January 17, 2010 Israel and Haiti, Israel and Turkey, US and Iran - History

January 17, 2010 Israel and Haiti, Israel and Turkey, US and Iran - History

A Daily Analysis
By Marc Schulman

January 26, 2010 Netanyahu, Egypt Blames Iran, Shas and Israeli Beitenu

To say that Prime Minister Netanyahu is a man of contradictions, is an understatement. Netanyahu first made his name when he served as Israel’s Ambassador to UN. He became Israel's most effective advocate, since Abba Eban, and made his name as a great spokesman for Israel. And yet on Sunday, after meeting with George Mitchell talking about Israel’s willingness to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians, Netanyahu could not resist the impulse to visit various West Banks sites (all in what will become the settlement bloc if Israel reaches an agreement with the Palestinians). His visit, of course became the lead story out of the Middle East yesterday, showing off Netnayahu as being the obstructionist. This masked the important news of the day; news of Egyptian President Mubarak's speech yesterday. In that speech Mubarak spoke about the reasons Egypt was building a fence between Sinai and the Gaza Strip. Mubarak spoke about the reasons there is not peace in the Middle East- not mentioning Israel's positions, in fact, claiming that it is Iran’s meddling that has stopped any chance of Middle East peace from occurring.

Simultaneously, Abbas has been claiming he can not enter peace talks until Israel stops all settlement activity. However, I watched excerpts of the religious sermon given by the Minister of Religion during the weekly Friday services at the Palestinian Authority headquarters. The Minister stated that a Palestinian state had never been closer- what was holding it back was Iranian meddling. The Minister continued further, that if the Iranians had not meddled, there could have been a Palestinian state already. I suggest that Netanyhu just stop making meaningless gestures that slightly strengthen his domestic standing, and let the Egyptians and Palestinians point the finger in the right direction.

The Netanyahu coalition is not as strong as it would seem. Shas and Israel Beitenu are clearly at war with each other. Yisrael Beitenu’s major constituency are Russian immigrants-- and the biggest problems the Russians face, are connected to difficulties in converting or marrying. Every effort Yisrael Beitunu has taken to improve their situation has been blocked by Shas. To aggravate matters, PM Netanyahu has not intervened on behalf of Yisrael Beitenu. Yisrael Beitenu has responded by blocking one of Netanyahu’s most favored pieces of legislation- a bill to allow Israelis abroad vote. Netanyhu is convinced that Israelis abroad are mostly right of center and I think he is correct. Shas does not like Netanyahu’s law either, since it only allows Israelis who served in the army to register to vote.

Meanwhile, the Shas Minister of Interior was blocked from visiting the town of Charish, in the Galilee. Shas is trying to build a Charedi town that would take over Charish and a surrounding village, neither of which is religious.

Finally, the Israeli Ministry of Education has announced that Chinese would now be offered as language/ matriculation option in Israeli high schools.


Israel–United Arab Emirates relations

Israel–United Arab Emirates relations had been cool for several decades, but in the 2010s, the countries' informal relations improved considerably and they began engaging in extensive unofficial cooperation based on their joint opposition to Iran's nuclear program and regional influence. [1] [2] In 2015, Israel opened an official diplomatic mission in Abu Dhabi to the International Renewable Energy Agency. [3] [4] [5]

Israel–United Arab Emirates relations

Israel

United Arab Emirates
Diplomatic mission
Embassy of Israel, Abu DhabiEmbassy of United Arab Emirates, Tel Aviv
Envoy
Israeli Ambassador to United Arab Emirates
Eitan Na'eh
Emirati Ambassador to Israel
Mohamed Al Khaja

In a significant warming of official Israeli-UAE relations, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) formally agreed in August 2020 to "normalise" relations in a United States-brokered deal that also requires Israel to halt its plan to annex parts of the West Bank, including the Jordan Valley. [6] [7] A joint statement issued by the UAE, Israel and the United States said that the three countries had "agreed to the full normalization of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates". [8] [9] The signing ceremony was held on 15 September 2020. [10]

Turkey and Iran both criticised the agreement. [11] On 16 August 2020, the UAE for the first time established telephone links to Israel by unblocking direct dialling to Israel's +972 country code. [12] The first direct commercial flight from Israel to the UAE was an El Al flight on 31 August 2020. [13]

On 24 January 2021, the official Israeli embassy in the UAE was opened with Eitan Na’eh serving as an acting ambassador/Chargé d'affaires. [14] Mohamed Al Khaja was selected to be the first UAE ambassador to Israel [15]

On 30 May 2021, the embassy of the United Arab Emirates officially opened in Tel Aviv, with Mohamed Al Khaja serving as ambassador. [16]


Israel International Relations: International Recognition of Israel

On May 14, 1948, the day the British Mandate over Palestine expired, the Jewish People's Council officially approved a proclamation declaring the establishment and independence of the State of Israel.

The United States was the first country to recognize Israel when President Harry Truman granted de-facto recognition eleven minutes after the proclamation of independence. Three days later, the USSR granted Israel de-jure recognition. Nearly a year after its creation, on May 11, 1949, Israel was admitted as the 59th member of the United Nations.

At least 167 of the 193 UN member states officially recognize Israel with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and Bhutan the most recent in 2020. Twenty-nine countries have never recognized Israel, most are Arab/Muslim nations.

May 14, 1948 - December 31, 1948 (21 Countries)

January 1, 1949 - May 11, 1949 (33 Countries)

May 11, 1949 - Present (97 Countries)

Do Not Recognize Israel (26 Countries)

**- Iran, Chad, Cuba, Mauritania, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Tunisia, Oman, Qatar, and Venezuela recognized Israel on the above dates but have since rescinded that recognition.
***Chad restored ties in 2019. Morocco restored ties in 2020.

Unverified dates of recognition or non-recognition: Lesotho, Ghana, Gambia, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Togo, Tanzania, Zambia, Equatorial Guinea, Botswana, Bhutan, Central African Republic and Burundi

Sources: &ldquoInternational recognition of Israel,&rdquo Wikipedia.
Sabir Shah, &ldquo30 countries, including Pakistan, still do not recognise Israel,&rdquo The News, (August 22, 2020).
Ben Simon, &ldquoKosovo establishes Israel ties, to open embassy in Jerusalem,&rdquo AFP, (February 1, 2021).
News reports.

