 1967), p. 349.
21 . Erasmus H. Kloman Case-Study of the Surveyor program (unpublished study for National Academy of Public Administration 1971) p. 110.
22 . House Science and Astronautics Committee, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Investigation of project Ranger, 88th Cong., 2d sess.. (1964), pp. 162-163, 165-166, 168-169.
24 . Webb and Dryden, revised draft of "Consideration of Supplemental Appropriation During FY 1963 for the Manned Lunar Landing Program," Jan. 1963.
25 . A summary of the Phillips report was prepared by the General Accounting Office at the request of Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R-Maine) in May 1967.
26 . See Astronautics and Aeronautics, 7954 (NASA SP-4005, 1965), pp. 99-100.
1 . Thus the NASA Management Instruction (NMI) describing the functions and responsibilities of the Associate Administrator for Organization and Management was issued on 14 Mar. 1968, exactly one year after the office was created
2 . Oral History Exit interview with Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. (8, 20 May 3 June 1968), p. 55.
3 . For pros and cons of study committees, see Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 207-208.
4 . Robert Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1953 (NASA SP-4101, 1966), p. 148. Hereafter cited as Administrative History.
7 . For a very detailed account of the Kimpton report, see ibid., pp. 161-169.
8 . See appendix C , "Biographical Sketches of Principal NASA Officials" for careers of Webb, Dryden, Seamans, et al..
9 . Statement of Albert Siepert in House Science and Astronautics Committee, 7953 NASA Authorization, 87th Cong., 2d sess. (1962), pp. 269-270.
10 . The key papers are "A Summary Look at 'The Headquarters Organization Problem,"' 27 Feb. Summary in Rosholt, Administrative History, pp. 200-201 "Clarifying and Strengthening the Role of NASA's General Management," 14 Apr. Ibid., pp. 203-206 "Reappraising NASA's Organizational Structure to Achieve the Objectives of an Accelerated Program," 12 June. Ibid., pp. 209-210 and "Organizing to Achieve the Objectives of an Accelerated Civilian Space Program," 7 Aug. Ibid., pp. 218-221.
12 . Paper prepared by DeMarquis Wyatt, "Budget Formulation and Execution," 3 Mar. 1967, p. 1.
13 . In the November 1961 reorganization the functions of program review were divided among the new divisions of Technical Programs and Reliability and Quality Assurance.
14 . Rosholt, Administrative History, p. 221
15 . Statement of Raymond Bisplinghoff, OART Director, in House Science and Astronautics Committee, 7954 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 1st sess.. (1963), p. 1882
16 . House Science and Astronautics Committee, 1965 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 2d sess. (1964), p. 103.
17 . This was GMI 4-1-1 in the pre-1965 NASA coding system.
18 . Memorandum to Seamans through Director of Administration from Walter Hahn (Director, Management Analysis Division), "Inadequate and Conflicting Management Systems," 28 Sept. 1962.
19 . Transcript of remarks by Harry Goett at Seventh Semi-Annual Management Conference, Langley Research Center (4-5 Oct. 1962), p. 7.
20 . in NASA a "program" is defined as "a related series of undertakings which continue over a period of time (normally years), and which are designed to accomplish a broad scientific or technical goal. Program responsibility is assigned to the appropriate Program Office within NASA."
A "project" is "within a program, an undertaking with a scheduled beginning and ending, which normally involves one of the following. "(1) The design, development and demonstration of [a] major advanced hardware item "(2) The design, construction and operation of a new launch vehicle (and associated ground support) during its research and development phase "(3) The construction led operation of one or more aeronautical or space vehicles and necessary ground support in order to accomplish a scientific or technical objective." NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 4-1-1, 8 Mar. 1963, pp. 1-2.
21 . Rosholt, Administrative History , P. 227. The Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition is counted as a program office, although it had no centers and no "programs."
22 . On the problem of relieving Seamans of part of his workload, see memorandum from Webb's executive assistant R. P. Young to Webb, 30 July 1962.
23 . House Science and Astronautics Committee, 7955 NASA Authorization p. 69
24 . For an excellent survey of the NASA Technology Utilization Program, see Edward E. Furash, "The Problem of Technology Transfer," in Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen, eds., The Study of Policy Formation (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 281-328.
25 . From transcript of Webb's briefing of the Administrator's Management Advisory Panel, 19 Apr. 1968, p. 28.
26 . The directive setting forth NASA policy concerning functional management is NPD 1240.1, 13 June 1966.
28 . Transcript of Management Advisory Panel meeting, 19 Apr. 1968, p. 23?
29 . The centers reported to the program offices as follows: Goddard JPL, and Wallops Station to OSSA Ames, Flight Research Center, Langley, Lewis, and the Electronics Research Center that NASA proposed for the FY 1964 budget to OART Kennedy Space Center, Manned Spacecraft Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center to OMSF. For establishment of the Launch Operations Center, see Seamans exit interview, pp. 51-52.
31 . "Dr. Seamans stated this group would meet weekly to focus its attention on management problems, processes and procedures in order to insure that the new organization works effectively. Program matters would be discussed in detail at the monthly status reviews." From minutes of first Management Committee meeting, 14 Oct. 1963
32 . Based on a memorandum from Wyatt to Edgar Cortright, Deputy Associate Administrator (OSSA), "Presentation Formats, Associate Administrator's Monthly Program Meetings," 9 Dec. 1965.
33 . This is as good a place as any to sort out and explain the various titles of headquarters officials. The heads of the program offices were "Directors" from 1961 to 1963, when they became "Associate Administrators for -." The Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition became a program office in December 1965. Following the 1963 reorganization, the heads of the offices reporting to Webb (e.g., Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, International Programs) became "Assistant Administrators for_." Following the 1963 reorganization, the heads of the offices reporting to Seamans (e.g., Industry Affairs, Defense Affairs, Programming, Administration) became "Deputy Associate Administrators," changed to "Assistant Administrators" in the 1965 reorganization. Although it appears in early organization charts, the office of "Associate Deputy Administrator" actually dates from 1965, when it was created for Willis Shapley. The Associate Deputy Administrator had general responsibility for external affairs, especially liaison with Congress, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Department of Defense. One of the most confusing titles was "Deputy Associate Administrator." In 1962-1963 there were two such officials, one for "Manned Space Flight Centers," the other for "Other than Manned Space Flight Centers." The 1963 reorganization replaced these with a single official who acted as Seamans' deputy. The Deputy Associate Administrator from 1964 to 1966, Earl Hilburn, had a number of responsibilities for procurement, liaison with the General Accounting Office, and as all-purpose troubleshooter. Hilburn was director of two task forces that investigated the 1964 Ranger 6 failure and the relation between costs and schedule slippages in major NASA programs. The position lapsed when Hilburn left NASA but was revived in the 1970s.
34 . See draft memorandum, 14 Nov. 1962, enlarging the scope of Office of Plans and Program Evaluation and giving its head special responsibility for evaluating current programs. "In this regard I |Webb?] believe we should reconsider foregoing revision of the long range plan for calendar year 1963 in order to apply maximum available effort to initiating the review and analysis outlined above."
On 13 March 1963 Webb wrote to Abe Hyatt, the office Director, that "there is no doubt that our short range planning needs increased emphasis, and at the same time should be given higher priority than updating the long range plan." In August Webb decided to disperse the functions of the Office of Plans and Program Evaluation among other headquarters divisions, and Hyatt left at the end of October.
35 . Webb to James Elliott, Director of Management Analysis (Office of Administration), 7 July 1965.
36 . This and the following paragraph are based on several internal memorandums, especially one from James Elliott to members of the NASA Management Committee, 20 May 1964, and a briefing memorandum for the Administrator, 5 May 1965.
37 . These included policy statements (NPDs), Management Instructions (NMls), detailed handbooks (NHBs), statements of procurement procedures (NPCs), and temporary notices (NNs). Headquarters Management Instructions (HQMls) and delegations of authority (HMDs) were added later.
39 . According to Seamans, Webb "wanted to have a clear-cut outline of what every responsible person's job was and who they dealt with, and all this kind of thing--which is . . . a classical way of dealing with big organizations . . . but it's sometimes harder to visualize what you do in given circumstances if there are only word-type job descriptions." Seamans exit interview, p. 60.
40 . For origins of secretariat, see draft report of Adm. Rufus E. Rose (USN, Ret.), "Development and Establishment of the Executive Secretariat," 27 Jan. 1966.
41 . The plan for a secretariat was outlined by Jack Young in "Plan for Keeping the Members of General Management More Fully Informed," 2 Oct. 1963, which was revised by Seamans before being forwarded to Dryden and Webb.
42 . Interview with Lawrence Vogel, Director, Headquarters Administration, 13 Oct. 1976.
43 . There is a good description of the State Department secretariat in a "Report on Federal Secretariat Functions," prepared by NASA consultant J. S. Patterson and submitted 17 Aug. 1961.
44 . Source: Vogel interview. It must be stressed that Webb needed the secretariat to get on top of internal information and that he preferred part-time consultants like Gen. George Cabell (USAF, Ret.) or Ambassador Joseph C. Satterthwaite as contacts with other agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department.
45 . Memorandum from Webb to heads of all Headquarters Offices and Directors of Field Centers, "Office of the Administrator," 29 Dec. 1965. This memorandum incorporated many of the changes recommended in "The Office of the Administrator: Evolving Concepts and Practices," prepared by Jack Young and staff in Dec.1965.
46 . Minutes of the "Special Meeting of the Deputy Administrator on Reorganization," 30 Dec. 1965. Seamans was appointed Deputy Administrator on an interim basis, since the Senate was not in session, and his appointment was routinely confirmed in Jan. 1966.
47 . See note 45 above. Vogel was both executive officer and executive secretary.
48 . This example is cited by Assistant to the Administrator, W. H. Close, "The Secretariat," 17 May 1967.
49 . Seamans exit interview, p. 79.
51 . Briefing for Webb on Voyager program by Edgar Cortright, 8 Feb. 1967, pp. 82, 47.
53 . Webb to Seamans, 5 Jan. 1967, and Webb to Finger, 6 Jan. 1967.
54 . Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 (NASA SP-4008, 1968), p. 75.
55 . NM I 1130.1, "Role and Responsibilities-The Associate Administrator for Organization and Management," 14 Mar. 1968. See note I above.
56 . Transcript of Management Advisory Panel meeting, 19 Apr. 1968, pp. 41, 48-49.
57 . Webb memorandum, 27 Jan. 1968.
58 . Newell was not made Associate Administrator in anticipation of Seamans' departure he was offered the position before Seamans announced his intention to leave. Newell to NASA Historian Eugene Emme, 20 Sept. 1968.
59 . T.E. Jenkins (Director, Program and Special Reports Division, Executive Secretariat) to Newell, "NASA Monthly Status Reviews in support of the NASA Management Council," 7 Jan. 1968.
60 . This office was originally created by Webb to enable Gen. William McKee (USAF, Ret.) to serve as a troubleshooter, and it consisted of little more than an office with a secretary. It was wound up shortly after McKee left NASA in 1965 to become the FAA Administrator.
61 . NMI 1156.15, 12 Feb. 1968.
62 . The first quotation is excerpted from Newell's memorandum to Directors of Headquarters Program and Staff Offices, 11 Mar. 1968 the second, from a memorandum of 4? Nov. 1968, "Regularly Scheduled Meetings Chaired or Attended by the Administrator." Newell's 11 Mar. memorandum incorporated the recommendations of an Ad Hoc Group on Project Status Reviews that reported on I Mar.
63 . Transcript of Management Advisory Panel Meeting, 19 Apr. 1968, pp. 28, 29.
64 . On the problem of communications within bureaus, see Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, chap. 10.
65 . Gen. Jacob E. Smart (USAF, Ret.) et al., "A Philosophy of Management for NASA," 23 June 1967, p. 1.
67 . Leonard R. Sayles and Margaret K. Chandler, Managing Large Systems: Organizations for the Future (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 173. Prof. Sayles, of the Columbia University Graduate School of Business, was appointed a special assistant to Webb in Sept. 1966 and was a "counsellor" to the Management Advisory Panel when it was created in 1968. Emphasis added.
68 . For the inspector-general concept, see memorandum from Charles G. Haynes, Director of Inspections (Office of Administration), 28 June 1966. He noted that the following headquarters offices and divisions had inspection functions: the Inspection Division, the Audit Division, and the Division of Management Analysis and Research, all in the Office of Administration the Office of Programming and the Office of Industry Affairs.
1 . Report of Steering Group for Study of NASA Acquisition Process, Management Study of NASA Acquisition Process, June 1971, p. 6.
2 . NASA Source Evaluation Board Manual (NPC 402, Aug. 1964), p. 2-1.
3 . House Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Government Procurement and Contracting, Part 2, 91st Cong., 1st sess. (25-27 Mar. 1969), p. 505.
4 . Testimony of David E. Bell, Director, Bureau of the Budget, House Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Systems Development and Management, 87th Cong., 2d sess. (21 June 1962), p. 44.
5 . House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Review of the Space Program, 86th Cong., 2d sess. (1960), p. 400.
6 . On these institutions, see Dean Coddington and J. Gordon Milliken, "The Future of Federal Contract Research Centers," in Thomas P. Murphy, ed., Science, Geopolitics, and Federal Spending (Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books, 1971), pp. 87-110.
7 . Webb to Dryden and Seamans, 25 Oct. 1963. In congressional testimony, John Young, the NASA Director of Administration, stated that it was NASA policy not to create not-for-profit corporations. See House Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Systems Development and Management-1963, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963) pp. 214-215.
8 . In 1966, for example, 6 percent of RAND's $22 million budget was for work done under contract to NASA. Armed Forces Management (Feb. 1966), p. 71. Many RAND studies were commissioned by OMSF and the Apollo Program Office in support of long-range and contingency planning. The extent of NASA's use of "nonprofits" may be gauged by the fact that in 1964 RAND had contracts with NASA totaling $3.3 million, while M IT's Lincoln Laboratories had contracts totaling over 57 million. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1964, p. 435.
9 . Interview with Kenneth Webster, Office of Assistant Associate Administrator for Center Operations (Systems Management), 31 Aug. 1976.
10 . Webster interview. See also NHB 2410.1, Management Procedures for Automatic Data Processing Equipment, July 1965. The annual reports to the Bureau of the Budget on utilization of ADP equipment were standardized in the Bureau's Circular A-55, 15 Nov. 1963.
11 . House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Advanced Research and Technology, 1968 NASA Authorization, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (1967), pp. 567-568.
12. In 1969 the following centers were authorized to negotiate contracts up to $2.5 million: Ames, Langley, Lewis, Goddard, the Manned Spacecraft and Marshall centers, and the Space Nuclear Propulsion Office. Up to $1 million: Kennedy, the Headquarters Contracts Division, and the NASA Pasadena Office. Up to $500 000: the Flight Research Center and Wallops Station.
13 . NASA Source Evaluation Board Manual, p. 4-1.
14 . Clarence Danhof, Government Contracting and Technological Change (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 95.