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Contents

As of November 2019, 123 states have ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute. [1]

State party [1] Signed Ratified or acceded Entry into force A1 [2] A2 [3] A3 [4] A4 [5] A5 [6] A6 [7]
Afghanistan 10 February 2003 1 May 2003
Albania 18 July 1998 31 January 2003 1 May 2003
Andorra 18 July 1998 30 April 2001 1 July 2002 In force In force Ratified
Antigua and Barbuda 23 October 1998 18 June 2001 1 July 2002
Argentina 8 January 1999 8 February 2001 1 July 2002 In force In force
Australia 9 December 1998 1 July 2002 1 September 2002
Austria 7 October 1998 28 December 2000 1 July 2002 In force In force Ratified
Bangladesh 16 September 1999 23 March 2010 1 June 2010
Barbados 8 September 2000 10 December 2002 1 March 2003
Belgium 10 September 1998 28 June 2000 1 July 2002 In force In force Ratified
Belize 5 April 2000 5 April 2000 1 July 2002
Benin 24 September 1999 22 January 2002 1 July 2002
Bolivia 17 July 1998 27 June 2002 1 September 2002 Ratified
Bosnia and Herzegovina 17 July 1998 11 April 2002 1 July 2002
Botswana 8 September 2000 8 September 2000 1 July 2002 In force In force
Brazil 7 February 2000 20 June 2002 1 September 2002
Bulgaria 11 February 1999 11 April 2002 1 July 2002
Burkina Faso 30 November 1998 16 April 2004 1 July 2004
Cambodia 23 October 2000 11 April 2002 1 July 2002
Canada 18 December 1998 7 July 2000 1 July 2002
Cape Verde 28 December 2000 10 October 2011 1 January 2012
Central African Republic 12 December 1999 3 October 2001 1 July 2002
Chad 20 October 1999 1 November 2006 1 January 2007
Chile 11 September 1998 29 June 2009 1 September 2009 In force In force
Colombia [A] 10 December 1998 5 August 2002 1 November 2002
Comoros 22 September 2000 18 August 2006 1 November 2006
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 8 September 2000 11 April 2002 1 July 2002
Congo, Republic of the 17 July 1998 3 May 2004 1 August 2004
Cook Islands 18 July 2008 1 October 2008
Costa Rica 7 October 1998 7 June 2001 1 July 2002 In force In force
Côte d'Ivoire [B] 30 November 1998 15 February 2013 1 May 2013
Croatia 12 October 1998 21 May 2001 1 July 2002 In force In force Ratified Ratified Ratified Ratified
Cyprus 15 October 1998 7 March 2002 1 July 2002 In force In force
Czech Republic 13 April 1999 21 July 2009 1 October 2009 In force In force Ratified Ratified Ratified
Denmark [C] 25 September 1998 21 June 2001 1 July 2002
Djibouti 7 October 1998 5 November 2002 1 February 2003
Dominica 12 February 2001 1 July 2002
Dominican Republic 8 September 2000 12 May 2005 1 August 2005
East Timor 6 September 2002 1 December 2002
Ecuador 7 October 1998 5 February 2002 1 July 2002 Ratified
El Salvador 3 March 2016 1 June 2016 In force In force
Estonia 27 December 1999 30 January 2002 1 July 2002 In force In force
Fiji 29 November 1999 29 November 1999 1 July 2002
Finland 7 October 1998 29 December 2000 1 July 2002 In force In force Ratified
France [D] 18 July 1998 9 June 2000 1 July 2002 Ratified
Gabon 22 December 1998 20 September 2000 1 July 2002
Gambia, The [E] 4 December 1998 28 June 2002 1 September 2002
Georgia 18 July 1998 5 September 2003 1 December 2003 In force In force
Germany 10 December 1998 11 December 2000 1 July 2002 In force In force
Ghana 18 July 1998 20 December 1999 1 July 2002
Greece 18 July 1998 15 May 2002 1 August 2002
Grenada 19 May 2011 1 August 2011
Guatemala 2 April 2012 1 July 2012
Guinea 7 September 2000 14 July 2003 1 October 2003
Guyana 28 December 2000 24 September 2004 1 December 2004 In force In force
Honduras 7 October 1998 1 July 2002 1 September 2002
Hungary 15 January 1999 30 November 2001 1 July 2002
Iceland 26 August 1998 25 May 2000 1 July 2002 In force
Ireland 7 October 1998 11 April 2002 1 July 2002 In force
Italy 18 July 1998 26 July 1999 1 July 2002 Ratified
Japan 17 July 2007 1 October 2007
Jordan 7 October 1998 11 April 2002 1 July 2002
Kiribati 26 November 2019 1 February 2020
Kenya 11 August 1999 15 March 2005 1 June 2005
Korea, South 8 March 2000 13 November 2002 1 February 2003
Latvia 22 April 1999 28 June 2002 1 September 2002 In force In force Ratified In force In force In force
Lesotho 30 November 1998 6 September 2000 1 July 2002
Liberia 17 July 1998 22 September 2004 1 December 2004
Liechtenstein 18 July 1998 2 October 2001 1 July 2002 In force In force
Lithuania 10 December 1998 12 May 2003 1 August 2003 In force In force
Luxembourg 13 October 1998 8 September 2000 1 July 2002 In force In force In force In force In force
Madagascar 18 July 1998 14 March 2008 1 June 2008
Malawi 2 March 1999 19 September 2002 1 December 2002
Maldives 21 September 2011 1 December 2011
Mali 17 July 1998 16 August 2000 1 July 2002
Malta 17 July 1998 29 November 2002 1 February 2003 In force In force
Marshall Islands 6 September 2000 7 December 2000 1 July 2002
Mauritius 11 November 1998 5 March 2002 1 July 2002 In force
Mexico 7 September 2000 28 October 2005 1 January 2006
Moldova 8 September 2000 12 October 2010 1 January 2011
Mongolia 29 December 2000 11 April 2002 1 July 2002
Montenegro [F] 23 October 2006 3 June 2006
Namibia 27 October 1998 25 June 2002 1 September 2002
Nauru 13 December 2000 12 November 2001 1 July 2002
Netherlands 18 July 1998 17 July 2001 1 July 2002 In force In force Ratified In force In force In force
New Zealand [G] 7 October 1998 7 September 2000 1 July 2002 Ratified Ratified Ratified Ratified
Niger 17 July 1998 11 April 2002 1 July 2002
Nigeria 1 June 2000 27 September 2001 1 July 2002
North Macedonia 7 October 1998 6 March 2002 1 July 2002 In force In force
Norway 28 August 1998 16 February 2000 1 July 2002 In force Ratified Ratified Ratified Ratified
Palestine [H] [I] 2 January 2015 1 April 2015 In force In force
Panama 18 July 1998 21 March 2002 1 July 2002 In force In force
Paraguay 7 October 1998 14 May 2001 1 July 2002 In force In force
Peru 7 December 2000 10 November 2001 1 July 2002
Poland 9 April 1999 12 November 2001 1 July 2002 In force In force
Portugal 7 October 1998 5 February 2002 1 July 2002 In force In force Ratified
Romania 7 July 1999 11 April 2002 1 July 2002 Ratified
Saint Kitts and Nevis 22 August 2006 1 November 2006
Saint Lucia 27 August 1999 18 August 2010 1 November 2010
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 December 2002 1 March 2003
Samoa 17 July 1998 16 September 2002 1 December 2002 In force In force
San Marino 18 July 1998 13 May 1999 1 July 2002 In force In force
Senegal 18 July 1998 2 February 1999 1 July 2002
Serbia 19 December 2000 6 September 2001 1 July 2002
Seychelles 28 December 2000 10 August 2010 1 November 2010
Sierra Leone 17 October 1998 15 September 2000 1 July 2002
Slovakia 23 December 1998 11 April 2002 1 July 2002 In force In force Ratified In force In force In force
Slovenia 7 October 1998 31 December 2001 1 July 2002 In force In force Ratified
South Africa [J] 17 July 1998 27 November 2000 1 July 2002
Spain 18 July 1998 24 October 2000 1 July 2002 In force In force
Suriname 15 July 2008 1 October 2008
Sweden 7 October 1998 28 June 2001 1 July 2002
Switzerland 18 July 1998 12 October 2001 1 July 2002 In force In force Ratified Ratified Ratified Ratified
Tanzania 29 December 2000 20 August 2002 1 November 2002
Tajikistan 30 November 1998 5 May 2000 1 July 2002
Trinidad and Tobago 23 March 1999 6 April 1999 1 July 2002 In force In force
Tunisia 24 June 2011 1 September 2011
Uganda 17 March 1999 14 June 2002 1 September 2002
United Kingdom [K] 30 November 1998 4 October 2001 1 July 2002
Uruguay 19 December 2000 28 June 2002 1 September 2002 In force In force
Vanuatu 2 December 2011 1 February 2012
Venezuela 14 October 1998 7 June 2000 1 July 2002
Zambia 17 July 1998 13 November 2002 1 February 2003