15 . This paragraph is based on an article by Robert B. Hall, "The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 Should Be Reformed," reprinted in House Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Government Procurement and Contracting, Part 7 (22, 26-28 May 1969), pp. 2001-2015.
17 . Robert L. Perry, "The Atlas, Thor, Titan, and Minuteman," in Eugene M. Emme, ed., 'The History of Rocket Technology: Essays on Research, Development, and Utility (Detroit: Wayne State University Press 1964), p. 149.
18 . This turned out to be the case. It took the Thor only 3.5 years and the Atlas 5.2 years to go from program approval to first operational squadron, instead of the 6-8 years first projected. By comparison, it took the B-47 7.8 years and the B-52 9.4 years to attain operational capability. John Greenwood, "The Air Force Ballistic Missile and Space Program (1954-1974)," Aerospace Historian (Dec. 1974), 195. Quote is from Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 157.
19 . Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation, p. 157.
20 . In 1958 Ramo-Wooldridge merged with Thompson Products to become TRW, Inc., while Space Technology Laboratories (STL), which had performed general systems engineering and technical direction for the Air Force, became a separate incorporated subsidiary. In 1960 the nonprofit Aerospace Corporation was established with a nucleus of STL personnel to free TRW/STL to compete for production contracts.
21 . Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation, p. 159.
22 Danhof, Government Contracting and Technological Change, pp. 50-51
23 . Joseph Fernandez, The Origin, Evolution, and Operation of the NASA Contractor Source Evaluation Board Process, unpublished M.Sc. thesis (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1966), p. 11. Emphasis in original.
25 . For an account of the 1959 "production of documents" controversy, see Rosholt, Administrative History,. pp. 99-102.
27 . See "Office of Procurement: Organization and Functions," July 1963.
28 . House Committee on Government Operations, Government Procurement and Contracting, Part 2, pp. 475-476. The justification for noncompetitive procurement was signed by Webb in Dec. 1967.
29 . House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963), p. 3020.
30 . According to the National Science Foundation, they supplied a 90-percent average share during fiscal years 1960-1966 and 85 percent during 1967-1969. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1968, p. 333.
31 . Published as Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research and Development, S.Doc. 94, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., May 1962. This report, except for two brief omissions, is reprinted in its entirety in W. R. Nelson, ed., The Politics of Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 193-220, from which the following excerpts are cited.
33 . Ibid., p. 216. For recommendations concerning R&D contracts, see pp. 209-210.
34 . For details of Salary Reform Act, see Danhof, Government Contracting and Technological Change, pp. 121122 for Kennedy's memorandum of 2 May 1963, see House Committee on Government Operations, Systems Development and Management-1963, pp. 271-281.
35 . On these and other reforms in Defense management, see testimony of Director of Defense Research and Engineering Harold Brown, in House Committee on Government Operations, Systems Development and Management, pp. 436-440, and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) Thomas D. Morris, in ibid., p. 551.
36 . House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, p. 463.
37 . Another catalyst for DOD and NASA reforms was the publication in 1962 of Peck and Scherer, Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis. This was one of the first studies to demonstrate the inefficiencies of CPFF contracting. Peck and Scherer found an average cost production error of 220 percent in a sample of twelve CPFF programs. The study and its influence on NASA policy were discussed in a memorandum from Assistant Administrator for Industry Affairs Bernhardt Dorman to Harold Finger dated '8 Dec. 1967.
38 . NASA Circular 231, 29 May 1962. Subject: Special Procurement Study Reprinted in 1964 NASA Authorization pp. 1786-1787.
39 . Charles to Webb, 25 Feb. 1963. Subject: NASA Procurement. This memorandum summarizes Charles' 56-page report, "Recommendations Concerning NASA Procurement Policies," submitted at the same time. Two other reports by Charles were "Conversion from CPFF to CPIF," 7 Aug. 1963, and "Cost Reduction Incentives in Research and Development Contracts," 23 Aug. 1963.
40 . On Sept. 1962 circular, see Circular 242, I Sept. 1962. Subject: Use of Incentive Contracts. Reprinted in House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, pp. 3009-3011. For Nov. 1963 directive, see House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1966 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., l st sess. (1965), p. 387.
41 . Webb to James E. Underwood, 27 Sept. 1966. Webb was also a member of the Commission on Government Procurement from March 1972 to the completion of its report the following December.
42 . As justification for Electronics Research Center, see NASA report, "Role and Mission of the NASA Electronics Research Center," in Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1964 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963), p. 1002. The entire report, at pp. 999-1009, is perhaps the most concise analysis of the rationale for maintaining a large in-house staff.
43 . Report of the Survey Task Team for Study of Major Systems Contracts (JPL: 10 Nov. 1965), p. 38.
44 . House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, 88th Cong., 2d sess. (executive session, 4 Mar. 1964), pp. 627, 626.
45 . Testimony of Deputy Associate Administrator (OSSA) Edgar Cortright in House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1965 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 2d sess. (1964), pp. 1539-1540.
46 . Third draft of a memorandum from Executive Secretary Lawrence Vogel to Deputy Associate Administrator for Industry Affairs William Rieke,2 Dec. 1965. Subject: Administrator's Selection of Contractors to Provide Support Services.
47 . This section is based on the following sources: "DOD Contract Administration Services Support Task Group Report," to George Mueller, 5 Feb.1965 Paper, Clyde Bothmer, Office of Industry Affairs, to Rieke, 30 July 1965. Subject: The Future of Contract Administration in NASA NASA, Office of the Executive Secretary (Program and Special Reports Division, 31 Oct. 1966), Procurement Program, pp. 32-33.
48 . Seamans to Mueller, 23 Sept. 1964.
49 . Memorandum, E. Z. Gray, Director, Advanced Manned Missions, 7 Apr.1965. Subject: Component/System Interaction Problems.
50. Statement of Webb in transcript of Senate Hearing Dry Run (8 June 1967), p. 6. This was a rehearsal involving Webb, Mueller, and Phillips for a hearing in executive session on the Apollo fire by the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences.
52 . Webb to Seamans, 20 Oct. 1964. This is the source for indented quotations below.
53 . Sources. Rough notes and staff papers of joint cost and schedules validation team at Marshall Space Flight Center, June-July 1963, interview with James Elliott, Office of Management Planning, 5 Oct. 1976.
54 . Seamans to members of NASA Management Committee, 17 July 1964. Subject: Outline for Discussion- Probable Contributing Factors to Project Schedule Slippage.
55 . First and Second Interim Reports to the Associate Administrator on Studies Relating to Management Effectiveness in Scheduling and Cost Estimating, 15 Sept. 1964 and 15 Dec.1964. The staff work underlying these reports was carried out by the Program Review, Resources Analysis, and Management Reports Divisions of the Office of Programming, with Thomas E. Jenkins as coordinator.
56 . First Interim Report . . . p. 26.
57 . See ibid., pp. 27-28, for specific recommendations.
58 . Phased project planning was also used in studies for the Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory (canceled in December 1965) the Hypersonic Ramjet Experiment, and the 445-newton-thrust engine for Surveyor, Voyager, and the Manned Orbiting Research Laboratory. Cited by Bernard Maggin, "Phased Project Planning," NASA Management Seminar, 12 Jan. 1966.
59 . Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1966 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (1965), p. 95.
60 . NPD 7121.1, 28 Oct. 1965. Subject: Phased Project Planning.
61 . Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 240.
62 . Report of Commission on Government Procurement, vol. 2 (Dec. 1972), p. 100, n. 11.
63 . For DOD policy on program definition, see DOD Directive 3200.9, I July 1965. Subject: Initiation of Engineering and Operational Systems.
64 . A personal service contract is one in which "an employer-employee relationship between the Government and contractor personnel is provided for in the contract, or actual practice in this respect leads to that conclusion." The U.S. Comptroller General and the Civil Service Commission, in decisions handed down in 1965 and 1967, ruled such contracts invalid. A contract for nonpersonal services "contemplates the furnishing of a service as an end product, rather than merely man-hours of effort. The contractor is actually independent not merely a servant, employee or intermediate agent of the Government." For these definitions, see NASA Office of Programming, Program Reports Division, Procurement Program (27 Oct. 1964), p. 27.
65 . House Committee on Government Operations, Special Studies Subcommittee, A Cost Profile for Support Services, 90th Cong., 2d sess. (23 Apr. 1968), p.7. This was one of a series of hearings held by subcommittee chairman Porter Hardy, Jr. (D-Va.) in 1967 and 1968 on NASA contracting for support services.
66 . These guidelines are in section 3, "Criteria for Contracting Out," in NASA Policy and Procedures for Use of Contracts for Non personal Services (N PC 401, Apr. 1964), issued after reviews by the General Accounting Office and the Civil Service Commission disclosed that the method used at Goddard in hiring technical writers and typists violated the Civil Service Act and the 1949 Classification Act.
67 . The relevant guidelines are in the Bureau's Bulletin 60-2 (21 Sept.1959), which was superseded by Circular A-76 (3 Mar. 1966 revised, 30 Aug. 1967).
68 . GAO Report B-133394, "Potential Savings Available Through Use of Civil Service Rather Than Contractor-Furnished Employees for Certain Support Services," June 1967.
69 . Bernard Sisco, Deputy Assistant Director for Administration, Goddard Space Flight Center, to Carl Schrieber, NASA Office of Procurement, 12 Nov. 1964.
70 . House Committee on Government Operations, A Cost Profile for Support Services, p. 6.
71 . House Committee on Government Operations, Special Studies Subcommittee, Support Service Contract, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (21 June 1967), p. 70.
72 . However, the OMSF centers were permitted to use Boeing for "local support," for which the necessary funds would be transferred to Boeing's contract for the first stage of the Saturn V. Memorandum, Mueller to Paine, 9 July 1969. Subject: Phasedown of Boeing TIE Support . . . Following the First Successful Lunar Landing Mission.
73 . Samuel Phillips to Mueller, 13 Dec. 1968. Subject: Future OMSF Engineering Requirements.
74 . The discussion of the Bellcomm, General Electric, and Boeing TIE contracts is based on the following sources: inspection of pertinent files in Headquarters Contracting Office, interview with Alexander Lyman, NASA Office of Energy Affairs, 3 Dec. 1976 Apollo Program Office, "Apollo Program Office Experience with Engineering Support Contractors," 15 Sept. 1969 and Apollo Program Office, "Paper on the Boeing Technical Integration and Evaluation Contract . . . ," I Oct. 1968.
75 . "Apollo . . . Experience with Engineering Support Contractors," p. 11.
76 . This quotation and the Gemini-Apollo comparison are in ibid., p. A-2.
77 . See, for example, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, pp. 146, 376-377, 1126-1133 (Bellcomm) and 389-390, 1102-1107 (GE).
79 . House Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Avoiding Conflicts of Interest in Defense Contracting and Employment, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (22 Nov. 1963), pp. 81-83. Restrictions on GE are in NASA Circular 280, 16 Apr. 1963. Subject: Restrictions on contracting with the General Electric Company where competitive advantage may exist. Reprinted in House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, pp. 3265-3266.
80 . "Paper on Boeing TIE . . ., p. 4.
83 . On a visit to the Manned Spacecraft Center in August 1968, Finger explained "that one of the reasons for selecting Boeing for the TIE contract was that North American Rockwell's interest in subcontracts with Boeing for the SST made Boeing less competitive with North American Rockwell than other large aerospace firms. [North American Aviation has merged with Rockwell Standard in September 1967.] Therefore, Boeing was in a better position to step in to manage the Downey plant if such a drastic measure had been necessary to get the Apollo spacecraft program back on its feet after the Apollo 204 accident." Lawrence Vogel, memorandum for the record, "Mr. Finger's Visit to MSC to Review Boeing TIE Activities, 20 Aug. 1968." 8 Nov. 1968, p. 7.
84 . See "Paper on Boeing TIE . . . ," passim.
85 . Lawrence Vogel, memorandum for the record, 8 Nov. 1968. Emphasis added.
86 . Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1971, pp. 41-42.
87 . This is the charge made by H. L. Nieburg. "The so-called 'supporting role' of Bellcomm as a decision-making input may rather be a determining influence in the policy choices of NASA officials. That this process is at work was revealed in the most important NASA technical decision: selection of the mode of Right for the manned lunar landing." H. L. Nieburg, In the Name of Science, revised ed. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970) p. 261.
88 . Courtney J. Brooks, James M. Grimwood, Loyd Swenson, Jr., Chariots for Apollo (Comment draft, Aug. 1976), p. 137.
89 . Lyman interview and memorandum, Webb to Mueller, 26 Sept. 1967. Subject: Procurement Plan for a Continuation of Systems Analysis, Study, Planning and Technical Support Performed by Bellcomm, Inc. under Contract NASW-417.
90 . "Apollo . . . Experience with Engineering Contractors," p. 1.
91 . Brooks et al., Chariots for Apollo, p. 152 and n.
92 . Gilruth to Mueller, 9 Jan. 1969. See also letters from von Braun, 21 Jan., and Kurt Debus, 14 Jan.
93 . House Committee on Government Operations, Special Studies Subcommittee, Investigation of the Boeing TIE Contract-Part 1, 90th Cong., 2d sess. (15 July 1968), pp. 3, 6, 8.
94 . When the Panel on Government Laboratories of the President's Science Advisory Committee visited MSC in 1964, they could not "help contrasting the atmosphere in which NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center operates with that of the Air Force's Avionics Laboratory. While competent professionals populate both, the sense of mission in MSC is infinitely stronger. Unlike some of the agencies previously treated, NASA has a strong line management organization for its technical effort. The NASA organization, furthermore, is relatively new and does not exhibit yet the 'agings effects observed in older organizations." Report of Panel on Government Laboratories of the President's Science Advisory Committee (>an. 1965), pp. 11, 21.
95 . Merton J. Peck and Frederick M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1962), pp. 56-57.
96 . Webb to Frank R. Hammill, Jr. (Counsel, House Committee on Science and Astronautics), 5 Apr. 1965.
97 . Thomas P. Murphy, Science, Geopolitics, and Federal Spending, table 6-14, pp. 183-185 and 182, 186.
98 . "Statement of the Administrator of NASA on Selection of a Contractor for the Saturn Stage S-11," 15 Sept. 1961, and covering letter from Webb to Seamans, 16 Oct. 1961.
99 . Peck and Scherer, Weapons Acquisition Process, p. 331, n. 13.
100 . Fernandez, Origin . . . of the NASA . . . Source Evaluation Board Process, pp. l 5,23. It would seem that the high cost barriers to entry into major systems development have given certain firms a lock on such programs. DOD figures on contract awards show that eighteen of twenty-five contractors in 1958 were still in the top bracket in 1969. Report of Commission on Government Procurement (Dec.1972),2:124, n. 20. NASA figures are more difficult to interpret because the ability of a contractor to remain in the top bracket year after year might owe less to its ability to compete for new contracts than for payments on major contracts already awarded, e.g., the Grumman contract for the lunar module. See NASA Data Book, tables 5-22 to 5-27.