Withdrawal Edit

Article 127 of the Rome Statute allows for states to withdraw from the ICC. Withdrawal takes effect one year after notification of the depositary, and has no effect on prosecution that has already started. As of March 2018 four states have given formal notice of their intention to withdraw from the statute, [1] although two rescinded before it came into effect.

State party [1] Signed Ratified or acceded Entry into force Withdrawal notified Withdrawal effective Withdrawal rescinded
Burundi 13 January 1999 21 September 2004 1 December 2004 27 October 2016 27 October 2017
Gambia, The 4 December 1998 28 June 2002 1 September 2002 10 November 2016 10 February 2017
Philippines 28 December 2000 30 August 2011 1 November 2011 17 March 2018 [L] 17 March 2019
South Africa 17 July 1998 27 November 2000 1 July 2002 19 October 2016 7 March 2017

Several states have argued that the ICC is a tool of Western imperialism, only punishing leaders from small, weak states while ignoring crimes committed by richer and more powerful states. [12] [13] [14] This sentiment has been expressed particularly by African states, 34 of which are members of the ICC, due to a perceived disproportionate focus of the Court on Africa. Nine out of the ten situations which the ICC has investigated were in African countries. [15] [16]

In June 2009, several African states, including Comoros, Djibouti, and Senegal, called on African states parties to withdraw en masse from the statute in protest against the indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. [17] In September 2013, Kenya's National Assembly passed a motion to withdraw from the ICC in protest against the ICC prosecution of Kenyan Deputy President William Ruto and President Uhuru Kenyatta (both charged before coming into office). [18] A mass withdrawal from the ICC by African member states in response to the trial of Kenyan authorities was discussed at a special summit of the African Union in October. [19] The summit concluded that serving heads of state should not be put on trial, and that the Kenyan cases should be deferred. [20] However, the summit did not endorse the proposal for a mass withdrawal due to lack of support for the idea. [21] In November the ICC's Assembly of State Parties responded by agreeing to consider proposed amendments to the Rome Statute to address the AU's concerns. [22]

In October–November 2016, Burundi, South Africa, and The Gambia all notified the UNSG of their intention to withdraw from the ICC. Burundi was the subject of an ongoing preliminary investigation by the ICC at the time. [23] South Africa's exit followed its refusal to execute an ICC warrant for Sudan's al-Bashir when he was in the country. Following The Gambia's presidential election later that year, which ended the long rule of Yahya Jammeh, The Gambia rescinded its withdrawal notification. [1] The constitutionality of South Africa's notice was challenged by the Democratic Alliance opposition party, which argued that the approval of parliament was required and not sought. The High Court of South Africa ruled in February 2017 that the government's notification was not legal, and it was required to revoke the notice effective 7 March 2017. [1] A parliamentary bill on ICC withdrawal was subsequently withdrawn by the government. [24] However, the governing African National Congress party still supports withdrawing, [25] and in 2019 a new bill was put before Parliament to withdraw from the Statute. [26]

On March 14, 2018, Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippine President who is under preliminary examination by the ICC, announced that the country would withdraw from the Rome Statute. [27] He argued that while the Statute was ratified by the Senate of the Philippines in 2011, it was never published in the Official Gazette of the Philippines, a requirement for penal laws (of which the Rome Statute subscribes as such) to take effect. Hence, he claimed that the Philippines was never a State Party ab initio. Additionally, he stated that the ICC was being utilized as a political tool against weak targets such as the Philippines. The United Nations received the official notification of withdrawal on March 17, 2018 [28] one year later (March 17, 2019), by rule, the Philippines' withdrawal became official. The legal validity of the withdrawal was challenged at the Supreme Court of the Philippines, [10] was dismissed in a unanimous decision for being "moot and academic" [11] 2 years after the country's official withdrawal from the tribunal.

Implementing legislation Edit

The Rome Statute obliges states parties to cooperate with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes, including the arrest and surrender of suspects. [29] Part 9 of the Statute requires all states parties to “ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation which are specified under this Part”. [30]

Under the Rome Statute's complementarity principle, the Court only has jurisdiction over cases where the relevant state is unwilling or unable to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute the case itself. Therefore, many states parties have implemented national legislation to provide for the investigation and prosecution of crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the Court. [31]

As of April 2006, the following states had enacted or drafted implementing legislation: [32]

States Complementarity legislation Co-operation legislation
Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom Enacted Enacted
Colombia, Congo, Serbia, Montenegro Enacted Draft
Burundi, Costa Rica, Mali, Niger, Portugal Enacted None
France, Norway, Peru, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland Draft Enacted
Austria, Japan, Latvia, Romania None Enacted
Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominica, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Samoa, Senegal, Uganda, Uruguay, Zambia Draft Draft
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Hungary, Jordan, Panama, Venezuela Draft None
Mexico None Draft
Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cyprus, Djibouti, Fiji, the Gambia, Guinea, Guyana, Liberia, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mongolia, Namibia, Nauru, North Macedonia, Paraguay, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste None None

Summary of signatures and ratifications/accessions Edit

Date Signatures
December 31, 1998 72
December 31, 1999 93
December 31, 2000 139
Date Ratifications/accessions Remaining signatories
December 31, 1998 0 72
December 31, 1999 6 87
December 31, 2000 27 112
December 31, 2001 48 92
December 31, 2002 87 55
December 31, 2003 92 51
December 31, 2004 97 46
December 31, 2005 100 43
December 31, 2006 104 41
December 31, 2007 105
December 31, 2008 108 40
December 31, 2009 110 38
December 31, 2010 114 34
December 31, 2011 120 32
December 31, 2012 121
December 31, 2013 122 31
December 31, 2014
December 31, 2015 123
December 31, 2016 124
December 31, 2017 123 32
December 31, 2018 123
June 1, 2019 123 33

Allocation of judges Edit

The number of states parties from the several United Nations regional groups has an influence on the minimum number of judges each group is allocated. Paragraph 20(b) of the Procedure for the nomination and election of judges of the Court [33] states that any of the five regional groups shall have at least two judges on the court. If, however, a group has more than 16 states parties, there is a third judge allocated to that group.

The following table lists how many states parties there are from each regional group. After the accession of the Maldives on 1 December 2011, the Asian Group has become the last regional group to have three judges allocated. This already had consequences for the 2011 judges election. [34]

Group Number of states parties Number of judges allocated
African Group 34 3
Asian Group 19 3
Eastern European Group 18 3
Latin American and Caribbean Group 27 3
Western European and Others Group 25 3

Pursuant to article 12(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a state that is not a party to the Statute may, "by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question." Even if the state that does so is not a State Party to the Statute, the relevant provisions of the statute would still be applicable on the accepting state, but only on an ad hoc basis.

To date, the Court has made public five article 12(3) declarations. Additionally, a declaration was submitted in December 2013 by the Freedom and Justice Party of Egypt seeking to accept jurisdiction on behalf of Egypt. However, the Office of the Prosecutor found that as the party has lost power following the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état that July, it did not have the authority to make the declaration. [35] [36]

State [37] Date of acceptance Start of jurisdiction End of jurisdiction Date of membership
Côte d'Ivoire [B] 18 April 2003 19 September 2002 Indefinite 1 May 2013
Palestine [H] 21 January 2009 1 July 2002 Indefinite 1 April 2015
Ukraine [M] 9 April 2014 21 November 2013 22 February 2014 Non-member
Palestine [H] 31 December 2014 13 June 2014 Indefinite 1 April 2015
Ukraine [M] 8 September 2015 20 February 2014 Indefinite Non-member
Italicized entries signify that the declaration has been deemed invalid by the Office of the Prosecutor.

Of the 139 states that had signed the Rome Statute, 31 have not ratified. [1]

State [1] Signature
Algeria 28 December 2000
Angola 7 October 1998
Armenia 1 October 1999
Bahamas, The 29 December 2000
Bahrain 11 December 2000
Cameroon 17 July 1998
Egypt 26 December 2000
Eritrea 7 October 1998
Guinea-Bissau 12 September 2000
Haiti 26 February 1999
Iran 31 December 2000
Israel* [N] 31 December 2000
Jamaica 8 September 2000
Kuwait 8 September 2000
Kyrgyzstan 8 December 1998
Monaco 18 July 1998
Morocco 8 September 2000
Mozambique 28 December 2000
Oman 20 December 2000
Russia* [O] 13 September 2000
São Tomé and Príncipe 28 December 2000
Solomon Islands 3 December 1998
Sudan* [P] 8 September 2000
Syria 29 November 2000
Thailand 2 October 2000
Ukraine [M] 20 January 2000
United Arab Emirates 27 November 2000
United States* [Q] 31 December 2000
Uzbekistan 29 December 2000
Yemen 28 December 2000
Zimbabwe 17 July 1998
* = States which have declared that they no longer intend to ratify the treaty

According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a state that has signed but not ratified a treaty is obliged to refrain from "acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of the treaty. However, these obligations do not continue if the state has "made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty". [49] Four signatory states (Israel, Russia, Sudan, and the United States) have informed the UN Secretary General that they no longer intend to become parties to the Rome Statute, and as such have no legal obligations arising from their signature.

Bahrain Edit

The government of Bahrain originally announced in May 2006 that it would ratify the Rome Statute in the session ending in July 2006. [50] By December 2006, the ratification had not yet been completed, but the Coalition for the International Criminal Court said they expected ratification in 2007. [51]

Israel Edit

Israel voted against the adoption of the Rome Statute but later signed it for a short period. In 2002, Israel notified the UN Secretary General that it no longer intended to become a party to the Rome Statute, and as such, it has no legal obligations arising from their signature of the statute. [52]

Israel states that it has "deep sympathy" with the goals of the Court. However, it has concerns that political pressure on the Court would lead it to reinterpret international law or to "invent new crimes". It cites the inclusion of "the transfer of parts of the civilian population of an occupying power into occupied territory" as a war crime as an example of this, whilst at the same time disagrees with the exclusion of terrorism and drug trafficking. Israel sees the powers given to the prosecutor as excessive and the geographical appointment of judges as disadvantaging Israel which was prevented from joining any of the UN Regional Groups. [53]

Kuwait Edit

At a conference in 2007, the Kuwaiti Bar Association and the Secretary of the National Assembly of Kuwait, Hussein Al-Hereti, called for Kuwait to join the Court. [54]

Russia Edit

Russia signed the Rome Statute in 2000. On 14 November 2016 the ICC published a report on its preliminary investigation of the Russian military intervention in Ukraine which found that "the situation within the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol factually amounts to an on-going state of occupation" and that "information, such as reported shelling by both States of military positions of the other, and the detention of Russian military personnel by Ukraine, and vice-versa, points to direct military engagement between Russian armed forces and Ukrainian government forces that would suggest the existence of an international armed conflict in the context of armed hostilities in eastern Ukraine". [55] In response, a presidential decree by Russian President Vladimir Putin approved "sending the Secretary General of the United Nations notice of the intention of the Russian Federation to no longer be a party to the Rome Statute". [56] [57] Formal notice was given on 30 November. [58]

Sudan Edit

Sudan signed the Rome Statute in 2000. In 2005 the ICC opened an investigation into the war in Darfur, a region of Sudan. Omar al-Bashir, the President of Sudan, was indicted in 2009. On 26 August 2008, Sudan notified the UN Secretary General that it no longer intended to ratify the treaty and therefore no longer bears any legal obligations arising from its signature. [1] Following the 2019 Sudanese coup d'état, Sadiq al-Mahdi a former Prime Minister of Sudan who backs the opposition, called for Sudan to join the ICC. [59]

Thailand Edit

Former Senator Kraisak Choonhavan called in November 2006 for Thailand to ratify the Rome Statute and to accept retrospective jurisdiction, so that former premier Thaksin Shinawatra could be investigated for crimes against humanity connected to 2,500 alleged extrajudicial killings carried out in 2003 against suspected drug dealers. [60]

Ukraine Edit

A 2001 ruling of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine held that the Rome Statute is inconsistent with the Constitution of Ukraine. [61] Notwithstanding, in October 2006, the Ambassador to the United Nations stated that the Ukrainian government would submit a bill to the parliament to ratify the Statute. [62] Ukraine ratified Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court (APIC) without having ratified the Rome Statute on 2007-01-29. [63] On 4 April 2012, the Foreign Minister of Ukraine told the President of the International Criminal Court that "Ukraine intends to join the Rome Statute once the necessary legal preconditions have been created in the context of the upcoming review of the country’s constitution." [64] A bill to make the necessary constitutional amendments was tabled in Parliament in May 2014. [65] [66] Article 8 of the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement, which was signed in 2014, requires Ukraine to ratify the Rome Statute. In 2016 the Ukrainian parliament adopted the necessary constitutional amendments to allow for ratification of the treaty, however they will not enter into force for three years. [67]