101 . Wyatt to Hilburn, 15 June 1964. Subject: Source Evaluation Boards, Draft Manual of Procedures, Comments. The examples of overruns and slippages noted above are excerpted from this memorandum.
102 . This was one of the reasons for awarding RCA a contract for operating and maintaining two new tracking facilities. NASA wanted to write in a ceiling on overhead, the amount of the fixed fee, and the like and RCA's response to these special provisions was the most satisfactory received. "Selection of Contractor for Operation, Maintenance, and Logistic Support of the New Data Acquisition Facilities near Fairbanks, Alaska and Rosman, North Carolina," 27 June 1963.
103 . Peck and Scherer, Weapons Acquisition Process, p. 377.
104 . Erasmus H. Kloman, "Case Study to the Lunar Orbiter Program," draft submitted to National Academy of Public Administration (June 1971), pp. 41-42, 70. One of the principal reasons for awarding North American Aviation rather than the Martin Company the Apollo command and service modules contract- although the SEB had given the latter a higher overall rating-was because of its outstanding performance in developing the X-15, F-86, and F-100. For excerpts from the SEB report, see Brooks et al., Chariots for Apollo, pp. 71-72.
105 . Eldon Taylor (Director, Program Review and Resources Management, OSSA) to Bernard Moritz (Acting Associate Administrator for Organization and Management), 20 May 1969.
106 . Finger to Phillip Whittaker (Assistant Administrator for Industry Affairs), 28 Jan. 1969.
107 . Herbert Kaufman, The Limits of Organizational Change (University of Alabama Press, 1971), pp. 33, 35
108 . Procurement Program (31 Oct. 1966), p. 8.
109 . Management of NASA Study of NASA Acquisition Process, p 25.
110 . Edward B. Roberts, "How the U.S. Buys Research," in David Allison, ed., The R&D Game (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 292, 294. See same author's "Questioning the Cost/Effectiveness of the R&D Procurement Process," in M.C. Yovits et al., eds. Research Program Effectiveness (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1966), pp. 93-113, which was based on research supported by NASA Grant No. NaNSG 235-62.
111 . Roberts, "How the U.S. Buys Research," p. 289. In a study of forty-one Defense contracts, ranging from $100 000 to $8 million, and ten non-DOD (NASA?) awards, from 51 million to $40 million, Roberts found that "about 60 percent of the R&D awards were made on a sole-source basis-without formal competition " Ibid., p. 284.
112 . Management Study of NASA Acquisition Process, p 6.
113 . Memorandum, Dorman to Finger, 18 Dec. 1967, and Procurement Program (31 Oct. 1966), p. 17. In FY 1966, ninety-two incentive contracts, totaling $4.3 billion, were cost-plus-incentive-fee fifty-one ($447 million) were award fee thirty-two ($222 million) were fixed-price incentives and fifteen ($306 million) were mixed.
114 . Mueller said this at an executive session of an OMSF program review, 20 Apr. 1965. Transcript, p. 10.
115 . Dorman to Finger, 18 Dec. 1967.
116 . Mueller to Morton Henig (Assistant Director, Civil Division, GAO), 23 May 1968.
117 . See note 114 above, p. 10.
118 . Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc., .Study of the Effectiveness of NASA Incentive Contracts, vol. 1. This study was done under NASA contract NASW-1277. The final report, on which the remainder of this section is based, was submitted on 5 Aug. 1966 a summary report was submitted on 15 Sept.
119 . The contracts (and the prime contractors) were as follows: Pioneer spacecraft, Orbiting Geophysical Observatories, and Follow-on Orbiting Geophysical Observatories (TRW Systems Group) Gemini spacecraft (McDonnell Aircraft) biosatellite spacecraft (General Electric, Re-entry Systems Department) Orbiting Astronomical Observatories (Grumman) Delta vehicles (Douglas Aircraft) Lunar Orbiter spacecraft (Boeing) instrumentation units and prototype guidance computer and data adapters (IBM Federal Systems Division) ST-124M stabilized platform (Bendix Corporation) crawler transporter for launch complex 39, KSC (Marion Power Shovel Company) Manned Spaceflight Tracking Network operation and maintenance (Bendix Field Engineering Corporation) base support services for KSC launch complex (Trans-World Airlines) support services for MSC (Brown & Root/Northrup).
120 . Summary Report, pp. 2-3.
121 . Study of the Effectiveness of NASA Incentive Contracts, p 51.
122 . Procurement Program (31 Oct. 1966), p. 20.
123 . Study of the Effectiveness of NASA Incentive Contracts, p 72.
124 . Sapolsky has noted the same contradiction in the development of weapons systems. "Unlike cost-plus contracts, the targets and their rankings in incentive contracts are supposedly fixed for the length of the contract and, thus, can reflect only the conditions that exist at the beginning of the development effort or that can be then anticipated. Yet, unpredictable changes in political conditions affecting major weapon acquisitions seem to require constant alterations in project targets and their rankings. It seems unrealistic to expect the development and procurement targets of major weapon systems . . . will remain fixed." Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, p 214.
125 . Study of the Effectiveness of NASA Incentive Contracts, pp. 80-94.
1 . From 57 500 at the end of June 1961 to 115 500 one year later and to 218 000 one year after that. NASA Data Book, table 3-26.
2 . This is the figure given by Seamans for the third quarter (Jan.-Mar.) of FY 1966. House Science and Astronautics Committee, 1968 NASA Authorization, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (1967), p. 111.
3 . NASA Personnel Division, Personnel Division Report: The In-House Work Force, Sept.1969, p.3. All figures are as of 30 June. The employment figures are divided between contractor and in-house employees as follows: 1966, 360 000 contractor and 36 000 in-house 1967, 273 000 and 34 000 1968, 235 000 and 33 000 1969, 186 000 and 32 000. The 11-percent decline in the NASA work force from 1966 to 1969 conceals the variations between one center and another in personnel reductions.
4 . NPD 1240.1, "Functional Management," 13 June 1966.
5 . Memorandum, Ray Kline to members of NASA Personnel Management Review Committee, 21 Feb. 1968, "Consolidation of Comments on Items in the Civil Service Inspections Report," p. 2. These comments were omitted in the Committee progress report of Apr. 1968.
6 . The remainder of this and the whole of the next paragraph are based on a paper by Leonard Carulli, management analyst in the Organization and Management Planning Division, "Establishing and Filling Excepted and Super-Grade or Key Positions," 5 May 1967. The quotation immediately below is from p. 4.
7 . Ibid., p. 6. Adams is Mac Adams, who succeeded Raymond Bisplinghoff as Associate Administrator for Advanced Research and Technology in 1965. Holmes is Brainerd Holmes, Director of Manned Space Flight from 1961 to 1963. Harry Goett was fired as Director of Goddard in July 1965 in the wake of disagreement with general management over the proper amount of supervision of the center by headquarters. Goett thought that there was too much supervision, if not downright interference Associate Administrator for Space Science Newell and Seamans, that in the existing external climate they could do no less.
8 . This section draws extensively on the notes and memorandums assembled by Howard N. Braithwaite, staff assistant to the NASA Executive Salary Committee from 1958 to 1967. Two items were particularly useful: "A Summary of Major Developments . . . ," Jan. 1967 (cited as "Summary"), and a paper addressed to Associate Deputy Administrator Willis Shapley, 23 Apr. 1968, titled "History of Super-Grade Positions, NACA/NASA" (cited as "Super-Grade Positions"). I would also like to thank Bill Lee, of the NASA Personnel Office, for making less mysterious the intricacies of NASA's use of excepted positions.
9 . Braithwaite, "Super-Grade Positions," p. 4. "P-8." on the old civil service professional scale, was equivalent to GS-15 on the new "general schedule."
10 . Ibid., pp. 4 3. Italics and inverted commas omitted.
11 . Victor K. Heyman, "Government by Contract: Boon or Boner?" Public Administration Review 21 (Spring 1961): 63.
13 . These were the positions from grade GS-16 and above that were actually filled, rather than simply authorized. There were 341 nonquota GS-16 positions, 355 excepted positions (out of 425), and 11 Public Law 313 positions for a total of 707 positions filled. One important point is that all nonquota positions were filled at the GS-16 level. As a matter of policy, NASA used its allotment of excepted positions to appoint at grades GS-17 and GS-18 in order to avoid having to justify such appointments to the Civil Service Commission.
14 . Braithwaite, "Summary," p. Vll.
15 . Braithwaite, "Processing of Actions for Excepted and GS-16/18 Positions," 15 Nov. 1963, p. 1.
16 . Braithwaite, "Executive Personnel Program," p. 46.
17 . Braithwaite, "Summary," p. IV.
18 . Memorandum from John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Civil Service Commission, 14 Oct. 1966, to heads of executive departments and agencies.
19 . Macy to Webb, 29 Aug. 1966.
20. Braithwaite memorandum, 22 Feb. 1968, p. 10.
21 . Comparisons of employment figures for different agencies are notoriously difficult because of the lack of uniform definitions of occupational groups. For what they are worth, the data collected by the National Science Foundation (NSF) show that in 1969 the 7 Federal agencies employing the greatest number of scientists and engineers were DOD (76 026), Agriculture (25 783), Interior (15 340), NASA (13 918), Commerce (6 293), Health Education, and Welfare (6 123), and Transportation (5 049). Thus NASA employed more scientists and engineers than all but three Federal agencies, and these three had much greater total employment than NASA. Source: National Science Foundation, Scientific, Technical and Health Personnel in the Federal Government, 1969 (NSF 70-44), table 6. Even more remarkable is that the percentage of NASA scientists and engineers actually engaged in R&D has been consistently higher than that of any other Government agency. The data collected by NSF at two-year intervals from October 1967 to October 1973 show that the percentage of NASA scientists and engineers in R&D has ranged from a low of 51.7% in 1967 to a high of 53.3% in 1973. By comparison, the figures in those years for DHEW and DOD, with the next highest percentages were DHEW, 45.9% and 44.5% and DOD, 33% and 33.8%. Figures for other agencies are much lower. l am indebted to Joseph Gannon of the NSF Manpower Utilization Studies Group for this information.
22 . This definition is included as part of NASA's reply to a series of questions submitted by Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.), chairman of the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. NASA assembled a number of papers and tables and titled the collection Reply to Sen. Gaylord Nelson (1965). This definition is taken from the Reply, p 12-1.
23 . Rosholt, Administrative History, p 267.
25 . Reply to Sen. Gaylord Nelson, p. 12-3, which is based on the same source as that for table 3.
26 . Ibid, p. 12-6. The last figure is an estimate from budget projections for FY 1966.
27 . Executive Order 11246, "Equal Employment Opportunity," p. 1.
28 . U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on HUD, Space, Science, Veterans and Certain Other Independent Agencies-Part 1, 93rd Cong., 2d sess. (1974), pp. 108-109. See pp. 1-156 for a general review of NASA policy on EEO. The remainder of this paragraph and the whole of the next are based on material submitted at these hearings.
29 . See Adm. W. Fred Boone (USN, Ret.), NASA Office of Defense Affairs: The First Five Years (NASA HHR-32, Dec. 1970), pp. 42-60, for an account of NASA's use of military detailees. See also Edgar E. Ulsamer, "USAF Professionalism-A National Resource," Air Force Magazine (Dec. 1967): 101-106. Retired military officers who have worked for NASA include Adm. Boone, Lieut. Gen. Frank Bogart (USAF), who was Deputy Associate Administrator (OMSF) before becoming Associate Director of MSC Maj. Gen. Robert Curtin (USAF), who became the first Director of Facilities in May 1968 and Lieut. Gen. Duward Crow (USAF), who was appointed Associate Deputy Administrator of NASA in 1975.
30 . NASA Data Book, table 3-6.
31 . Boone, NASA Office of Defense Affairs, p. 55.
32 . For information on astronaut selection, see note 28 above, pp. 122-131.
33 . Memorandum for the record, 5 Feb. 1968. Subject: Trip by [Personnel Management Review Committee] to Lewis Research Center on January 26, 1968. Memorandum was written by Ray Kline, executive secretary to the Committee.
34 . For material on patterns of support service contracting at the Manned Space Flight centers, see Office of Programming (Program Reports Division), Procurement Program, 27 Oct. 1964, pp. 21-23.
35 . House Government Operations Committee, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Missile and Space Ground Support Operations, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (21 Mar. 1966), p. 63.
36 . Webb to Kermit Gordon, Director, Bureau of the Budget, 14 Dec. 1964.
37 . Annual Report of the Comptroller General of the United States for Fiscal Year 1964 (Washington: USGPO, 1964), p. 19.
38 . Interview with Walter Shupe, Director, GAO Liaison Activities, 6 Dec. 1976.
39 . Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964), p. 141. Emphasis added.
40 . House Committee on Government Operations, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Government Operations in Space, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (4 June 1965), p. 14.
41 . Annual Report of the Comptroller General . . . 1964, pp. 291-292, 436. In Aug. 1971 the Pratt & Whitney Division of United Aircraft Corporation filed a formal protest with the GAO against the award of the contract for the main engine of the space shuttle to the Rocketdyne Division of North American Rockwell. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1971 (NASA SP-4016, 1972), pp. 218, 233.
42 . These reports are drawn from the lists of audit reports published in the annual reports of the U.S. Comptroller General.
43 . In a memorandum of I Apr. 1966, Deputy Associate Administrator Earl Hilburn notes that "a high percentage of the GAO draft reports have been cancelled (dropped) because of NASA's replies. Recent examples are the case with respect to the Douglas fee on subcontractors' work in connection with the Delta, the Nerva case dealing with the contracting arrangement between Westinghouse and Aerojet, and several cases involving reasonableness of costs at contractor's operations (LTV, Rocketdyne, Douglas, etc.)."
44 . Office of the Executive Secretary (Program and Special Reports Division), Audit Program, 31 Oct. 1966, pp. 15-16.
45 . Transcript of taped meeting of Webb, Seamans, and all the center directors, 28 Sept. 1966, p. 35. Staats, of course, had recently left the Bureau of the Budget, of which he was Deputy Director, to head the GAO.
46 . "Considerations in the Management of Manpower in NASA," p. 1.
47 . On the "Marshall problem," see ibid., pp. 3-4.
49 . Ibid., p. 13. See section on "Aligning Manpower and Program Requirements," pp. 13-20.
52 . U.S. Comptroller General, "Report on Potential Savings Available Through Use of Civil Service Rather Than Contractor-Furnished Employees for Certain Support Services, National Aeronautics and Space Administration," June 1967, Code B-133394. This report was submitted to Congress, and copies were sent to Webb. For figures on Marshall and Goddard contracts, see tables, pp. 9, 23.
54 . Aviation Week and Space Technology (30 Oct. 1967), p. 20.
55 . For NASA response to the GAO report and the Pellerzi decision, see House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Support Service Contracting by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 90th Cong., 2d sess., (Apr. 1968), pp. 5, 7-8, 19, 23-25.
56 . NASA News Release, "NASA Contractor Conversion Plan," 27 Dec. 1968.