United States Edit

The United States signed the Rome Statute in December 2000 (under President Bill Clinton), but Clinton decided not to submit the treaty to the United States Senate for ratification, stating: "I will not, and do not recommend that my successor [George W. Bush] submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns are satisfied." [68] Opponents of the ICC in the U.S. Senate are "skeptical of new international institutions and still jealously protective of American sovereignty" before the Rome Statute, opposition to the ICC was largely headed by Republican Senator Jesse Helms. [69] On May 6, 2002, the Bush administration stated that the U.S. did not intend to become a state party to the ICC in a letter to Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton stated that "the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty," and that "the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000." [70] This letter is sometimes called the "unsigning" of the treaty however, legal opinions on the actual legal effect of the letter differ, [71] with some scholars arguing that the president does not have the power to unilaterally "unsign" treaties. [72]

The United States "adopted a hostile stance towards the Court throughout most of the Bush presidency." [73] In 2002, Congress enacted the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA), which was signed into law on August 2, 2002 the "overriding purpose of the ASPA was to inhibit the U.S. government from supporting the ICC." [73] Major provisions of the ASPA blocked U.S. funding of the ICC and required the U.S. "to enter into agreements with all ICC signatory states to shield American citizens abroad from ICC jurisdiction, under the auspices of Article 98 of the Rome Statute," which bars the ICC "from prosecuting individuals located on the territory of an ICC member state, where such action by the Court would cause the member state to violate the terms of any other bilateral or multilateral treaty to which it is a party." [73] Traditionally, Article 98 was used in relation to traditional status of forces agreements (SOFAs) and status of mission agreements (SOMAs), in which nations hosting U.S. military personnel by invitation agreed to immunize them from prosecution in foreign courts. [73] The Bush administration, supported by opponents of the ICC in Congress, adopted a new strategy of aggressively pursuing Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs), "which guarantee immunity from ICC prosecution for all American citizens in the country with which the agreement is concluded" rather than just U.S. military forces. [73] "Under the original ASPA, nations who refused to conclude BIAs with the United States were subject to sanctions, including the loss of military aid (though these provisions have since been repealed)." [73] As of December 2006, the U.S. State Department reported that it had signed 102 BIAs. [74] In 2002, the United States threatened to veto the renewal of all United Nations peacekeeping missions unless its troops were granted immunity from prosecution by the Court. [75] In a compromise move, the Security Council passed Resolution 1422 on 12 July 2002, granting immunity to personnel from ICC non-states parties involved in United Nations established or authorized missions for a renewable twelve-month period. [75] This was renewed for twelve months in 2003 but the Security Council refused to renew the exemption again in 2004, after pictures emerged of US troops abusing Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib, and the US withdrew its demand. [76]

Under the Obama administration, the U.S. did not take moves to ratify the Rome Statute, but did adopt a "cautious, case-by-case approach to supporting the ICC" by supporting cases before the ICC. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the U.S. encouraged "effective ICC action in ways that promote U.S. interests by bringing war criminals to justice." [73] U.S. steps in support of the ICC undertaken under the Obama administration included participating in the annual Assembly of States Parties as an observer using the U.S.'s permanent seat on the UN Security Council to support the referral of cases to the ICC (including the Libya in 2011) "sharing intelligence on fugitives and providing other substantial in-kind support" to the ICC and expanding the War Crimes Rewards Program." [73]

The Trump administration strained relations with the ICC, stating it would revoke visas for any ICC staff seeking to investigate Americans for war crimes. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that such revocations could be applied to any staff involved with investigating war crimes committed by Israel or other allied nations as well. [77]

Yemen Edit

On 24 March 2007, the Yemeni parliament voted to ratify the Rome Statute. [78] [79] However, some MPs claim that this vote breached parliamentary rules, and demanded another vote. In that further vote, the ratification was retracted. [80]

The deadline for signing the Rome Statute expired following 31 December 2000. States that did not sign before that date have to accede to the Statute in a single step.

Of all the states that are members of the United Nations, observers in the United Nations General Assembly, or otherwise recognized by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as states with full treaty-making capacities, [81] there are 41 which have neither signed nor acceded to the Statute:

  • Azerbaijan
  • Belarus
  • Bhutan
  • Brunei
  • China
  • Cuba
  • Equatorial Guinea
  • Ethiopia
  • India
  • Indonesia
  • Iraq
  • Kazakhstan
  • Korea, North
  • Laos
  • Lebanon
  • Libya
  • Malaysia[R]
  • Mauritania
  • Micronesia
  • Myanmar
  • Nepal
  • Nicaragua
  • Niue
  • Pakistan
  • Palau
  • Papua New Guinea
  • Qatar
  • Rwanda
  • Saudi Arabia
  • Singapore
  • Somalia
  • South Sudan
  • Sri Lanka

Additionally, in accordance with practice and declarations filed with the Secretary-General, the Rome Statute is not in force in the following dependent territories:

  • Guernsey – a Crown dependency of the United Kingdom
  • Jersey – a Crown dependency of the United Kingdom
  • Tokelau – a territory of New Zealand

China Edit

The People's Republic of China has opposed the Court, on the basis that it goes against the sovereignty of nation states, that the principle of complementarity gives the Court the ability to judge a nation's court system, that war crimes jurisdiction covers internal as well as international conflicts, that the Court's jurisdiction covers peacetime crimes against humanity, that the inclusion of the crime of aggression weakens the role of the UN Security Council, and that the Prosecutor's right to initiate prosecutions may open the Court to political influence. [84]

India Edit

The government of India has consistently opposed the Court. It abstained in the vote adopting the statute in 1998, saying it objected to the broad definition adopted of crimes against humanity the rights given to the UN Security Council to refer and delay investigations and bind non-states parties and the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction not being explicitly criminalized. [85] Other anxieties about the Court concern how the principle of complementarity would be applied to the Indian criminal justice system, the inclusion of war crimes for non-international conflicts, and the power of the Prosecutor to initiate prosecutions. [86]

Indonesia Edit

Indonesia has stated that it supports the adoption of the Rome Statute, and that “universal participation should be the cornerstone of the International Criminal Court”. [87] In 2004, the President of Indonesia adopted a National Plan of Action on Human Rights, which states that Indonesia intends to ratify the Rome Statute in 2008. [87] This was confirmed in 2007 by Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda and the head of the Indonesian People's Representative Council's Committee on Security and International Affairs, Theo L. Sambuaga. [88] In May 2013, Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro stated that the government needed "more time to carefully and thoroughly review the pros and cons of the ratification". [89]

Iraq Edit

In February 2005, the Iraqi Transitional Government decided to ratify the Rome Statute. However, two weeks later they reversed this decision, [90] a move that the Coalition for the International Criminal Court claimed was due to pressure from the United States. [91]

Lebanon Edit

In March 2009, Lebanese Justice Minister said the government had decided not to join for now. The Coalition for the International Criminal Court claimed this was due in part to "intense pressure" from the United States, who feared it could result in the prosecution of Israelis in a future conflict. [92]