57 . Annual Report of the Comptroller General . . . 1969, pp. 146-148. For changes at Marshall, see briefing by von Braun for the Administrator's Management Advisory Panel, 11? Apr. 1969, pp. 14-15.
58 . For 1962 review, see Rosholt, Administrative History, pp. 268-269.
59 . From cover letter, Macy to Webb, 10 Oct. 1967.
60 . Memorandum for the record by Ray Kline, "Discussion of Personnel Management Review Committee with Mr. Webb on January 8, 1968," 9 Jan. 1968.
61 . NASA Personnel Division, Personnel Division Report: The In-House Work Force, Sept. 1969, pp. 52-55. A "high" or "low" rate was one higher or lower than the NASA-wide percentage. In FY 1969, Langley had the lowest accession and the lowest separation rates in NASA.
63 . Personnel Management Review Committee, Progress Report, Apr. 1968, p. 23.
65 . For these recommendations, see ibid., pp. 19, 22, 15, 3.
67 . James E. Webb, "NASA As An Adaptive Organization," John Diebold Lecture on Technological Change, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration (Boston: 30 Sept. 1968), pp. 47-48.
68 . Briefing by von Braun for Management Advisory Panel, p. 8.
69 . Considerations in the Management of Manpower in NASA," p. 4.
70 . Von Braun briefing, pp. 8- 11.
71 . Personnel Management Review Committee, Progress Report, p. 21.
72 . The average age of permanent employees had risen to 41, up 1.6 years since 1968. The greatest net loss had been for those under age 25. NASA Office of Personnel, The In-House Work Force, Sept. 1970, pp. 20-21.
73 . Paine to Mayo, 18 Aug. 1969, pp. 2-3.
75 . Finger to Assistant Administrator for Administration William Lilly, 25 Sept. 1968.
77. MSC, "Background . . . of the Reduction-in-Force at the Manned Spacecraft Center during FY 68 . . " (n.d.), pp. 5-6.
79 . Paper in files of Personnel Management Review Committee, based on discussion by Seamans with the Committee, 18 Jan. 1968.
80 . Seamans Exit Interview, p. 51.
81 . Memorandum for the record by Ray Kline, " Discussion with OSSA Top Management on January 29,1968," 30 Jan. 1968.
1 . Webb to Chet Holifield (D-Calif.), 20 May 1964.
2 . Joins DOT-NASA Report, Civil Aviation Research and Development Policy Study (Mar. 1971), pp. 25/2-6. Italics omitted.
3 . NASA Headquarters Management Seminar, Unit 11, "The Planning and Approval Process" (Nov. 1964), p. 5.
4 . "Report on Excepted Positions in the Office of Programming," 12 Mar. 1965.
5 . Exit interview with DeMarquis Wyatt, conducted by Eugene Emme, John Sloop, and William Fleming, 21 June 1973, p. 97.
6 . This paragraph and the next are based on a memorandum from Fleming to Seamans, 11 Sept. 1964.
7 . "Staff Paper on Proposed Space Science Data Center Concept," 8 Nov. 1965.
8 . Seamans to Newell, 15 Nov. 1965.
9 . Raymond A. Bauer and Richard F. Meyer, NASA Planning and Decision Making-Final Report (typescript contractor report, Jan. 1970), vol. l, p.111-12. On the problems involved in assigning the Saturn IB/Centaur to either Lewis or Marshall, see draft memorandum, Seamans to Mueller, Newell, and Bisplinghoff, "Considerations Concerning Management of Saturn IB/Centaur," 2 Feb. 1965.
10 . Seamans to Program Associate Administrators, "Selection of Contractors for Advanced Studies," 24 Oct.1963.
11 . The varied nature of these studies should be stressed. A study might be exploratory, which systematically analyzes an idea for a new program or system it might be an examination of feasibility to determine "the practicability of accomplishing, within a specified period, a given space project, program or major component" it might be parametric, a study of tradeoffs between the different elements of a program it might be a preliminary design study, which makes detailed assessments of the assumptions underlying earlier study phases or it might be a detailed engineering design, in which the design could be specified to the point where it was possible to let contracts for hardware production. Citation is from the Office of Plans and Program Evaluation, "Review of NASA's Advanced Study Program," Oct. 1963, p. 7.
12 . NASA Data Book, table 4-23. See also a staff paper, "NASA Advanced Studies Mission," 1 May 1963.
13 . For further guidelines, see Seamans to Program Associate Administrators, "Award of Contracts for Advanced Systems and Mission Studies," 14 Apr. 1966.
14 . Interview with William Fleming, 8 Feb. 1977.
15 . Transcript of tape, "Meeting with Mr. Webb on Budget Discussion, 11 Aug. 1967, pp. 28-29.
16 . Bauer and Meyer, NASA Planning and Decision Making, vol. 1, pp. 111-31/32.
17 . At a staff meeting in the summer of 1967, Associate Deputy Administrator Willis Shapley announced that "Dr. Seamans has authorized a major in-house study on the space station concept. OSSA wants this study and considers such a station as NASA's most important potential contribution. This view is not shared by others." From notes of functional staff meeting taken by NASA Executive Officer Lawrence A. Vogel, 20 July 1967.
18 . This account is based on Adm. W. Fred Boone (USN, Ret.), NASA Of lice of Defense Affairs (NASA HHR-32, Dec. 1970), pp. 88-96, and House Committee on Government Operations Committee, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Government Operations in Space, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (4 June 1965), pp. 84-91.
19 . Government Operations in Space, p. 90.
20 . Boone, NASA Office of Defense Affairs, p. 88.
22 . Government Operations in Space, p. 90.
23 . Office of Plans and Program Evaluation, "Review of NASA's Advanced Study Program," Oct. 1963, pp. 3, 13.
24 . Seamans to Program Associate Administrators, "Guidelines for FY 1965 Contract Advanced Mission Study Program," 12 Oct. 1964.
25 . Fleming to George Trimble, Director, OMSF Advanced Manned Mission Program, 19 June 1967.
26 . Seamans to Program Associate Administrators, "Advanced Mission Studies," 30 Aug. 1967. This action was preceded by a memorandum from Fleming to Webb dated 22 Aug., recommending that he withdraw approval, and by the discussion of advanced studies cited in note 15 above. On the MSC study contract for a Mars-Venus flyby, see Science 158 (24 Nov. 1967): 1028.
27 . The Air Force approach to R&D planning is set forth in the Air Force Systems Command 375 series of manuals.
28 . NASA Headquarters Management Seminar, Unit 111, "Budget Formulation and Execution" (Nov. 1964), p.26. It should be noted that the 506 green was issued by Seamans to the program offices they, in turn, issued a 506 white authorizing resources to the centers.
29 Wyatt to headquarters offices, 29 May 1963. Subject: Revision of Project Approval Document System.
31 . This paragraph is based on the following sources: Memorandum, Hilburn to Seamans, 30 Aug.1965. Subject: Establishment of Office of Finance Program Review Document, Financial Management Program, 31 Oct. 1966 and NASA, Management Effectiveness Report to the President of the United States for Fiscal Years 1971 and 1970, submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, 13 Oct. 1970, to meet the requirement of the Office's Circular A-44.
32 . See Hilburn memorandum cited in note 31.
33 . Wyatt to Paine, 10 Apr. 1969. Subject: NASA Cost Projections.
34 . Ibid. In a study of twelve major weapons projects, Peck and Scherer found that average costs exceeded estimates by a factor of 3.2. Peck and Scherer, Weapons Acquisition Process, table 16.1, p. 429.
36 . Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris Systems Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 125, 246.
37 . Erasmus Kloman, Case Study of the Surveyor Program (typed manuscript, June 1971), p. 216.
38 . Memorandum, T. Hechler, Jr., to Fleming, 4 Mar. 1965. Subject: Cost Relationship Study, Project Gemini. Also, interviews with Fleming, Bernard Maggin dated I Feb. 1977, and DeMarquis Wyatt, 9 Mar. 1977.
39 . Notes and daily logs of Cost Validation task force members. June 1963.
40 . For an account of NASA costing techniques, see DeMarquis Wyatt, "Cost Models for Complex Programs," a lecture delivered at the National Conference on the Management of Aerospace Programs at the University of Missouri, Columbia, 17 Nov. 1966, and issued as a NASA news release.
41 . Memorandum, Dixon Forsythe to J. L. Mitchell, 27 May 1965. Forsythe was program manager of the Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory. Emphasis in original.
42 . Assistant Administrator for Industry Affairs Bernhardt Dorman to Wyatt, 9 June 1967, citing a letter from von Braun of 27 March.
43 . The principal management instructions were NPD 7000.1, "Authorization and Control of Agency Programs and Allocation of Resources," issued 16 Mar.1968 NPD 7121.1A, "Phased Project Planning," 2 May 1968 NHB 7121.2, "Phased Project Planning Guidelines," final draft, 28 Feb. 1968, issued Aug. 1968 and NMI 7100.4, "Authorization and Control of Research and Development Programs, Projects, Other Activities, and Resources Related Thereto," 15 Aug. 1968.
44 . As illustration of the confusion in defining and authorizing projects, consider the anomalies of facilities planning. To avoid the cumbersome authorization process, many centers funded their facilities out of R&D money by distinguishing between nonseverable facilities, which were funded out of "construction of facilities" (COF) money, and severable facilities, which could be funded out of R&D money. The flooring or heating ducts of a building cannot be severed from the building itself the chairs and furniture can. A center could build a shell for $100 000 under COF and then install millions of dollars worth of equipment under R&D because the equipment was severable from the building in which it was contained. One reason for reestablishing the Facilities Office in May 1968 was to control such construction funding.
45 . Transcript of Webb's remarks at meeting of Management Advisory Panel, 19 Apr. 1968, p. 58.
46 . Exit interview with Harold Finger, 16 Apr. 1969, p. 24.
47 Finger cited a Centaur PAD sent up by OSSA. "Here we were in the middle of a budget reduction process. We were cutting money out of the Centaur program . . . and a PAD change comes in that includes a budget number for fiscal year 1970 that I know is higher than the one that we're going to be handling. So I said I'm not going to sign the PAD. So the Office of Space Science and Applications got very upset. Well, we don't know that's the final number. I said yes we do, you know darn well it isn't going to be the right number. And I said I'm not going to ask the Administrator. In fact, l won't allow the Administrator to sign something that he knows is wrong." See Finger exit interview, p. 32.
49 . This section is based on interviews with Frederick Bryant and Richard Stock (3 Feb.1977) and Robert Rapp (11 Feb. 1977), all of OTDA, and Review of Tracking and Data Acquisition Program, hearings before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Aeronautics and Space Technology Subcommittee, 93rd Cong., 1st and 2d sess. (Oct. 1973-Jan. 1974). I have used the present tense for most of this section, since OTDA's current organization and operating philosophy are very close to what they were in the mid-1960s.
50 . For background of the decision to build one large antenna, see testimony of DSN Director Eberhardt Rechtin, in House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Manned Space Flight Subcommittee, 1967 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (1966), pp. 762-763.
51 . Source: Rapp interview.
52 . See chapter 4, note 59.
53 . Review of Tracking and Data Acquisition Program, p. 58.
54 . House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963), p. 1882.
55 . See Edwin P. Hartman, Adventures in Research (NASA SP-4302, 1970), especially pp. 397, 399, 404-407, 411-412
56 . Finger to Ray Romatowski (Director, Organization and Management Planning Division), 22 May 1967. Subject: OART Management and Control System Proposal for SRT.
57 . Richard L. Chapman et al., Project Management in NASA (NASA SP-324, 1973), pp. 28-30.
58 . Program Review Document, Mission Analysis Division Programs, 21 Sept. 1967.
59 . Information supplied by Assistant Associate Administrator for Center Operations Paul Cotton, 22 Feb.1977. Cotton was Director of the Program and Resources Division from 1967 to 1970.
60 . Memorandum, Bisplinghoff to OART Division Directors and Staff, 28 May 1964. Subject: Organizational Changes in OART.
61 . See minutes of 3rd meeting of NASA Management Committee, 27-28 Oct. 1963, section on SRT-Revised Assumptions.
62 . Memorandum, Associate Administrator for Advanced Research and Technology James Beggs to Finger, 27 June 1968.
63 . Memorandum, Dr. Leo Packer (special assistant to Associate Administrator, OART) to Willis Shapley, 7 Aug. 1969. Subject: Observations on OART.
64 . See note 62 and Chapman, Project Management in NASA, p. 41.
65 . Principal sources for this section include a Program Review Document, Science and Applications Management, and an interview with Dr. Homer E. Newell, I Feb. 1977.
66 . Norriss P. Hetherington, "Winning the Initiative: NASA and the U.S. Space Science Program," Prologue (Summer 1975): 105.
67 . See briefing by Newell to Science Advisory Committee, 8 July 1966 Report of the Committee of the Administrator, 15 Aug. 1966 memorandum, Newell to Seamans, 20 Dec. 1966, commenting on the report and Interim Response to the Report of the Ad Hoc Science Advisory Committee, 7 June 1967, which incorporated most of Newell's criticisms.
68 . Report on Advisory Boards, 15 Jan. 1968, p. 41.
69 . Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Scientists' Testimony on Space Coals, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (10-11 June 1963), especially comments of Dr. Philip Abelson at p. 11 and Prof. Martin Schwarzschild at pp. 160-161.
70 . See statement of Dr. John Naugle in Science and Applications Management, p. 46.
71 . House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Space Science and Applications Subcommittee, 1966 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (1965), p. 1054.
72 . Newell, draft of "Functions and Authorities of Program Managers and Project Managers in Office of Space Science and Applications Flight Programs," 10 Feb. 1966. This followed by one week a reorganization of OSSA that established a Program Review and Resources Management division in each program office and set up a Manned Flight Experiments Office to work with OMSF.
73 . See transcript of briefing for Webb by Goddard officials on OAO-I failure, 4 Nov. 1966, p. 53.
74 . Presentation by Goddard officials to NASA Headquarters management as part of an "Institutional Base Study," 12 June 1971, p. 83.
75 . Sources: Newell interview and memorandum, Hilburn to Seamans, 21 July 1965, in which Hilburn said that after a long discussion with Newell the consensus was to "remove Harry at once." And they did.
76 . Science and Applications Management, p. 45.
77 . The following sources have proved useful: the 1966 Apollo Program Development Plan and the 14-volume survey of Apollo Program Management issued by the Apollo Program Office, Nov. 1967-Jan. 1968.
78 . Seamans exit interview, p. 53.
79 . Open-ended missions "are designed to continue so long as astronauts' safety is not impaired, until a series of objectives are reached with the option at each step of terminating the mission." Statement of George Mueller, House Science and Astronautics Committee, Apollo Program Pace and Progress, staff study for Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (17 Mar. 1967), p. 3.
80 . Seamans exit interview, pp. 115-116.
82 . 21st meeting of Manned Space Flight Management Council, 24 Sept. 1963.
83 . Apollo Program Office (KSC), Apollo Program Management, vol. 4, Kennedy Space Center (15 Jan. 1968), p. 3-1.