Malaysia Edit

Malaysia submitted an instrument of accession to the Rome Statute on 4 March 2019, which was to enter into force on 1 June. [82] However, on 29 April 2019 Malaysia submitted a notice withrawing its instrument of accession effective immediately to the Secretary General of the United Nations, preventing it from acceding. [83] Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad explained that the withdrawal was due to concerns over its constitutionality as well as possible infringement of the sovereignty of the Malay Rulers. [93]

Nepal Edit

On 25 July 2006, the Nepalese House of Representatives directed the government to ratify the Rome Statute. Under Nepalese law, this motion is compulsory for the Executive. [94]

Following a resolution by Parliament requesting that the government ratify the Statute, Narahari Acharya, Ministry of Law, Justice, Constituent Assembly and Parliamentary Affairs of Nepal, said in March 2015 that it had "formed a taskforce to conduct a study about the process". However, he said that it was "possible only after promulgating the new constitution", which was being debated by the 2nd Nepalese Constituent Assembly. [95] [96]

Pakistan Edit

Pakistan has supported the aims of the International Court and voted for the Rome Statute in 1998. However, Pakistan has not signed the agreement on the basis of several objections, including the fact that the Statute does not provide for reservations upon ratification or accession, the inclusion of provisional arrest, and the lack of immunity for heads of state. In addition, Pakistan (one of the largest suppliers of UN peacekeepers) has, like the United States, expressed reservations about the potential use of politically motivated charges against peacekeepers. [97]

South Sudan Edit

South Sudan's President Salva Kiir Mayardit said in 2013 that the country would not join the ICC. [98]

Turkey Edit

Turkey is currently a candidate country to join the European Union, which has required progress on human rights issues in order to continue with accession talks. Part of this has included pressure, but not a requirement, on Turkey to join the Court which is supported under the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. [99] Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated in October 2004 that Turkey would "soon" ratify the Rome Statute, [100] and the Turkish constitution was amended in 2004 to explicitly allow nationals to be surrendered to the Court. [101] However, in January 2008, the Erdoğan government reversed its position, deciding to shelve accession because of concerns it could undermine efforts against the Kurdistan Workers Party. [102]


Haiti earthquake aid pledged by country

One year ago today Haiti was hit by an earthquake which devastated its already fragile infrastructure.

In the months since the quake we at the datablog have been keeping track of the aid pledged and the uncommitted pledges. We found a particularly interesting set of data from Relief Web that shows:

  • the amount of money pledged by each country and each aid agency
  • the projects that are expecting funds and have received funds
  • how much of the money pledged has actually got through to the projects intended.

Now we would like to present the whole year of Relief Web data showing the total funding for Haiti since the earthquake. Obviously throughout the year Haitian's have faced other problems such as the Cholera outbreak in the latter part of 2010, and funding addressed at these problems is included in the yearly picture.

The Relief Web site sums up the funding situation from January to December 2010 as: the requested amount of aid was $1.5bn and the funding received was $1bn, despite receiving pledges for $2.8m.

The funding situation so far for Haiti in 2011 according to Relief Web is that $906m are requested to for aid projects and funding so far has been $44m.

This diagram shows the committed pledges by country and by organsiation for all of 2010.

The data below shows the pledged and uncommitted pledges for each country, each aid agency and each project that is expecting aid. Please tell us what you think will add to this data.


Measuring and Assessing Well-being in Israel

This report provides a description of the level, distribution, and sustainability of well-being in Israel. It examines well-being in Israel in the context of the Israeli government's recent initiative to develop indicators of well-being, resilience, and sustainability, and provides a complementary account of well-being in Israel with a stronger focus on international comparisons.

Official visit of OECD Secretary-General in Israel

Mr. Angel Gurría, Secretary-General of the OECD, was in Israel on 31 January - 1 February 2016 on an official visit and to commemorate the 5th anniversary of Israel's accession to the OECD.

OECD Observer: Special focus on Israel's economy

From innovation to the banking sector, investment policy, tourism, immigration and employment, read this profile of Israel's economy. Includes interview with Yuval Steinitz, minister of finance.

On 21 August 2010, Israel deposited its instrument of accession to the OECD Convention, thereby becoming a member of the Organisation. Israel was invited by OECD countries to open negotiations for membership in May 2007. On 10 May 2010, OECD countries .


The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process

On September 13, 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Negotiator Mahmoud Abbas signed a Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, commonly referred to as the “Oslo Accord,” at the White House. Israel accepted the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians, and the PLO renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace. Both sides agreed that a Palestinian Authority (PA) would be established and assume governing responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip over a five-year period. Then, permanent status talks on the issues of borders, refugees, and Jerusalem would be held. While President Bill Clinton’s administration played a limited role in bringing the Oslo Accord into being, it would invest vast amounts of time and resources in order to help Israel and the Palestinians implement the agreement. By the time Clinton left office, however, the peace process had run aground, and a new round of Israeli-Palestinian violence had begun.

The Clinton Administration and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, 1993–1996

The Clinton administration did not initially make Israeli-Palestinian peace a priority. Clinton and his advisors believed that a diplomatic breakthrough on the Israeli-Syrian track would be more likely, and that Israel’s leaders would find it politically easier to pull back from the Golan Heights than to withdraw from the West Bank. An Israeli-Syrian agreement, they reasoned, would also lead to an Israeli-Lebanese agreement, and help isolate Iraq and Iran, the principal regional opponents of the peace process. U.S. officials were briefed on secret negotiations that the Israelis and Palestinians had begun in Oslo in December 1992, but made little effort to get involved in them.

The United States did not play a major role in the negotiations that led to the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of October 1994, though Clinton lent his support by hosting King Hussein and Rabin in Washington and urging Congress to forgive Jordan’s debts. Nor did the United States play a critical part in the negotiations leading up to the May 1994 Cairo Agreement, which finalized Israel’s withdrawal from most of Gaza and Jericho, or the Taba (or "Oslo II") Agreement of September 1995. The latter agreement divided the West Bank into separate areas under Israeli control, Palestinian control, and Israeli military responsibility with Palestinian civil administration, respectively. Oslo II aslo spelled out provisions for elections, civil/legal affairs, and other bilateral Israeli-Palestinian cooperation on various issues. Since the Oslo Accord did not give the United States monitoring responsibilities, the Clinton administration found itself largely confined to defusing crises and building up the Palestinian Authority with economic aid and security assistance.

On the Israeli-Syrian track, the administration exerted itself more forcefully, but with few results. Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher , and Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross tried to build on Rabin’s August 1993 promise to withdraw fully from the Golan if Syria agreed to full peace and necessary security arrangements. By 1994, these talks stalled over Israel and Syria’s different definitions of “full withdrawal.” The Syrians insisted that the Israelis should withdraw to the line of “June 4, 1967,” when they had controlled a pocket of land on the northeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee, Israel’s principal source of water. The Israelis wanted to pull back to the 1923 international border, which would have left the Sea of Galilee under their sovereignty. That July, Rabin indicated to Christopher that Israel would withdraw to the June 4 line if Syria met its other needs, paving the way for talks between Israeli and Syrian military officers. However, these negotiations eventually bogged down over whether Israel could retain early warning stations on the Golan, and also became politically controversial in Israel. Rabin thus chose to suspend them until after Israel’s elections in 1996.