84 . Apollo Program Office, Apollo Program Management, vol. 3, Marshall Space Flight Center (Dec. 1967), p. 1-2.
85 . Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963 (NASA SP-4004, 1964), pp. 190, 420.
86 . House Science and Astronautics Committee, 1965 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 2d sess. (1964), p. 447.
87 . Gilruth to E. Z. Gray, 5 Aug. 1964. Emphasis added.
88 . Seamans to Program Associate Administrators, "Management Responsibilities for Future Manned Flight Activities," 26 July 1966.
89 . Although the evidence is not conclusive, the decision to develop the supersonic transport (SST) was probably of this sort. The pressure for an SST program came from within Government rather than from the civil aviation industry, which insisted that the Government foot the bill for proving the concept. The prime movers for an SST-the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA, and FAA officials (together with DOD officials)-signed an agreement in June 1961 to study the feasibility of a supersonic transport, which was two years before President Kennedy, in June 1963, authorized Congress to fund an SST program.
1 . Senate Committee on Government Operations, Financial Management in the Federal Government, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (13 Feb. 1961), p. 131.
2 . Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), pp. 11-13, 57-60. When this was published, the Budget Bureau had not yet metamorphosed into the Office of Management and Budget.
3 . Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 251.
4 . For a history of these and other proposals, see financial Management in the Federal Government, and Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964), pp. 104-127.
5 . For an account of the Bureau's reorganization and its powers and authorities prior to 1970, see Lewis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 44-51, and Peter Woll, ed., Public Administration and Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), Part 111.
6 . William S. Beller, "Decision-Making in Washington," Space/Aeronautics (Dec. 1967): 83-98, and Donald F. Hornig, "The President's Scientist: A Private Diary," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Apr. 1977): 62-64.
7 . BOB staff paper, "FY 1966 NASA Budget Review," 12 Nov. 1964, p. 1-4.
8 . House Government Operations Committee, Military Operations Subcommittee, Government Operations in Space, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (4 June 1965), p. 106.
9 . House Science and Astronautics Committee, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, hearing on CAO Report on Analysis of Cost of Space Shuttle Program, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. (26 June 1973), p. Vll.
10 . As shown by NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher's reply to U.S. Comptroller General Elmer Staats, reprinted in ibid., pp. 94-97.
11 . On NASA's use of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness studies, see Senate Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee, Hearings-Part 1, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. (1973), pp. 510-512. This includes NASA and GAO correspondence pertaining to such studies, and selected lists of cost-benefit studies at pp. 511, 513, and 518-519. Note that the difference between cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses is that the former are those "in which benefits are measurable in terms of dollars." The GAO study concluded that while "only certain NASA programs are susceptible to cost-benefit analysis involving dollar-measurable benefits . . . we believe that all NASA programs are susceptible to cost-effectiveness analysis." Ibid., pp. 511-512.
12 . NASA Assistant Administrator for Administration William Lilly to Elmer Staats, 16 Nov. 1967.
13 . House Science and Astronautics Committee, Authorizing Appropriations to NASA, 89th Cong., 1st sess., Rep. No. 273 (3 May 1965), p. 118.
14 . Without citing an authority, Lewis Fisher has noted that $35 000 in R&D funds was set aside as a contingency fund for national security purposes. See Presidential Spending Power, pp. 207-208. This is apparently an erroneous reference to sec. 1(f) of the 1969 and 1970 NASA Authorization Act, which permits the Administrator to use up to $35 000 in R&D appropriations "for scientific consultations or extraordinary expenses . . . and his determination shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers of the Government." This is the Administrator's "champagne money" and has nothing to do with national security.
15 . NHB 7330.1, "Approval of Facility Projects" (July 1966), p. 25.
16 . Paine to Speaker of the House, 15 Jan. 1969, enclosing copy of draft bill to authorize appropriations for NASA.
17 . 1966 NASA Authorization Act, sec. 4(3). Emphasis added. However, the act did provide that such programs might be funded if the Committee was notified in advance and gave approval.
18 . Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1966 NASA Authorization, pp. 947-950.
19 . Wyatt to William McCandless (Assistant Director for Budget Review, BOB), 12 Mar. 1964.
20 . Memorandum for the record by Adm. Rufus E. Rose (USN, Ret.), "General Management Involvement in Formal Budget Process," I Sept. 1965.
21 . Donald Crabill (Economics, Science, and Technology Division, BOB) to BOB Director Charles Schultze, 27 Oct. 1967.
22 . BOB Director Robert Mayo to Paine, "1971 Budget Appeal Procedures," 20 Oct. 1969.
23 . NASA staff paper (draft), "The NASA Programming Process," 24 Jan. 1966, p. 8.
24 . Minutes of NASA Management Committee meeting, 17 Jan. 1966, and paper on "NASA Incremental Funding Study," 20 Apr. 1966.
25 . Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Space Launch Vehicles, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (2627 Jan. 1965), pp. 10-17, 25-30.
26 . Logsdon, Decision to Go to the Moon, p. 91.
27 . Transcript of meeting of Webb, Seamans, and all the center directors, 28 Sept. 1966, p. 35.
28 . PPBS generated an enormous literature between 1965 and the early 1970s. Besides the sources cited below, two compendia are especially useful: "Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System: A Symposium," Public Administration Review 26 (4) (Dec. 1966) and U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Economy in Government, The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System, 3 vole., 90th Cong., 2d sess. (1969).
29 . In a 21 June 1971 memorandum accompanying its Circular A-11, the Office of Management and Budget stated that "agencies are no longer required to submit with their budget submissions the multi-year program and financing plans, program memoranda and special analytical studies . . . or the schedules . . . that reconcile information classified according to the program and appropriation structures."
30 . This was Public Law 84-863 (1 Aug. 1956), for which see Financial Management in the Federal Government, pp. 92-97.
31 . Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense System, 1961-1969 (New York: Holt, Harper and Row, 1971), p. 25.
32 . Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, pp. 180-181.
33 . Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough? p. 48.
35 . The phrase is Allan Schick's in his "A Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of Federal PPB," Public Administration Review, 33 (2) (Mar./Apr. 1973): 146.
36 . Milton Margolis and Stephen Barro, "The Space Program," in David Novick, ed., Program Budgeting, 2d ed. (New York: Holt, 1969), pp. 125, 127. This essay is an attempt to apply PPB techniques to NASA. Among the authors' proposals are the amalgamation of NASA and DOD space budgets, the introduction of a new Launch Capability category, and the elimination of aircraft technology from the budget. NASA officials were understandably unenthusiastic about these proposals.
37 . Shapley to William McCandless, Harry Rowen, Samuel Cohn, "Notes for discussion of approach for NASA on proposed revisions to the budget process," 14 May 1965. This memorandum was written shortly before Shapley transferred to NASA.
38 . Novick, Program Budgeting, p. XIX.
39 . Joon Chien Doh, The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System in Three Federal Agencies (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 154.
40 . Webb to Schultze, 13 July 1966.
41 . Doh, The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, p. 155.
42 . Schick, "A Death in the Bureaucracy," p. 148.
43 . Richard R. Nelson, The Moon and the Ghetto: An Essay on Public Policy Analysis (New York: Norton, 1977), p. 34.
44 . BOB Bulletin 66-3, "Planning-Programming-Budgeting," 12 Oct. 1965. More detailed guidelines were issued as Bulletin 68-2, 18 July 1967, and Bulletin 68-9, 12 Apr. 1968.
45 . See BOB memo cited in note 21 above.
46 . Schultze and Califano to Johnson, 19 Aug. 1967. On 21 Aug. Johnson signed the bill and issued the statement.
47 . Schultze to Webb, 7 Aug. 1967.
48 . Schick, "A Death in the Bureaucracy," p. 151.
49 . Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 71-73.
50 . Two other subcommittees deserve a passing mention: the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, which, among other things, investigated the Ranger 6 failure and the Apollo fire and the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, established in 1963 to examine the policy issues created by Federal R&D spending. This subcommittee was chaired by Representative Emilio Q. Daddario (D-Conn.) from 1963 to 1970.
51 . Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Report on 1970 NASA Authorization, 91st Cong., 1st sess., Rep. No. 91-282 (26 June 1969), pp. 86-87, and authorization hearings for 1970, pp. 128-131. For elimination of excess authorizations, see 1970 Authorization Act, sec. 1(i) for prior notice of facilities spending, see sec. 1(d).
52 . Sec. 5 of 1964 and subsequent NASA authorization acts.
53 . Shapley to Wyatt, "NASA Responsiveness to House Reports," 18 May 1966. Report itself is dated 25 May. Except where noted, all examples in this and the next paragraph are drawn from this paper.
54 . James R. Kerr, "Congress and Space: Overview or Oversight?," in Nelson, The Politics of Science, pp. 176-189.
55 . Murphy, Science, Geopolitics, and Federal Spending, pp. 207-210.
57 . Beller, "Decision-Making in Washington," p. 98.
58 . Remarks of Congressman Joseph Karth (D-Minn.), Chairman, Space Science and Applications Subcommittee, in House Science and Astronautics Committee, 1964 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 1st sess., (1963), pp. 1662-1664.
60 . National Science Foundation, National Patterns of R&D Resources: Funds and Manpower in the United States, 1953-1976 (NSF 76-310), p. 1.
61 . National Science Foundation, An Analysis of Federal R&D Funding by Budget Function (NSF 71-25), p.1.
64 . James L. Penick, Jr., Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., et al., eds., The Politics of American Science, 1939 to the Present (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1972), p. 343.
65 . Charles L. Schultze, "Federal Spending: Past, Present and Future," in Charles L. Schultze and Henry Owen, eds., Setting National Priorities: The Next Ten Years (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 335.
66 . Analysis of Federal R&D Spending, p. 2.
69 . Data cited are from Fleming to Newell, 24 Oct. 1968. We do not touch on the related question of how the NASA budget might have been affected by changes in the budgets of other agencies, e.g., that portion of the Atomic Energy Commission for the jointly run Space Nuclear Propulsion Office. There were also programs funded as NASA line items that were to all intents and purposes in support of DOD, e.g., the XB-70 flight research program, at least part of the entry for "supersonic aircraft technology," and the item for "Special Support (OSS & A)" for NASA's "Limited Warfare Program" discussed in chapter 8.
70 . Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 (NASA SP-4008, 1968), pp. 189190. Also Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1966 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (1965), pp. 605-606.
71 . This is discussed in chapter 9. The Report of the Future Programs Task Group is printed in the Senate hearings cited in note 70, at pp. 1029-1102, with the Committee's criticisms at p. 1015.
72 . NASA officials knew this quite well. At the Administrator's staff luncheon of 6 July 1966, it was agreed that " 'preeminence in space' has probably outlived its usefulness as a main argument to make in support of NASA programs. We are possibly entering a period where 'uses of space' should rather be emphasized." From notes taken by NASA Executive Secretary Lawrence Vogel.
73 . A memorandum from Seamans to Finger, the Program Associate Administrators, and other key headquarters officials, 15 Sept. 1967, announced that Saturn IB production would end with the sixteenth vehicle and that there would be no Saturn V production beyond the fifteenth in 1968. The final decision to discontinue Saturn V production was announced in Feb. 1970. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1970 (NASA SP-4015, 1971), p. 37.
74 . Another problem during the late 1960s was the exceptional length of the later stages of the budgetary cycle. The 1970 Independent Offices Appropriations Act was not signed by the President until 26 November 1969. In August 1970 President Nixon vetoed the FY 1971 Independent Offices Appropriations bill, and the revised bill was not signed into law until 17 December. Because of the delays, NASA was under a "continuing resolution," an interim appropriation limiting the agency to the rate of operation of the previous fiscal year, effectively prohibiting new starts until appropriations were voted.
1 . Space Act, sec. 102(b) and 102(c) (6).
2 . Willis H. Shapley, "United States Space Program," in Hugh Odishaw, ed., The Challenge of Space (Chicago: Praeger, 1962), p. 166.
3 . Milton Rosen, "Military Significance of Surveyor," 15 June 1966. Rosen was senior scientist, NASA Office of Defense Affairs (changed to Office of DOD and Interagency Affairs in Jan. 1968), 1963-1972.
4 . Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 231.
5 . House Government Operations Committee, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Government Operations in Space, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (4 June 1965), p. 54.
6 . For a history of Project Advent, see House Government Operations Committee, Military Operations Subcommittee, Satellite Communications (Military-Civil Roles and Relationships), 89th Cong., 1st sess. (17 March 1965), pp. 123-158, from which this account is drawn.
9 . Government Operations in Space, p. 103.
10 . Satellite Communications (Military-Civil Roles . . . ), pp. 13-15.
11 . Theodore W. Bauer and Harry B. Yoshpe, Defense Organization and Management (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1971), pp. 72-73.
12 . Satellite Communications (Military-Civil Roles . . . ), pp. 148, 152-153.
13 . This was DOD Directive 5160.32, reprinted in House Science and Astronautics Committee, Defense Space Interests, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (1961), pp. 2-3.
14 . Testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Charles J. Hitch in ibid., p. 82.
15 . Bauer and Yoshpe, Defense Organization and Management, p. 127.
16 . DOD Directive 5030.18, 24 Feb. 1962. Subject: Department of Defense Support of National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
17 . A list of eighty-eight major NASA-DOD agreements for the period 1 Oct. 1958-31 Dec. 1964, with brief descriptions of each, is printed in Government Operations in Space, pp. 123-133. Except where noted, agreements for that period discussed in the text are excerpted from this list.
18 . The 1959 agreement states, "When either agency places a contract through the other, reimbursement is limited to direct costs. when either assigns a contract to the other for administration, the direct costs involved are reimbursable. construction undertaken by DOD for NASA is charged directly to NASA funds when either agency is a tenant on an installation of the other, all direct costs attributable to such tenancy are reimbursed, but rent or depreciation are not charged for the use of each other's facilities." House Government Operations Committee, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Government Operations in Space, p. 101.
19 . The full text of this agreement is reprinted in House Science and Astronautics Committee, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, The NASA-DOD Relationship, 88th Cong., 2d sess. (26 March 1964), pp. 10-11.
20 . Government Operations in Space, p. 126.
21 . Ibid., p. 129. For the earlier agreement of 24 Aug. 1961, see p. 127.
22. Provisions of the Gemini agreement are in Adm. W. Fred Boone (USN, Ret.), NASA Office of Defense Affairs: The First Five Years (NASA HHR-32, Dec. 1970), pp. 83-84. Hereafter cited as NASA Office of Defense Affairs.
23 . Aviation Week (22 July 1963): 25.
24 . NASA Office of Defense Affairs, p. 28.
26 . House Government Operations Committee, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Missile and Space Ground Support Operations, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (21 Mar. 1966), p. 28.
27 Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1964 (NASA SP-4005, 1965), pp. 430-431.
28 . The National Range Division was established in January 1964 as a division of the Air Force Systems Command and was charged with planning and management of the Eastern Test Range and that portion of the Western Test Range previously transferred from the Navy to the Air Force. The commander of the National Range Division was designated as DOD's point of contact with NASA for manned spaceflight support. For details, see NASA, Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1964, pp. 3, 164 and House Government Operations Committee, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Missile and Space Ground Support, p. 18.
29 . Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 224.
30 . See NASA Office of Defense Affairs, pp. 122-162, for an extremely detailed account of the funding issue, and pp. 163-195 for NASA and DOD policy statements.
31 . In practice, most of DOD's space launches, especially those using the Titan 111, took place at the Western Test Range. The breakdown of the NASA-DOD workload at the Eastern Test Range in 1966 was about fifty-fifty, even though three-quarters of the launches there were missiles. House Government Operations Committee, Missiles and Space Ground Support Operations, pp. 20-21.
32 . On the funding of NASA laboratories, see Webb to Schultze (9 Aug.1967), which sets forth the NASA position on reimbursement for services at the Eastern Test Range. NASA's viewpoint on supporting other agencies is set forth in encl. B.
34 . NASA Office of Defense Affairs, p. 144.
37 . See statement of OTDA Director Edmond C. Buckley in Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1966 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (1965), p. 447.
38 . This was the position of the House Government Operations Committee in Missile and Space Ground Support, p. 49.
39 . NASA Office of Defense Affairs, pp. 207-209.
40 . For details of the agreement, see ibid., pp. 74-76 Government Operations in Space, p. 131 and Missile and Space Ground Support, pp. 37-38.
42 . NASA Office of Defense Affairs, p. 66. Emphasis in original.
43 . See, e.g., Webb's statement in Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Space Launch Vehicles, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (26-27 Jan. 1965), pp. 17-18.
44 . PSAC, Report of the Ad Hoc Booster Panel on Large Rocket Boosters for Space Exploration, 5 June 1961.
45 . Summary Report, NASA-DOD Large Launch Vehicle Planning Croup, 24 Sept. 1962. This was also known as the Golovin report, after Nicholas Golovin, NASA cochairman, and subsequently a staff member of the Office of Science and Technology. One of the most important results of the group's work was its October 1961 recommendation that DOD proceed to develop the Titan Ill launch vehicle to meet its own and NASA's needs.
46 . On the history of LLVPG, see foreword to LLVPG Summary Report, and Courtney Brooks et al., Charriots for Apollo: A History of Lunar Spacecraft (comment draft, Aug. 1976), pp. 80-87.
47 . It should be noted that the Webb-Gilpatric agreement applied only to development of new vehicles or stages, not to studies of proposed improvements. How far it applied to modification of existing stages was less certain. The usual procedure was for AACB cochairmen to decide whether such improvements came within the terms of the agreement, and then to invoke it or not, as the case determined.
48 . These were the four-stage Jupiter C the improved Jupiter C, known as Juno 11 the Thor-Able, which combined the Thor booster with the second and third stages of the Vanguard the Thor-Hustler, which had a liquid-propellant upper stage using the Hustler engine the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile and the Atlas-Able, combining the Atlas and Vanguard second and third stages. The only nonmilitary vehicle, the Vanguard, was built by the Navy for the International Geophysical Year. From Homer E. Newell, Space Science in NASA, Ch. 11, work in progress.
49 . Statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance in Space Launch Vehicles, p. 43.
50 . See, e.g., minutes of 29th AACB meeting, 28 Aug. 1964 minutes of 30th AACB meeting, 20 Oct. 1964 and paper by Rosen, "Statement of Launch Vehicle Cost Effectiveness," 26 Jan. 1965, especially pp. 2-3.
51 . See Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1966 NASA Authorization, pp. 605-606, and Space Launch Vehicles, pp. 124-125, for a chronology of the large-solid-motor program.
52 . Space Launch Vehicles, pp. 16-18, 28-30.
53 . On guidelines for launch vehicle study, see Seamans and Brown to Chairman, AACB Launch Vehicle Panel, "Guidelines for Study of NASA and DOD Launch Vehicle Requirements," 19 June 1964. For interim summary of the study, see Hilburn to Seamans, "Brief Summary of Findings to Date on Launch Vehicle Cost Study," 4 Nov. 1964. The unclassified portion of the final report was summarized by Assistant Air Force Secretary (R&D) Alexander Flax in Space Launch Vehicles, pp. 81-89, 95.
54 . Space Launch Vehicles, pp. 8-9.
55 . Government Operations in Space, p. 100. Of 900 space medicine tasks reviewed, 335 were found valid, 55 were canceled, 2 were assigned further examination, and 488 "were considered outside the scope of mutual interagency decision since they were necessary to the peculiar needs of the respective agency." Ibid.
56 . "NASA/DOD Coordination of FY 1970 Facility Projects," encl.1 of minutes of 49th AACB meeting, 30 Jan. 1969.
57 . Minutes of 50th AACB meeting, 29 May 1969, item 4.
58 . Minutes of 51st AACB meeting, 3 Oct. 1969, NASA Status Report to AACB.
60 . See especially the memorandum for the record prepared by Albert J. Evans, Acting NASA Director of Aeronautics (OART), "XB-70 Research Program . . . ," 27 Feb. 1964. One passage (crossed out in pencil) stated that "the Air Force had come to the conclusion that the XB-70 can no longer be justified on the basis of a weapon system, and believed that a study should be made to insure that the large investment of the Air Force in the program would produce research results of the maximum value possible." On 1967 agreement, see Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 (NASA SP-4008, 1968), pp. 74-75.
61 . On this program, see NASA Office of Defense Affairs, pp. 249-253 Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967, p. 366 and Boone to Seamans, "Assumption of Your Limited Warfare Support Role by Dr. Adams," 7 Dec. 1967.
62 . NASA Office of Defense Affairs, p. 9.
63 . The NASA position is set forth in a "talking paper" on Project Gemini drafted by Boone, 9 Jan. 1963.
64 . Webb to Seamans, 18 Jan. 1963.
65 . Barton C. Hacker and James Grimwood, On the Shoulders of the Titans: A History of Project Gemini (manuscript draft, Oct. 1973), p. 208.
66 . Webb to Johnson, 30 July 1963.
67 . Webb to NASA Executive Officer Col. R. P. Young (USA), 1 Mar. 1963.
68 . New York Herald Tribune, "The Death of the Dyna-Soar Project," 26 Dec. 1963.
69 . Missile/Space Daily, 11 Dec. 1963, p. 4.
70 . Donald Hornig, PSAC subcommittee chairman, to President's Science Advisor Jerome Wiesner, "PSAC Space Panels' Evaluation of the Requirements for a Manned Space Station," 22 Nov. 1963.
71 . Draft "Discussion Paper" on MOL and extended Apollo, forwarded from Shapley to Seamans, 19 Nov. 1964, pp. 5, 6, 7
73 . Missiles and Rockets, 16 Dec. 1963, p. 15.
74 . See NASA MOL paper summarized in Space Daily, 6 Jan.1964, p.20. Also memorandum prepared by M/G David Jones (USAF), Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight (Programs), "MOL Congressional Hearings," Jan. 1966 and memorandum prepared by William Schneider, Director, Apollo Applications Program, "Answers to Questions from Congressional Hearings," 18 Mar. 1969.
75 . See attachment to memorandum, Boone to Seamans, "NASA-DOD Coordination with Respect to the MOL Program," 16 Nov. 1965.
76 . Memorandum, E. Z. Gray, Director, Advanced Manned Missions Program, to Mueller, "Space Station Programs " 31 Aug. 1964.
77 . See, for instance, the draft responses to questions circulated by Vice President Hubert Humphrey at Space Council meeting, 9 July 1965. Moreover, one year after the MOL was finally approved, a top official told Webb at a meeting of NASA center directors that "I think that it is the military that needs to justify the position and they could be put in a rather awkward position with respect to MOL. MOL is a rather poor program at best and they have never justified it properly. Now, you haven't wanted to attack them . . . because I don't think McNamara is a nice guy to attack, he is rough." Webb: "Well, hell, he has attacked MOL worse than I have." Official: "Well, my point is that MOL is a very poor program. At one time it would have been a halfway decent program but it is way out of date now. I was trying to get rid of a program that they got rid of later which was no good, Dyna-Soar, because I said that program was no good a long time ago. I say it right now that MOL is no good. They are always too late." Transcript of tape of meeting on budget changeover, 28 Sept. 1966, pp. 59-60.
78 . See draft responses to question of why Saturn/Apollo was not being used for MOL, Space Council meeting, 9 July 1965.
79 . Gordon's memorandum is summarized in memorandum from Boone to Seamans cited in note 75. Note that the "Discussion Paper" cited in note 71 had been drafted only three weeks earlier.
80 . Aviation Week and Space Technology (7 Dec. 1964): 16.
81 . NASA News Release, "Decisions on Manned Orbiting Laboratory and Other Matters," 25 Jan. 1965.
82 . Government Operations in Space, p. 17.
83 . Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965 (NASA SP-4006, 1966), p. 396.
84 . Another reason for the delay was a struggle between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Air Force over who would exercise mission control. Donald E. Fink, "CIA Control Bid Slowed Decision on MOL," Aviation Week, 20 Sept. 1965. The charge was officially denied by the Air Force on 5 Oct. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 463.
85 . Information supplied by Willis Shapley.
86 . Hilburn to Seamans, "MOL Decision," 24 June 1975.
87 . Missile and Space Ground Support, p. 46.
88 . Boone to Webb, Seamans, Dryden, 12 July 1963, p. 3.
89 . Sapolsky, Polaris System Development, p. 204.
90 . Boone memorandum cited in note 88, p. 4.
1 . U.S. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Policy Planning for Aeronautical Research and Development, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (19 May 1966), p. 8.
2 . For a summary of research on space stations up to 1969, see Compilation of Papers Presented at the Space Station Technology .Symposium (NASA Langley Research Center, 11-13 Feb. 1969), especially the paper on MSC studies by Maxime Faget and Edward Olling, pp. 43-98, and the historical sketch of Marshall studies at pp. 99-120.
3 . Ibid., and Space Station Requirements Steering Committee, The Needs and Requirements for a National .Space Station-Summary Report, 15 Nov. 1966.
4 . Boone, NASA Office of Defense Affairs, pp. 324-325.
5 . Task Team on Management and Integrated Information Systems, "Outline of Interim Report," 16 Sept.1963, pp. 11-2/11-3. See also draft of "The NASA Programming Process," 24 Jan. 1966, p. 2.
6 . Frank W. Anderson, Jr., Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA, 1915-1976 (NASA SP-4403, 1976), p. 65.
7 . Arthur L. Levine, The Future of the U.S. Space Program (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 118-119.
8 . The group's summary report is reprinted in Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1966 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (1965), pp. 1029-1102. The President's letter is at ibid., pp. 1016-1017, and Webb's interim replies are at pp. 1017-1029.
10 . Transcript of tape of briefing on Apollo Extensions Systems, 22 Sept. 1965, pp. 48, 50-51, 52-53.
11 . See e.g. "Ground Rules for Apollo Extension," 20 Oct. 1964, which were confirmed by Seamans' memorandum for the record, "Apollo Program Decision-Manned Apollo Flights and Apollo Applications Program Plans," 17 May 1967.
12 . E. Z. Gray to Gilruth, 18 Aug. 1964.
13 . Mueller to Francis Smith, 28 Apr. 1964, and Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, National Space Coals for the Post-Apollo Period, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (23-25 Aug. 1965), pp. 76-104.
14 . Mueller to Charles Townes, Chairman, Science and Technology Advisory Committee, 14 Jan. 1966.
15 . W. David Compton and Charles D. Benson, History of Skylab (Comment edition, May 1977), pp. 53-55.
16 . Gray to Gilruth, 18 Aug. 1964.
17 . Compton and Benson, History of Skylab, pp. 112-115.
18 . Minutes of Science and Technology Advisory Committee (STAC) meeting at JPL, 30 Oct. 1964, p. 3.
19 . See speech of Dr. Harry Hess to a joint PSAC/STAC meeting at KSC, 20 May 1969.
20 . Compton and Benson, History of Skylab, pp. 112-115.
21 . Adams, Mueller, and Newell to Seamans, Dec. ? 1965, and summary minutes of Planning Coordination Steering Group, 17 Jan. 1966.
22. This was the design approved by Seamans on 29 Aug. 1966. For further details on the origins of the orbital workshop, see Compton and Benson, History of Skylab, chapters 2-4.
23 . NASA Program Review, Apollo Applications Program (15 Nov. 1966), p. 21.
24 . Compton and Benson, History of Skylab, pp. 186-187.
25 . "Manned Space Flight: Summary of Roles and Missions Agreements," Aug. 1966.
26 . Newell and Cortright, 13 June 1966. Subject: NASA Future Program Planning.
27 . House Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Missile and Space Ground Support Operations, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (21 March 1966), pp. 46-47.
28 . Schultze to President Johnson, I Sept. 1966. Also, memorandum for the record by Wyatt, 27 July 1965. Subject: Director's Review with Bureau of the Budget (July 26).
29 . This paragraph is based on a NASA report, "Evolution of Advisory Counsel Structure and Practice," 15 Jan. 1968, prepared by a task force under the Office of Organization and Management.
30 . Newell to Webb, 6 Oct. 1965.
31 . Ray Romatowski (Director, Organization and Management Planning Division) to Harold Finger, 21 Apr. 1967.
32 . Bruce Murray (CalTech) to PSAC Space Panel, 10 Apr. 1967. Subject: NASA Science Management in the Planetary Program. Murray succeeded William Pickering as JPL Director in 1976.
33 . On NASA's reasons for rejecting the Ramsey report, see Newell to Seamans, 20 Dec. 1966 and "Interim Response to the Report of the Ad Hoc Science Advisory Committee," 7 June 1967.
34 . The remainder of this paragraph and the whole of the next are based on Barry Rutizer, "The Lunar and Planetary Missions Board" (NASA HHN-138, 30 Aug. 1976).
36 . Newell, "Notes on Science in NASA," 14 Nov. 1969, pp. 5-6. Newell, of course, was describing a position with which he did not agree.
37 . Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1966, pp. 17, 39, 53.
38 . Hess to Webb, 29 July 1966.
39 President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), "The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period," Feb.1967, p. 14.
42 . Quotation is from Newell, "Notes on Science in NASA," pp. 8-9. PSAC criticism of the Apollo Telescope Mount is in "The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period," appendix C, especially pp. 73-74.
43 . PSAC Space Science and Technology Panel, "U. S. Strategy for Space Research and Exploration: Fiscal Year 1969 Program Decisions," 19 Dec. 1967.
44 . Milton Rosen to Seamans, 2 Sept. 1966. Rosen, the senior scientist in the Office of Defense Affairs, was the NASA observer to the PSAC space panels.
45 . PSAC Space Science and Technology Panel, "U.S. Strategy for Space Research and Exploration," p. 28.
46 . Finger to Romatowski, 28 Dec. 1967.
47 . Webb to Finger, 28 June 1968.
48 . Milton Rosen, "Information on NASA Activities with Respect to Titan Launch Vehicles. " 24 July 1967.