In November 1995, Rabin was assassinated by Yigal Amir , an Israeli who opposed the Oslo Accords on religious grounds. Rabin’s murder was followed by a string of terrorist attacks by Hamas, which undermined support for the Labor Party in Israel’s May 1996 elections. New Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu hailed from the Likud Party, which had historically opposed Palestinian statehood and withdrawal from the occupied territories.

Worried that the peace process might collapse, the Clinton administration involved itself more actively in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. In January 1997, following intensive U.S. mediation, Israel and the PA signed the Hebron Protocol, which provided for the transfer of most of Hebron to Palestinian control. In October 1998, Clinton hosted Netanyahu and Arafat at the Wye River Plantation, where they negotiated an agreement calling for further Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank. Infighting over the implementation of the Wye Memorandum, however, brought down Netanyahu’s government in January 1999.

In Israel’s May 1999 elections, the Labor Party’s Ehud Barak decisively defeated Netanyahu. Barak predicted that he could reach agreements with both Syria and the Palestinians in 12 to 15 months, and pledged to withdraw Israeli troops from southern Lebanon. In September, Barak signed the Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum with Arafat, which committed both sides to begin permanent status negotiations. An initial round of meetings, however, achieved nothing, and by December the Palestinians suspended talks over settlement-building in the occupied territories.

Barak then focused on Syria. In January 2000, Israeli, Syrian, and U.S. delegations convened in West Virginia for peace talks. These negotiations foundered when Barak refused to reaffirm Rabin’s pledge to withdraw to the June 4, 1967 line, arguing that none of the concessions offered by the Syrian delegation in return could be considered final, since Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad was not present. A subsequent meeting between Clinton and Asad in Geneva failed to produce an Israeli-Syrian accord.

Barak then withdrew Israeli forces unilaterally from Lebanon and returned to the Palestinian track. At the prime minister’s insistence, Clinton convened a summit at Camp David in July 2000, where he, Barak, and Arafat attempted to reach a final agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Accounts differ as to why Camp David failed, but it is clear that despite additional concessions by Barak, the Israelis and Palestinians remained strongly at odds over borders, Jerusalem, and whether Israel would recognize Palestinian refugees’ “right of return.” The summit ended without a settlement Clinton would blame Arafat for its failure.

On September 28, riots erupted following a visit of Likud Party leader Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount, and soon escalated into a wave of Israeli-Palestinian violence that became known as the al-Aqsa Intifada. In December 2000, Clinton put forward his own proposals for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. By this point, however, the president was leaving office, Barak faced electoral defeat, and Israeli-Palestinian violence continued unabated.

Thus, by the end of 2000, the prospect of ending the Arab-Israeli conflict looked more distant than it had eight years earlier. The Clinton administration had helped facilitate Israeli-Jordanian peace and lay the foundations for Palestinian self-rule. More broadly, the negotiations of the 1990s helped Israel, the Palestinians, and Syria break with numerous diplomatic taboos and establish a basis for what a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace might look like. But a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict remained elusive.


Israel chooses to buy Lockheed’s CH-53K over Boeing’s CH-47

JERUSALEM — Israel has decided to purchase Lockheed Martin’s CH-53K helicopter over the Boeing-made CH-47, the Defense Ministry announced Feb. 25.

The move is seen as essential for Israel, as its older CH-53 Sea Stallion “Yasur” helicopters have been in use since the 1960s.

Defense Minister Benny Gantz said the decision to purchase new heavy-lift helicopters for the Air Force is a significant step in further building up the Israel Defense Force’s capabilities. “It is also essential to the IDF’s ability to carry out a wide range of operational activities. The new helicopter is adapted to the [Air Force’s] operational requirements and to the challenges of the changing battlefield,” he added.

In a statement, his ministry said: “The decision was made following a professional assessment that included test flights in all the proposed aircraft, as well as a thorough examination of the various alternatives in terms of engineering, technology, maintenance and other considerations. All details, including the number of helicopters requested, will be brought to the approval of the Ministerial Committee for Procurement as soon as possible.”

Israel has lost several of its CH-53s to crashes. Two crashed in 1997 during a midair collision, and a November 2019 crash was blamed on a defect reportedly identified by Lockheed subsidiary Sikorsky but allegedly not relayed to the IDF. Grounded in 2019 due to the technical concerns, the aircraft were cleared to fly again in January 2020. In separate events, other helicopters made emergency landings in January and April that year. And Israel once procured five U.S. Navy CH-53s through the U.S. Defense Department for spare parts.

The Yasur fleet received upgrades over the years with an electronic warfare suite, according to The Drive. Israel also trained with the fleet for aerial refueling with the C-130 Karnaf planes used by the country. Israel’s 118th and 114th squadrons operate the CH-53, as does is search and rescue Unit 669. Israel has 23 of the helicopters and is thought to be purchasing between 20 and 25, according to previous reports.

In 2017, when Israel was weighing the purchase of a heavy-lift helicopter, the cost of the CH-53K was given as $87 million, compared to $38 million for the Chinook. In 2018, reports indicated Israel was leaning toward the Chinook. A final decision was expected when a new government formed in the spring of 2020.

Israel has not said when the CH-53K helos will be delivered or the current cost of the procurement. Recently, a CH-53 has cost up to $131 million.


U.S. Department of State

Front Matter
03/11/10 Preface
03/11/10 Overview and Acknowledgements
03/11/10 Introduction

Africa
03/11/10 Angola
03/11/10 Benin
03/11/10 Botswana
03/11/10 Burkina Faso
03/11/10 Burundi
03/11/10 Cameroon
03/11/10 Cape Verde
03/11/10 Central African Republic
03/11/10 Chad
03/11/10 Comoros
03/11/10 Congo, Democratic Republic of the
03/11/10 Congo, Republic of the
03/11/10 Cote d'Ivoire
03/11/10 Djibouti
03/11/10 Equatorial Guinea
03/11/10 Eritrea
03/11/10 Ethiopia
03/11/10 Gabon
03/11/10 Gambia, The
03/11/10 Ghana
03/11/10 Guinea
03/11/10 Guinea-Bissau
03/11/10 Kenya
03/11/10 Lesotho
03/11/10 Liberia
03/11/10 Madagascar
03/11/10 Malawi
03/11/10 Mali
03/11/10 Mauritania
03/11/10 Mauritius
03/11/10 Mozambique
03/11/10 Namibia
03/11/10 Niger
03/11/10 Nigeria
03/11/10 Rwanda
03/11/10 Sao Tome and Principe
03/11/10 Senegal
03/11/10 Seychelles
03/11/10 Sierra Leone
03/11/10 Somalia
03/11/10 South Africa
03/11/10 Sudan
03/11/10 Swaziland
03/11/10 Tanzania
03/11/10 Togo
03/11/10 Uganda
03/11/10 Zambia
03/11/10 Zimbabwe