49 Newell to Webb, 22 Dec. 1967.
50 . Draft memorandum by Milton Rosen, "Launch Vehicle Working Group: Task Definition," 17 Apr. 1968. See also a memorandum by Alexander Flax, chairman of the AACB Launch Vehicle Panel, 11 June 1968.
51 . Memorandum by Rosen, 21 Mar. 1969.
52 . Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Policy Planning for Aeronautical Research and Development, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (May 1966).
53 . Bernard Moritz (Acting Associate Administrator for Organization and Management) to NASA Deputy Administrator George Low, 23 Dec. 1969. Low had been sworn in as Deputy Administrator three weeks earlier.
54 . The members of the Post-Apollo Advisory Group were Floyd Thompson, chairman Edmond Buckley, former Associate Administrator for Tracking and Data Acquisition, vice chairman Goddard Director John Clark KSC Director Kurt Debus, LRC Deputy Director Charles Donlan MSC Director Robert Gilruth Charles Mathews, Director for Apollo Applications George Mueller John Naugle, Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications LRC Director Abe Silverstein and MSFC Director Wernher von Braun. The staff assistant was Ray Kline, and James Long was executive secretary.
55 . Newell, paper on "NASA Planning System," 13 May 1968.
56 . "PSG Guidelines: Center Participation in NASA PPB Process," 26 Mar. 1968.
57 . "NASA Planning System" p. 1.
58 . Some of the more important groups included the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences the Lunar and Planetary Missions Board and the Astronomy Missions Board the Post-Apollo Advisory Group chaired by Floyd Thompson the Group for Lunar Exploration Planning, a NASA group chaired by Wilmot Hess the Manned Space Flight Science and Technology Advisory Committee a Saturn Workshop study group directed by Douglas Lord of OMSF and a NASA Life Sciences Directors Group. This list is adopted from minutes of the STAC meeting at KSC (27-28 Mar. 1968), pp. 4-5.
59 . On the role of Bellcomm in supporting the PCG, see memorandum from W. G. Stroud to Newell, 15 Apr. 1968. Stroud, who had been the Nimbus project manager at Goddard, was PSG secretary during the 1968 planning cycle.
60 . Minutes of executive session of STAC, 12 Oct. 1968.
61 . Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1968 (NASA SP-4010, 1969), p. 213.
62 . "Post-Apollo Advisory Group: Summary of Proceedings" (20 July 1968), p. 13.
63 . See Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1969 (NASA SP-4014), p. 167.
64 . Paine to Presidential Science Adviser Lee DuBridge, 6 May 1969. Emphasis in original.
65 . Minutes of STAC meeting at NASA Headquarters, 22-23 Mar. 1969.
66 . Briefing for the Apollo Executives Group by LeRoy Day at KSC, 15-July 1969, p. 26. Day was in charge of a group responsible for developing material for a report on space shuttles to the President's Space Task Group.
67 . NASA News Release, "AAP Orbital Workshop," 22 July 1969, and Compton and Benson, History of Skylab, pp. 297-302.
68 . See source cited in note 66, pp. 34-35.
69 . Newell, memorandums for the record, 18 Nov. 1968 and 11 Dec. 1968.
70 . For NASA reports prepared for the STG, see "America's Next Decade in Space" and "Goals and Objectives for America's Next Decades in Space," both dated Sept. 1969.
71 . Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1969, p. 224.
72 . President's Space Task Group, "The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future" (Sept. 1969), pp. 19-23.
73 . Thomas O'Toole, "Nixon Rejects Big Outlay for Space in '70s," Washington Post (11 Jan. 1970), p. A1.
74. Newell to Low, 9 Feb. 1970, p. 5. Subject: Evolution of NASA's Long-Range Planning.
76 . Seamans to Mueller, 20 July 1967.
77 . Briefing by Newell for the Administrator's Management Advisory Panel, 25 Oct. 1968, pp. 40-41.
78 . Newell to Low, 9 Feb. 1970, p. 3.
79 . Moritz to Low, 23 Dec. 1969.
80 . See especially his memorandum to Newell and Paine, 18 June 1968, and the summary of notes from his discussion with the Administrator's Management Advisory Panel, 16 Sept. 1969.
81 . Moritz to Low, 23 Dec. 1969.
82 . Ad Hoc NASA Manpower Utilization Committee, "Considerations on the Management of Manpower in NASA," 8 Sept. 1966, p. 4.
83 . This paragraph is based on a briefing by Goddard officials for the Associate Administrator for Organization and Management, 12 June 1971, one of a number held at the centers as part of an "Institutional Base Study."
1 . Raymond Bauer et al., Second-Order Consequences: A Methodological Essay on the Impact of Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), p. 21.
2 . For examples of the "legislative veto," see Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964), chap. 8.
3 . Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 244.
4 . Summary report of "General Management Discussion of Policy and Management Matters During the General Management Program Review," 22 Sept. 1964.
5 . William J. Normyle, "Post-Apollo Space Plan Drafted," Aviation Week & Space Technology 81 (21 Oct. 1968): 26.
6 . Alan Dean and staff of Federal Aviation Administration, "The Decentralization of the Federal Aviation Agency," pp.77-78. This unpublished study was presented as the subject of the third meeting (19 June 1968) of a study group of the National Academy of Public Administration.
7 . From notes of Mueller's discussion with the Administrator's Management Advisory Panel, 16 Sept. 1969.
8 . On the analogy between the space program and social welfare programs, see Richard R. Nelson, The Moon and the Ghetto: An Essay on Public Policy Analysis (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1977).
Defining Water Weaponization
Put simply, water weaponization is the use of water as physical arms to harm and/or gain leverage over an adversary. Water weaponization has gathered scholarly attention only in recent years and remains underconceptualized. Building on early conceptual work by Marcus King and others, 20 I present a focused classification of water weaponization based on type—deprivation and inundation—and objective—strategic and tactical. Considering both dimensions captures almost all actions that have directly incorporated water as arms, while also speaking to the classic demarcation in security studies between strategic and tactical use of weaponry. 21
Figure 1 represents the main structure of water as a weapon of conflict. On the vertical axis, deprivation refers to the reduction or complete denial of water needed for basic subsistence, or its degradation. Deprivation is not directly physical violence, but rather works by preventing the fulfillment of basic human needs. 22 Examples include poisoning, scorched-earth destruction of water supply, and water blockade during siege warfare. On the other end of the axis, inundation refers to the rapid release of a large quantity of water through destroying storage infrastructure or opening floodgates. The British “Dam Busters” Operation Chastise in World War II exemplifies this, where the Royal Air Force bombed German dams to inundate land and damage vital infrastructure. 23 In the Netherlands, dikes were routinely breached as part of the Hollandic Water Line to hinder enemy advance. 24
The Structure of Water Weaponization
Additionally, water weaponization can be strategic in orientation. This is when water weaponization fulfills higher-order goals in conflict such as victory and unconditional surrender of the adversary. Water is here used to destroy important areas of land and population centers, typically on a large scale and with the expectation of decisive results. Strategic use can be enacted by surreptitious measures such as poisoning, or through sheer force of outflow by bombing dams and opening floodgates. By contrast, and often less extreme, is tactical weaponization, which aims to fulfill lower-order goals in conflict such as degrading an adversary's fighting capacity. Seeding clouds with silver iodide induces excess rain to disrupt transportation and the flow of military supplies. 25 Intermittently disrupting access to water (water blackouts) or diverting a stream away from a military camp hinders an adversary's war efforts. 26 Dike breaching produces moderate outflow, which floods proximate areas and can be used for military interdiction (tactical). The effect is heightened in low-lying, highly populated countries, where it can become strategic. Taken altogether, water presents a powerful means to achieve results in warfare.
Complications of Blood Product Transfusion [ edit ]
Blood Bank Concepts [ edit ]
Some authors (Miller’s Anesthesia, 6th edition, Chapter 55) have questioned whether or not a cross match is really needed. They cite the following statistics – only 1% of previously transfused or pregnant patients (i.e. some prior exposure to non-native red blood cell antigens) will have any non-A or non-B antibodies. Many of these are not reactive at temperatures above 30C. If anti-Rh(D) is accounted for, only 0.1% of these patients will have reactive (A, B, D) antibodies. Thus, a simple ABO-Rh type reduces the risk of a transfusion reaction to 99.8%. Screening lowers this risk to 99.94%, and crossmatching lowers it to 99.95% [Polesky HF, Walker RH, ed. Safety and Transfusion Practices, Skokie, IL: College of American Pathologists p. 79, 1982]. Is the crossmatch worth this extra 0.01% of risk (i.e. 1:10,000)?
Type and Cross [ edit ]
What does a “type and cross” actually mean? As always, both the recipient and donor cells are ABO-Rh typed – this alone reduces the risk of a transfusion reaction to 0.2%. In order to further decrease this risk, a small sample of donor blood can be mixed with the recipient’s serum. In the first phase (immediate phase, 1-5 mins, room temp), ABO errors antibodies and MN, P, and Lewis system antibodies are sought. In the second phase (incubation phase, 10-20 minutes), the first phase reactants are heated to 37C in salt solution (or for 30-45 minutes in albumin), additional antibodies (mostly to Rh, but also partial or incomplete Ab) are detected, as the salt solution and/or albumin can facilitate agglutination. In the last phase, (antiglobulin phase), antiglobulin sera are added, further increasing the ability of the crossmatch to detect incomplete antibodies (ex. Rh, Kell, Kidd, Duffy). This third step is not essential.
Type and Screen [ edit ]
In a type and screen, as in a type and cross, the recipient and donor cells are ABO-Rh typed (risk of transfusion reaction 0.2% after simply doing an ABO-Rh type). Subsequently, “standard” blood cells (with known, significant non-ABO-Rh-antibodies) are added to the patient’s serum. The major advantage of the type and screen is that it can be performed prior to the operation (ex. a patient’s blood and serum can be typed and screened well in advance of the day of surgery), and, if negative, a 99.94% transfusion risk is assured with ABO-Rh-matched blood. If an antibody is found, the blood bank can then give donor blood negative for the identified antibody, although the blood bank may choose to crossmatch the donor’s blood with the recipient’s serum. An important point is that while typing and screening cannot eliminate all potential transfusion reactions (clinically insignificant reactions may still approach 1%), the vast majority of transfusion reactions following a type and screen are benign – in fact, in a study of 13,950 patients, Oberman et al. found only eight “clinically significant” antibodies that were detected by complete crossmatch but not during antibody screening [Oberman et al.] (thus, the risk of hemodynamically significant transfusion reactions after a negative type and screen is approximately 0.057%).
Adverse Reactions [ edit ]
|Fever, chills, urticaria||1:100|
(Acute lung injury 1:5000 – < 10% fatality, leading cause of death)
Transfusion Reactions [ edit ]
Common symptoms of Acute hemolytic reaction
Transfusion reactions can be difficult to detect, as general anesthesia tends to ameliorate the most common signs and symptoms [Kopke PM, Holland PV. Transfus Clin Biol 8: 278, 2001]. One should be suspicious of increased peak airway pressures, hyperthermia, or changes in urine output or color in the context of a blood transfusion [Stoelting RK. Basics of Anesthesia, 5th ed. Elsevier (China) p. 360, 2007]. One should also be suspicious of urticaria, hypotension, tachycardia, and microvascular bleeding. [Stoelting RK. Basics of Anesthesia, 5th ed. Elsevier (China) p. 361, 2007].
Hemolytic Reactions [ edit ]
Caused by wrong blood type transfusion, acute hemolytic reactions are an antibody reaction to ABO surface antigens on donor erythrocytes and are rarely life threatening (
1:100,000) – one unit of RBC can by lysed in an hour, leading to a severe immunologic response that can be fatal. Hemolysis, spontaneous hemorrhage, complement activation, and renal failure are possible [Stoelting RK. Basics of Anesthesia, 5th ed. Elsevier (China) p. 361, 2007]. This error is usually clerical [Heart Lung 20: 506, 1991]. Severe reactions can occur with as little as 10 mL of blood [World J Surg 11: 25, 1987] – common initial signs include fever, dyspnea, chest pain, and low back pain. Hypotension can develop very suddenly. Hypotension is the only obvious sign under general anesthesia, thus always maintain a high level of suspicion. Severe reactions are accompanied by a consumptive coagulopathy and MOD. Acute renal failure occurs in 5 – 10% of cases [Anesth Intens Care 21: 15, 1993]. Treat by immediately discontinuing the transfusion, and consider fluid resuscitation with the addition of mannitol or furosemide. Bicarbonate has not been proven to be helpful [Stoelting RK. Basics of Anesthesia, 5th ed. Elsevier (China) p. 361, 2007]
- If BP dropping, give volume
- If BP dropping, start vasopressors (no data as to which are superior)
Febrile Reactions [ edit ]
While not as potentially devastating as acute hemolytic reactions, febrile non-hemolytic reactions are much more common (0.5% of transfusions). This is a reaction of antibodies to leukocytes in the donor’s blood (Abs produced in prior transfusions or pregnancies). These fevers will begin within 6 hours (after 6 hours look to a different etiology, ex. hemolysis). The goal is to exclude the possibility of hemolysis, so go through the same algorithm (see above). Some recommend routine culture of donor and recipient blood (if there is any sign of systemic illness, such as rigors, dyspnea) for the remote possibility of infection. > 50% of these patients will never have another transfusion reaction, so leukocyte-poor blood is not needed unless a second reaction occurs.
Allergic Reactions [ edit ]
Allergic reactions (rash, anaphylaxis) are a result of sensitivity to donor plasma proteins, usually beginning with urticaria and possibly with fever. Mild urticaria does not require intervention in the absence of fever, however it is common practice to stop the transfusion and give diphenhydramine 25-50 mg PO or IM q6h – the only benefit is relief of pruritus. If the patient has true anaphylaxis, treat it as such (also test these patients for IgA deficiency and avoid future transfusions if at all possible).
Acute Lung Injury [ edit ]
Acute lung injury is possible, but only occurs in 1:5000 transfusions [Intensive Care Med 14: 654, 1988]. The theory is that donor antileukocyte antibodies bind host granulocytes, sequestering them in the pulmonary microcirculation and leading to ARDS. Unlike most cases of ARDS, this variety is fatal in < 10% [Crit Care Med 34S: S114, 2006]. Dyspnea and/or hypoxemia may arise within a few hours, and CXR may show diffuse infiltrates. You CANNOT get pulmonary edema from PRBC because the osmotic pressure is too high – if you see what you think is edema, it’s TRALI/ARDS. The process generally resolves within a week. Stop the transfusion and manage as you would ARDS.
Infectious Disease [ edit ]
Highest risk of viral transmission is hepatitis B (1:220,000). < 10 fatalities per year in United States from bacterial infections
TRALI [ edit ]
TRALI is an acute syndrome of dyspnea, hypoxemia, and non-cardiogenic pulmonary edema usually occurring within 6 hours of transfusion and is now the leading cause of mortality following blood transfusion (as of 2005). Stop all transfusions if ongoing, and if possible consider suctioning fluid from the endotracheal tube to send for protein count.