East Asia and the Pacific
03/11/10 Australia
03/11/10 Brunei Darussalam
03/11/10 Burma
03/11/10 Cambodia
03/11/10 China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)
03/11/10 Taiwan
03/11/10 Fiji
03/11/10 Indonesia
03/11/10 Japan
03/11/10 Kiribati
03/11/10 Korea, Democratic People's Republic of
03/11/10 Korea, Republic of
03/11/10 Laos
03/11/10 Malaysia
03/11/10 Marshall Islands
03/11/10 Micronesia, Federated States of
03/11/10 Mongolia
03/11/10 Nauru
03/11/10 New Zealand
03/11/10 Palau
03/11/10 Papua New Guinea
03/11/10 Philippines
03/11/10 Samoa
03/11/10 Singapore
03/11/10 Solomon Islands
03/11/10 Thailand
03/11/10 Timor-Leste
03/11/10 Tonga
03/11/10 Tuvalu
03/11/10 Vanuatu
03/11/10 Vietnam

Europe and Eurasia
03/11/10 Albania
03/11/10 Andorra
03/11/10 Armenia
03/11/10 Austria
03/11/10 Azerbaijan
03/11/10 Belarus
03/11/10 Belgium
03/11/10 Bosnia and Herzegovina
03/11/10 Bulgaria
03/11/10 Croatia
03/11/10 Cyprus
03/11/10 Czech Republic
03/11/10 Denmark
03/11/10 Estonia
03/11/10 Finland
03/11/10 France
03/11/10 Georgia
03/11/10 Germany
03/11/10 Greece
03/11/10 Hungary
03/11/10 Iceland
03/11/10 Ireland
03/11/10 Italy
03/11/10 Kosovo
03/11/10 Latvia
03/11/10 Liechtenstein
03/11/10 Lithuania
03/11/10 Luxembourg
03/11/10 Macedonia
03/11/10 Malta
03/11/10 Moldova
03/11/10 Monaco
03/11/10 Montenegro
03/11/10 Netherlands
03/11/10 Norway
03/11/10 Poland
03/11/10 Portugal
03/11/10 Romania
03/11/10 Russia
03/11/10 San Marino
03/11/10 Serbia
03/11/10 Slovakia
03/11/10 Slovenia
03/11/10 Spain
03/11/10 Sweden
03/11/10 Switzerland
03/11/10 Turkey
03/11/10 Ukraine
03/11/10 United Kingdom

Near East and North Africa
03/11/10 Algeria
03/11/10 Bahrain
03/11/10 Egypt
03/11/10 Iran
03/11/10 Iraq
03/11/10 Israel and the occupied territories
03/11/10 Jordan
03/11/10 Kuwait
03/11/10 Lebanon
03/11/10 Libya
03/11/10 Morocco
03/11/10 Western Sahara
03/11/10 Oman
03/11/10 Qatar
03/11/10 Saudi Arabia
03/11/10 Syria
03/11/10 Tunisia
03/11/10 United Arab Emirates
03/11/10 Yemen

South and Central Asia
03/11/10 Afghanistan
03/11/10 Bangladesh
03/11/10 Bhutan
03/11/10 India
03/11/10 Kazakhstan
03/11/10 Kyrgyz Republic
03/11/10 Maldives
03/11/10 Nepal
03/11/10 Pakistan
03/11/10 Sri Lanka
03/11/10 Tajikistan
03/11/10 Turkmenistan
03/11/10 Uzbekistan

Western Hemisphere
03/11/10 Antigua and Barbuda
03/11/10 Argentina
03/11/10 Bahamas, The
03/11/10 Barbados
03/11/10 Belize
03/11/10 Bolivia
03/11/10 Brazil
03/11/10 Canada
03/11/10 Chile
03/11/10 Colombia
03/11/10 Costa Rica
03/11/10 Cuba
03/11/10 Dominica
03/11/10 Dominican Republic
03/11/10 Ecuador
03/11/10 El Salvador
03/11/10 Grenada
03/11/10 Guatemala
03/11/10 Guyana
03/11/10 Haiti
03/11/10 Honduras
03/11/10 Jamaica
03/11/10 Mexico
03/11/10 Nicaragua
03/11/10 Panama
03/11/10 Paraguay
03/11/10 Peru
03/11/10 Saint Kitts and Nevis
03/11/10 Saint Lucia
03/11/10 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
03/11/10 Suriname
03/11/10 Trinidad and Tobago
03/11/10 Uruguay
03/11/10 Venezuela

Related Material
03/11/10 Remarks to the Press on the Release of the 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Washington, DC
03/11/10 Briefing on the Release of the 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Assistant Secretary Michael H. Posner, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Washington, DC
03/02/10 Rollout of the 2009 Human Rights Report Assistant Secretary Michael H. Posner, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Washington, DC


Israel Population History

During the establishment of the State of Israel, there were only 806,000 residents. In 1949, the population crossed over the one million mark. Nine years later, in 1958, the population crossed the two million mark, indicating a strong positive population growth rate.

In early 1994, Israel had a population of approximately 5.3 million people. Of this, 81.5% were Jewish, 14.1% were Muslim and 2.7% were Christian, while 1.7% was comprised of Druze and others. The main factor that led to positive population growth was the large number of Jewish immigrants that arrived from all corners of the world. In 1948-1951, there were approximately 687,000 who arrived at the shore of the State of Israel. The majority of these were survivors from the Nazi extermination camps located in Europe, as well as members of communities whose migration originated from the Arab countries in Asia and North Africa.

As a result of this immigration, Israel’s population doubled in less than four years. In the years of 1955-1957, 1961-64 and 1969-74, smaller migration troops also settled in the country. The growth increment in these years was 30%-45%, with 35-50% of this figure being a result of the migration balance. The influx arising from migration was sometimes low and in 1974 it settled to an all-time low until the period of 1990-93, when thousands of Jews migrated from what was then the Soviet Union.

The immigration, as well as stability natural population increase, resulted in a population growth from 17% in the 1980s (of which migration accounted for 6%) to 40 per thousand (of which migration contributed over two-thirds). Emigration from Israel, though playing a small part, was also significant in the migration balance: 20% of emigration, as well as 30% in 1983-92, significantly reduced the population.

The rate of natural population also decreased from 21.6 per thousand in the late 1950s to 15-17 per thousand recorded, despite fluctuations in the past decade. Some of the factors leading to the decrease were life expectancy and fertility rate, as well as age structures of different population groups.

The fertility rate, or the number of children a woman had, fluctuated under different population groups in the 1950-60s. Well-off families were able to keep the number of children down while poor families saw the number of children born shoot up. In the 1960s, the rate was more than 9 among Muslims and about 3.4 among Jews. It then narrowed down in the 1970-80s. Total fertility declined among Asian/African Jews, Christians, Muslims and the Druze as well as European/American Jews. The rates were 2.61 among Jews, 4.68 for Muslims, 2.03 among Christians and 3.76 for Druze and others.


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