Immunomodulation [ edit ]
Allogenic transfusions suppress cell-mediated immunity, and may place patients at risk for post-operative infection.
Data Refuting a RBC/Infection Association [ edit ]
Vamvakas et. al. studied the records of 492 patients who underwent colorectal cancer resection and calculated the probability of infection in association with transfusion with and without adjustment for the effects of chronic systemic illness, number of days with urinary catheter, endotracheal intubation, impaired consciousness, and specific risk factors for wound infection. After adjustment for the effects of the aforementioned variables, allogeneic transfusion was not associated with postoperative infection at any site (p = 0.407). However, in a secondary analysis (data mining?) that adjusted for the effects of only the 18 confounders considered by previous authors, transfusion was the most significant predictor of infection. In that analysis, the risk of postoperative infection increased by 14 percent per unit of red cells transfused (p < 0.001). [Vamkakas EC et. al. Transfusion 36: 1000, 1996]
In Hébert et al.’s prospective, randomized study of critically ill patients, there was no statistically significant difference in pneumonia, bacteremia, catheter sepsis, or septic shock. [Hébert et al. NEJM 340: 409, 1999]
Vamkakas repeated this study on 416 CABG patients – on univariate analysis, patients who did (n = 64) or did not develop infection received 956.6 +/- 180.6 and 321.3 +/- 39.6 mL of plasma, respectively (p<0.0001). In multivariate analyses, the volume of transfused allogeneic plasma was not associated with postoperative pneumonia and/or wound infection (p = 0.24), pneumonia (p = 0.21), or wound infection (p = 0.74). [Vamvakas et. al. Transfusion 42: 107, 2002]
Ali et. al. prospectively studied 232 patients undergoing cardiac surgery, 50% of whom received blood product transfusion. There were no differences in the frequency of chest infection (20% versus 15%, p = 0.38), urinary infection (3.5% versus 5.3%, p = 0 0.75), wound infection (3.5% versus 8.0%, p = 0.16), or overall infection (28% versus 30%, p = 0.89) comparing the transfused versus untransfused groups. There was no evidence to suggest that administration of blood products was associated with infection (odds ratio 0.92, p = 0.77). [Ali ZA et. al. Ann Thorac Surg 78: 1542, 2004]
Data Supporting a RBC/Infection Association [ edit ]
Leal-Noval et. al. studied 738 patients in a post-operative ICU, and examined the influence of 36 variables on the development of severe postoperative infections (SPIs) in general and individually for pneumonia, mediastinitis, and/or septicemia. After multivariate analysis, the variables associated with SPI (incidence, 9.4%) were reintubation, sternal dehiscence, mechanical ventilation (MV) for > or = 48 h, reintervention, neurologic dysfunction, transfusion of >= 4 U RBCs, and systemic arterial hypotension. The mortality rate (patients with SPI, 52.8% non-SPI patients, 8.2% p < 0.001) was greater for the infected patients. The transfused patients also had a greater mortality rate (13.3% vs 8.9%, respectively p < 0.001) and a longer mean stay in the ICU (6.1 +/- 7.2 days vs 3.7 +/- 2.8 days, respectively p < 0.01) than those not transfused. Keep in mind that this was not a prospective study, thus the sicker patients may have been transfused. [Leal-Noval SR et. al. Chest 119: 1461, 2001]
Bochicchio GV et. al. conducted a prospective observational cohort study of 766 trauma patients admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU), who received mechanical ventilation (MV) for >= 48h, and who did not have pneumonia on admission. Logistic regression analyses controlled for all variables related significantly to VAP by univariate analysis (sex, Injury Severity Score, and ventilator days and ICU length of stay prior to VAP) and found that transfusion of blood products was an independent risk factor for VAP. All blood products were associated with a higher risk of VAP (RBC: odds ratio [OR] 4.41 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.00, 19.54 p = 0.05 FFP: OR 3.34 95% CI 1.18, 9.43 p = 0.023 platelets: OR 4.19 95% CI 1.37, 12.83 p = 0.012). [Bochicchio GV et. al. Surg Infect (Larchmt) 9: 415, 2008]
Summary of RBC/Infection Risk [ edit ]
No prospective, randomized studies show a difference in any infection rates following transfusion of blood products. Retrospective or prospective non-randomized studies have produced mixed results.
Others [ edit ]
Stored blood usually contains an excess of hydrogen ions (due to both the preservative as well as the continued metabolic activity) as well as potassium, neither of which is are clinically significant, even following massive transfusions [Stoelting 359-60]. Stored blood does contain progressively less 2,3 DPG, thus the older blood is, the less oxygen releasing capacity available – a study of 63 trauma patients who received 6-20 units of blood identified mean age of blood, number of units older than 14 days, and number of units older than 21 days as independent risk factors for MOF [Zallen G et. al. Am J Surg 178: 570, 1999]. Citrate (used to prevent coagulation) can cause two problems – a metabolic alkalosis, as well as hypocalcemia (very rare). Supplemental calcium is only indicated in three situations – infusion > 50 cc/min, liver disease (i.e., inability to metabolize citrate to bicarbonate), or for neonates. For these reasons, hypocalcemia is mostly an issue in liver transplant patients. Hypothermia can also be an issue if blood is not warmed through a Ranger.
Introduction to Science and the Realm of Physics, Physical Quantities, and Units
What is your first reaction when you hear the word “physics”? Did you imagine working through difficult equations or memorizing formulas that seem to have no real use in life outside the physics classroom? Many people come to the subject of physics with a bit of fear. But as you begin your exploration of this broad-ranging subject, you may soon come to realize that physics plays a much larger role in your life than you first thought, no matter your life goals or career choice.
For example, take a look at the image above. This image is of the Andromeda Galaxy, which contains billions of individual stars, huge clouds of gas, and dust. Two smaller galaxies are also visible as bright blue spots in the background. At a staggering 2.5 million light years from the Earth, this galaxy is the nearest one to our own galaxy (which is called the Milky Way). The stars and planets that make up Andromeda might seem to be the furthest thing from most people’s regular, everyday lives. But Andromeda is a great starting point to think about the forces that hold together the universe. The forces that cause Andromeda to act as it does are the same forces we contend with here on Earth, whether we are planning to send a rocket into space or simply raise the walls for a new home. The same gravity that causes the stars of Andromeda to rotate and revolve also causes water to flow over hydroelectric dams here on Earth. Tonight, take a moment to look up at the stars. The forces out there are the same as the ones here on Earth. Through a study of physics, you may gain a greater understanding of the interconnectedness of everything we can see and know in this universe.
Think now about all of the technological devices that you use on a regular basis. Computers, smart phones, GPS systems, MP3 players, and satellite radio might come to mind. Next, think about the most exciting modern technologies that you have heard about in the news, such as trains that levitate above tracks, “invisibility cloaks” that bend light around them, and microscopic robots that fight cancer cells in our bodies. All of these groundbreaking advancements, commonplace or unbelievable, rely on the principles of physics. Aside from playing a significant role in technology, professionals such as engineers, pilots, physicians, physical therapists, electricians, and computer programmers apply physics concepts in their daily work. For example, a pilot must understand how wind forces affect a flight path and a physical therapist must understand how the muscles in the body experience forces as they move and bend. As you will learn in this text, physics principles are propelling new, exciting technologies, and these principles are applied in a wide range of careers.
In this text, you will begin to explore the history of the formal study of physics, beginning with natural philosophy and the ancient Greeks, and leading up through a review of Sir Isaac Newton and the laws of physics that bear his name. You will also be introduced to the standards scientists use when they study physical quantities and the interrelated system of measurements most of the scientific community uses to communicate in a single mathematical language. Finally, you will study the limits of our ability to be accurate and precise, and the reasons scientists go to painstaking lengths to be as clear as possible regarding their own limitations.
|Executive Interior Installation in Viking Model DHC-6-200, -300, and -400 Aircraft||E||3/26/2018|
|Amphibian Gear Advisory System MkII and Laser Gear Advisory System||C||01/11/2017|
|Service Manual & ICA for Lycoming IO-580-B1A Engine Installation in Cessna Model 182||B||05/26/2015|
|Service Manual & ICA McCauley Start Lock Installation||A||09/6/2016|
|206 Electric Hydraulic Ski pump for Fli-Lite skis||10/20/2004|
|AT-802 (Two Seat) Air Tractor Wipline Model 10000A Service Manual and Instructions for Continued Airworthiness||N||2/3/2021|
|Boss Beaver Service Manual||B||11/14/2012|
|Model 13000 Service Manual||H||2/3/2021|
|AT-802A (Single Seat) Air Tractor Wipline Model 10000A Service Manual and Instructions for Continued Airworthiness||V||2/3/2021|
|Model 8750 Service Manual||M||3/12/2021|
|Model 8000 Service Manual||P||2/3/2021|
|Model 7000 Service Manual||N||8/3/2020|
|Model 6000-6100 Service Manual||L||2/3/2021|
|Model 4000 Service Manual||G||2/3/2021|
|Model 3730 & 3900 Amphibious Float Wipline Service Manual||K||2/3/2021|
|Model 3000 & 3450 Service Manual||K||1/27/2021|
|Model 2100 & 2350 Service Manual||N||2/3/2021|
As noted above, accounting for provisions within Umoja is typically a manual process comprising the following key stages:
Overview of accounting entry process
Manual journal voucher entry - see section 3.1.1 below.
Manual journal voucher entry - see section 3.1.2 below.
Manual journal voucher entry - see section 3.1.3 below.
Manual journal voucher entry - see section 3.1.4 below.
Discounting and unwinding provisions
Manual journal voucher entry - see section 3.1.5 below.
The sections below describe in detail the procedures required to enter these transactions into Umoja, using the example of a legal case handled by the OLA to illustrate the accounting entries required.
GRC-206 Program Pacer Speak
This vehicle mounted system allows two operators, one Army and one Air Force to coordinate air strikes. Mort GRC-206 info on the MT-6250 web page with links to the rest of the components.
Designed to be installed in the M151, M113 and the HMMWV. The AN/MRC-144 is a mobile HF/VHF/UHF HAVE QUICK II capable communications facility (AN/GRC-206(V)3) mounted in an M-998 Highly Mobile Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). It provides single sideband (SSB) HF, VHF/FM, VHF/AM, and UHF communications. This system can be remoted up to two kilometers. The HF radio has secure phone patch capability and all radios have secure voice capability. Note the HMMWV has a trailer, probably with a MEP-802A diesel generator, fuel and storage for equipment. The army HMMWV mounted system is called the AN/TSQ-198 Tactical Terminal Control System (TTCS).
FAS AN/TSQ-198 TTCS web page with photos,
First VRC-83 Aircraft Radio
The VRC-83 combines the manpack RT-1319/PRC-113 dual band (116-150, 225-400 + 243 MHz guard) aircraft radio with the AM-7176 RF Amp and VRC-83 vehicle mount. The AM-7176 also contains the digital interface between the RT-1319 and the C-11169. This RT-1319 is the UHF-AM frequency hopping radio and so needs the Time Of Day (TOD). Frequency hopping is not a way to secure crypto cover for the message traffic, it is an anti jam measure. For that the KY-57 located just below the radio is used.
Each of the two VTC-83 radios is dedicated to one band. For example this one is the UHF-AM only. There's a couple of reasons for doing that. First, there are a number of UHF aircraft antennas that can be used but very few combined VHF & UHV aircraft band antennas. Second Have Quick frequency hopping is used in the UHF band but it's not clear if it's used in the VHF aircraft band. The O-1814 is only cabled to one of the VRC-83 radios and this is the one it would go to.
The way the C11166 Control is laid out confirms that one of the VRC-83 radios is dedicated to UHF-AM and the other one to VHF-AM. By using the same radio for two different functions there are benefits rather than use two different radios.
O-1814 Rubidium Frequency Standard
The O-1814 Rubidium Frequency Standard maintains the TOD with high accuracy. I think the reason for using a Rb frequency standard in this system while you don't see them in Army SINCGARS installations is the need for UTC accurate TOD. In the army application the net controller can set the TOD and download that time into all the netted radios. Even if the net control time is wrong all the radios will interoperate. But when an aircraft is inbound from someplace far away (the TOD on the aircraft was set at it's home base) the TOD of the aircraft and the Pacer Speak system need to be the same for the radios to interoperate. It is only used on the UHF-AM radio.
Second generation and newer UHF-AM radios incorporate Have Quick (Wiki) which includes the ability to transfer a precision Time Of Day over the air. This eliminates the need for an atomic clock in the GRC-206 system.
URC-113 HF Radio
The RT-1209 from a PRC-104 has the RT-1444 remote control add on, or the RT-1209A or B with built in remote interface are used with the AM-7148 Amplifier/Coupler Solid State 150 Watt amplifier works with the RT-1209 or the RT-1444 22.5 to 30 VDC input , 17.5 Amps at 27.5 VDC.
Starting with the (V)5 system the PRC-104 has been replaced with the PRC-150.
Storage Drawer above KY-65?
C-11169 Signal Distribution Unit (SDU)
SB-4151 DC Power Distribution Unit (PDU)
Second VRC-83 Aircraft Radio
KY-57 for VHF Low Band Radio
H-250 Storage Box above KY-57
Army VHF Low Band Radio
First generation systems used the RT-524 radio on the MT-1029. This is a VRC-12 series radio and has no remote control capability. The second generation systems use the RT-1439 first generation SINCGARS radios. I think in the dual radio mount allowing one of them to use an external RF power amplifier. These radios have limited remote control based on the audio tone system which can select a channel number but not setup a channel frequency or other channel setup parameters. The various newer RT-1523 versions have the same remote control capability but also include built-in voice security and so the third KY-57 is not needed.
Different versions of the GRC-206 system have used the different Army VHF-FM radios starting with either the RT-524 or the 10 channel RT-246 (it's not clear to me which) then the RT-1439 that has 6 channels as does the RT-1523. The operator can select which of the preprogrammed channels to use. The implication is that there's some commonality in the channel selection method for the VRC-12 series radios and the SINCGARS radios.
But the C-2742 used with the RT-246 uses a very basic one wire per channel type control whereas the SINCGARS radios use serial data stream via an audio modem. So there must have been a serial to parallel converter in the GRC-206 system when (if?) it was used with the RT-246. If that's the case then the serial protocol in the SINCGARS radios may have been made to the the same one?
C-11166 Two Operator Control Box
From the t2k Yahoo gaming group:
The AN/GRC-206 (V)1,3,5,6
V1 is model with no crypto and no Have Quick, can be sold to foreign governments
V3 has crypto KY-57 x 3 and KY-65 x 1 and SINCGARS VRC-83 are have quick II (TOD cable)
V5 replaced SDU, PDU, RSC, KY-65 and VRC-46. KY-65 replaced with KY-99 and VRC-46 replaced with SINGARS long range short range combo.
V6 replaced VRC-46 (rt 524 or 246) with dual SINGARS long short combo.
The GRC-206 mounted in the M-998 hummer is the way we use them for forward air control. In the hummer it is called the MRC-144. The 206 replaced the 155/MRC-107 and MRC-108 (old radio systems).